

Charles Schottland  
Interviewed by Frances Lomas Feldman  
In his hotel room, Del Capri, West Los Angeles  
January 5, 7, & 8, 1987

*Charles Schottland was an important California social work leader whose influence as a social worker professional was felt nationally and internationally as he played important roles in the California State Relief Administration, the California State Department of Social Welfare, the Jewish Federation of Agencies in Los Angeles, the United States Children's Bureau, the Social Security Administration, and military government during World War II in Europe. He also was Dean of the Heller School of Social Policy at Brandeis University, as well as President of that University. Often concurrently with his agency activities, he devoted much time and talent as a volunteer chair or member of committees and boards of social agencies and professional social work organizations. In addition to his social work education, he held a law degree. The eight hours of interview in this history describe his various positions, how he got them, what he did in them, and the political and social climate in which his activities were pursued. On retirement from Brandeis University at age 72, he devoted much of his time and energies as a volunteer in a variety of organizations addressing the needs of the aging.*

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FELDMAN: Charles, give us a little picture of your background in terms of your activity in California and nationally; just a quick run down. I have the *Who's Who*, but I would like to know this from you.

SCHOTTLAND: Let me give you a quick background. My first job in the social work field was while I was still a senior at UCLA and became a part-time case worker at the Jewish Big Brother's Association in Los Angeles. I stayed with them until the middle of 1928 when I got a scholarship to graduate school for Jewish Social Work, which is no longer in existence. We took our regular social work courses at the old New York School of Philanthropy, later changed to the New York School of Social Work, and still later became the Columbia University School of Social Work. And we took special courses at the Jewish School.

I came back to organize the Jewish Center Association of Los Angeles. I was a member at that time and the director of the social center, the first Jewish Center in Los Angeles. When the emergency struck during the stock crash in the Depression of the 1930s, I became a field representative in the State Relief Administration and from there rose up the ranks into a number of positions. First I was director of social work; I forget what it was called, maybe director of social services; then assistant director of the State Relief Administration, then the deputy director, and then I was appointed by the governor as administrator. It was Frank Merriam. By the way, he was an arch reactionary. We became very close personal friends. Then I went on in

1936 to become the director of Jewish Welfare Administration and had a great deal of contact with public programs as well as local social welfare programs over and above the work of the Jewish Federation and its constituent agencies. I was on several committees of the Council of Social Agencies at the time. I was on the Agency's Committee, which divided relief funds among the voluntary agencies. I headed a committee on adoptions of the Council of Social Agencies and was Chairman of the Research Committee of the Council of Social Agencies. From there I left, in 1940, to become Assistant Chief of the United States Children's Bureau and had under my supervision and direction, the welfare side of the Children's Bureau. The other side was the health side and, incidently, I was the first male on the welfare side. All of the previous executives on the welfare side had been single, never-married women. I went from there on loan to set up the Day Care Program for Children of Working Mothers in the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services, which was created by the War Manpower Commission. From there I went into the Army. Through a series of jobs in the Army, and training at the School of Military Government, I became Chief of the Processing Center Section on Eisenhower's staff. This was the section in charge of the camps, slave labor camps, and the displaced person camps. The Displaced Persons Branch was divided into two sections. One had charge of the camps, I was chief of that and in charge of transporting people into their countries of origin, which was under a British Officer.

I came back to the United States looking for a major job with a reasonable income. Before I left the Army, I got the job as administrator of the Jewish Child Care Association of New York, which was then the largest private child placing agency in the United States. They had two institutions: Pleasantville, which was a typical child care congregate institution; and

Cottageclan, and one for mentally retarded boys; and a number of programs; some 2400 children were in 24-hour care through foster care. At that time there was a great argument in the social work profession: foster homes versus institutions. I think the staff were almost exclusively graduates of the University of Pennsylvania School of social Work. Some 80 of them felt “institutional care” was a dirty word, and so children who really could not get along with adults because of past background were put into foster homes. There were outstanding failures in many cases, and so we developed an assessment group that would diagnose and decide whether the child went into the foster home or to one of the institutions.

We had to move away from New York because our son developed a terrible allergy to cold, so we came back to California. With no job immediately available, I went to law school and, as a member of the California Bar, I decided to practice law while I looked around for something else. I practiced law for about a year. During that time I did a considerable amount of work in the adoption field. A committee was appointed by Earl Warren to choose a welfare director for the State Department of Social Welfare. This committee was headed by Don Howard, former Dean of the School of social Work at UCLA. The committee was asked to recommend three people. They interviewed me and I said, “Well, I’m not sure. I want to talk to the Governor first.” They said, “Until you talk , we are only going to recommend one person - you.” So I went to see the Governor, and we spent three hours together. He convinced me to become the director of social welfare. From that I was appointed by President Eisenhower as Commissioner of Social Security. At that time all of the welfare programs were under the Commissioner of Social Security. The Bureau of Public Assistance handled all grants for public assistance. The Children’s Bureau had maternal and child health program grants, juvenile

delinquency programs, child welfare programs, and adoption and child welfare services across the board. It really ran the gamut of social welfare programs among federal programs, except those that were specialized, like the Indian Service and the Veteran's Administration and other programs.

Then I went to Brandeis University to be Dean of the School of Social Welfare, which was actually called the Florence Heller Graduate School for Advanced Studies in Social Welfare.

This was a different kind of doctoral program, which emphasized social policy and social planning and social administration. We were not training people in the one-to-one relationship of treatment, but in terms of the broad social policy and administration, we were training the executives. That was the original orientation of the program. I stayed in Brandeis for twenty years, becoming president of the University. Later I came back and became Dean again for a short time when Arnold Goren, who had become Dean, had a heart attack. Then the State honored me as a professor and I took early retirement at age 73 and went to Tucson.

Edna, my wife, had an allergy to humidity and so we wanted a high, dry climate. Since then I've been involved in volunteer activities, emphasizing aging. That has become more or less my speciality. I was president of the National Senior Citizens Center, which brought some of the most important class actions against the Reagan Administration in the field of disability and misuse of Social Security funds, and so forth. I am consultant to SOS--Save Our Security--which is headed by Arthur Fleming and Wilbur Cohen as co-chairs. I am on the board of the National Council of Aging, current president of the American Society on Aging, which was a former Gerontological Association, chairman of the Governor's Advisory Council on Aging, which is a statutory body in Arizona advising the legislators and all of the Department of

Aging programs. I am on the board of Pima Council on Aging, which is the Council of Aging in Pima County, in which Tucson is the biggest city. Until recently I was chairman of the board of the county hospital, called Kino Hospital, and we still have that board, but we no longer are a board; we're now a committee in a county manager's office.

I do lecturing on social policy, social welfare and the law, aging, social security history, history of social welfare and federal-state regulations, and particularly a number of other areas in social welfare. I like to point out in my lecture in social welfare in the school of social work that you cannot teach social policy without teaching law because social policy in America is established by law and in no other way. All of the talk on social policy through voluntary agencies is just semantics; social policy has to be an established course of action capable of being enforced by a bigger authority and it's almost the definition of law. At any rate, that's my career, and I do a great deal of lecturing on a number of other subjects that are not necessary to go into here. So unless you have questions, we can come to my career in California.

FELDMAN: Over this long span of distinguished positions, you have dealt then with infancy to aging, and you have been involved as a professional in the field of social work, and a volunteer so that you really have a number of dimensions that I think are of great importance to researchers.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, I have been in voluntary agencies and public agencies, in local and state, federal, and international agencies. So I've covered about everything. And in one-to-one practice, and planning in the administration in education, etcetera.

FELDMAN: You have a unique perspective which makes it possible to show how all of these really inter-relate and the learnings from one area are applicable in the other.

SCHOTTLAND: Shall I start with the Eisenhower Administration?

FELDMAN: Why don't you do that?

SCHOTTLAND: I was happily engaged from 1929-1933 as director of the modern social center in the east side of town, when the Great Depression came along and Roosevelt came into office and set up the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the subsequent work programs, Work Progress Administration, Work Projects Administration, and the Public Works Administration. I had achieved something of a national reputation through a chance thing that I did. I had been a caseworker in the Jewish Big Brothers Association before I went to school, as I mentioned previously in my background. So I was case oriented, and I developed a way of recording case records, which none of the other communities sectors in the community had as far as I know. It enabled us to keep track of the group activities and progress as well as the effect on problem cases that had been referred to the Jewish Social Center for recreational and social and other types of activities. That came to the attention of the National Children's Bureau. The result was that when the State Relief Administration organized in California, some who were close to some of the Children's Bureau people were told that they ought to bring me into the State Relief Administration. One was Helen Montegriffo. I forget what her background was, but she was a very prominent social worker in the state. The other was Anita Brownlee, who was the deputy director of the State Relief Administration. I resigned as director of the Jewish Social Center to become field representative for Southern California outside of Los Angeles. Although my office was in Los Angeles, that was merely a convenience, since I was state representative for the counties of San Diego, Ventura, San Bernardino, Riverside, and Orange. The head of the agency was Ray Branion. One little aside; Ray Branion was a Republican and

this was a Democratic administration in Washington with a Republican governor in California. Ray Branion was a trained social worker, a liberal in social work programs, but the Democratic politicians did not like to have a Republican in charge. When we started having a work program, we found that it was very difficult to get people to work quickly. In the first place, there weren't enough tools. We bought out all the tools in every hardware store in California; rakes, shovels, picks, and so forth, to do weeding and make fire trails, and so forth. And we put a lot of people to work without tools; they couldn't do very much, and the question was; do we keep them on relief sitting at home or put them out to work, which was the goal of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration. The Democratic politicians brought a charge against Ray Branion under an old statute for the misuse of federal money because he was denying the federal government of the labor of these people because we did not have enough tools. It was a crazy kind of thing; he was indicted by a federal grand jury.

FELDMAN: Was there no money for him to buy the tools?

SCHOTTLAND: He couldn't get the tools so fast. They just weren't available. And we couldn't get the work projects started so rapidly. As a matter of fact, we did better than most of the states in the Union on this, but we didn't have politicians trying to make trouble. At any rate he was indicted; a federal indictment is serious no matter how flimsy the charge. The National Association of Social Workers nationally started a defense fund for him, but they also were politically oriented. They sent out people who came at great expense, did a lot of talking, but didn't do anything to help the defense. We started our own defense fund among the workers of the State Relief Administration and the social work profession. I was treasurer of it; we raised a lot of money, some \$15,000 for his legal defense. That was a lot of money in those days. This



solidified some of the leadership in social work who, for the first time, became interested in promoting ways of protecting social workers during these times when things were really very hectic. It made the two big chapters of the American Association of Social Workers (before the present organization of the National Organization of Social Workers) much more politically conscious than social action oriented. It really had a dramatic effect. Here was one of their own people who was likely to go to jail for something that was absolutely unavoidable. Well, the thing dragged on for a long time until several of us talked to Harry Hopkins, who said, "Look, the Democratic Party could be wrecked in California if we start raising a lot of Cain about infringement on some old law. It has never been enforced. When people who do what they were supposed to do under federal directive to get people to work--without any gain to themselves--are indicted with a criminal charge, something needs to be done." The result was that he raised a fuss apparently. I'm not sure how much or what happened exactly in Washington but an attorney general officer was sent out to dismiss the indictment.

The history of the establishment of the State Relief Administration is important because of the late influence of the State Relief Administration on the totality of social welfare in California, both on public and voluntary agencies. In many states the State Department of Social Welfare, the established public welfare agency, became the agency that handled the grants from the federal government's Federal Emergency Administration. The Federal Emergency Administration, as I recall, and understand it, indicated that it would not give money to be spent through the State Department of Social Welfare. They didn't feel that they were competent enough and it may also be because Roberta Crawford Spivalo, who was an evangelist, was the director of the California Department. It was just not considered efficient and the way to handle

the grants. The result was that California set up State Relief Administration under state statutes. Ray Branion became the first administrator; I later, as I indicated, became the administrator.

I was with the State Relief Administration from 1933-1936. We made several contributions that were very important. First, and not really what I want to talk about, was that its main function was to keep people from starving. We developed programs in existing county welfare departments in some cases, and in others we set up our own programs at the county level.

The contributions were several. First, it brought into the welfare business, hundreds of volunteers because we set up volunteer committees to supervise the work of the State Relief Administration in every county except for the two or three major counties, like Los Angeles, which didn't have a volunteer committee at the time. We had some 45 or 46 volunteer committees that averaged eight to ten people on each committee. Thus we had several hundred persons to go into the welfare programs and we saw to it that the committees represented labor and business, Democrats and Republicans. They were very important although technically they had no authority. There were questions as to what their authority actually was. If they wanted to take authority and if it was appropriate and the right thing, we went along with it even though they had no special legal authority. That's the number one contribution. The second; we introduced a number of new ideas in California. One was cash relief for people on welfare. Most of the counties did not give money to welfare recipients. They gave baskets; they had milk delivered, the welfare department paid the rent directly to landlords. Even the clothing they had came from a clothing warehouse from which sometimes the social workers would select the clothing items and at other times they let the girl or the mother come down to select and collect the clothing. The federal government required that assistance be in cash. Harry Hopkins, who

was head of the program, was a social worker, and his staff were primarily social workers; Joseph P. Brown, Jane Hoey, and others. The result was that they put into affect effect a number of things. One was cash relief.

A second contribution was that we required, in so far as we were able to arrange it, that there be a trained social worker in every county as the case supervisor for the Emergency Relief Administration program. Now, with the exception of four or five counties in the state, there were no trained social workers in the various counties in the rural areas, even in some of the counties that had fairly strong welfare departments, such as Orange County, with a strong executive named Bryon Curry, had no trained social workers. Where the welfare department took leadership, such as in Orange County, we insisted on a trained social worker. Where the State Relief Administration took the leadership and set up its own organization, not part of the county welfare department, of course we always had a trained social workers. This then was another contribution that was made; to bring trained social workers into the various counties. Since we worked a great deal through voluntary agencies in many of the counties, there was a much closer relationship in some counties: the first relationship between the voluntary social agencies and the public agencies. So these were the various contributions which the Relief Administration made in connection with the totality of the programs. They also made a number of contributions as part of their fundamental programs; namely, we made an unusual number of miles of mountain trails, we built new buildings which are still standing in Bakersfield. Their county building is one of our adobe buildings, which was done with hand labor. This program made the welfare programs of the state stand out, first because of their inadequacies and second,

because of their importance. They were inadequate in the fact that they did not have trained people, county budgets for the poor were very inadequate, the grocery baskets weren't very good, and it introduced both cash relief and also the use of surplus products which later was integrated--many years later--into the present food stamp program. But California was the largest producer of surplus food stuffs in the country, other than Iowa at the time, but theirs was mostly cattle, pigs, and so forth. We had developed a number of cooperatives whereby the people on relief got together and formed a cooperative and raised their own food or, in many cases, just processed food that the farmers couldn't pick because there was no market for it. People didn't have any money, but we had all the oranges that we needed to distribute to the entire relief population. We had cooperatives that took pears, dried them, and developed a dried pear program. One cooperative in Riverside made sauerkraut and made money out of it. We picked all the oranges and grapefruit we could pick because farmers couldn't afford to pick them, and those were contributions that were made by the State Relief Administration. After I left the program, the California conference of Social Welfare (forgive me if its not the current name) started a number of movements in which I was involved and which had an effect on social work. First they developed the movement to register social workers, and a committee headed by Father Lucy of the Catholic charities also headed at one time by Irving Lipsitch of the Federation of Jewish Welfare Organization of Los Angeles. That committee, of which I was a member, developed the first suggested voluntary proposal , non-legislative, for the registration of social workers. It later became state law. A second committee, under the leadership of Anita Eldrige, who was the executive director of the State Conference of social Welfare, brought together the county welfare directors and a couple of business people as I recall. That committee drafted a

statute which later became law and replaced the old statute with reference to the State Department of Social Welfare. It became the basic law for many years under which the State Department of Social Welfare operated. Although there were many amendments, it remained the basic law and may still be. I don't know what happened in the last few years that I have been away. But that was a very important contribution.

Now let me go to the State Department of Social Welfare, my own experience there, and then I will go back for other history. Before I move on, there is one thing that illustrates a number of policy problems. When the Federal Emergency Relief Administration was established, the problems in society were very powerful politically, and on the basis of sheer power pressure, they forced (in my opinion, though that may not be what happened) Harry Hopkins and the federal administration to permit the Traveler's Aid Society to handle the transient program in California. In Los Angeles County, the transient program was originally handled by the Traveler's Aid Society under Dorothy Wyser Smith. Actually, the Traveler's Aid society had neither the mechanism nor the ability to handle a big public program. So in California, we set up, from the state headquarters, the transient camps, and we handled the transient programs of the County. Where the Traveler's Aid was fairly large as in Los Angeles County and in San Francisco, they would tell you they were handling a transient program; actually they were handling a phase of the big money coming into the State Relief Administration. The reason I mention this is it is indicative of whatever a profession does, as a profession frequently comes first, and the program comes second. When I became State Relief Administrator, Harry Hopkins released an order that the transient program was to be completely

integrated into the State Relief Administration and that the Traveler's Aid Society would no longer have any role except as might any agency that was working with some segment of the poor. We integrated at that time. I was condemned by both the Los Angeles Chapter of the American Association Social Workers, of which I had been president a couple of years before, and the San Francisco Chapter. They were the only two large chapters. The basis was that I had been very unprofessional in kicking out a well staffed social work oriented agency. I met with representatives of the San Francisco chapter and indicated to them that what they were asking me to do was to violate regulations from Washington, which was immoral; we were accepting federal money, and we were bound by the regulations. I pointed out also that it was the counties and the state who were giving the services to transients, which had the affirmative endorsement of the professions because it didn't separate transients from other poor. But both chapters continued their opposition to the transfer. It was rhetoric; they had no power, and they didn't even seek to exercise whatever power they might have had. They were just influenced by Dorothy Wyser Smith, who was very important in the Los Angeles Chapter. The State Department of Social Welfare was organized way back in the early Thirties with strength and a strong director for many years, Fred Wollenberg, who had been the welfare director in San Francisco. A movement growing among the older people was headed by George McLain. It was a popular movement among the elderly, but he was a racketeer. He organized a very powerful movement in the state that was opposed both by the state and the counties. He developed an initiative petition which went to the voters of California. The voters in California in their judgment passed the initiative petition, which took away the programs for the aging and blind from the counties, to be administered by the state. George McLain, in writing the

initiative, also specified the name of the person who was to be appointed as director of the State Department of Social Welfare: Myrtle Williams. Though she was totally without experience except as his deputy, she became the director. She used her position to raise money. When I became director following her, the money still kept coming in: cash, checks, and everything addressed to her. She was no longer there, and I don't know how much they collected. No one knows, but it was certainly a large amount for it still kept coming in even though there was great publicity that the State Department had been organized. In order to make sense out of this, groups got together--among which was the State Conference of Social Welfare--which played a very important role, a number of prominent business people, League of Women voters, and others; and a new initiative petition came before the voters. The voters reversed the earlier initiative and put the program back into the counties, re-established the State Department of Social Welfare and took out the name of the director.

I was appointed director by Earl Warren. I had considerable experience with the State Welfare Department when I was with the State Relief Administration. But in 1949, I was deputy director for six months in the State Welfare Department, and I had recommended a very extensive study and put some of the recommendations into effect, a number of things which I won't go into great detail about. But I had a factual basis for the recommendations. When I became director of the department fifteen years later, I had to reverse all of my recommendations.

When I became director of the Social Welfare Department, Earl Warren made it very clear that as governor, he wanted me to develop a good department, an efficient department, and one that was eager to carry out its basic objective of providing appropriate services to the poor, to

the aging, to the children, to the blind, and others in the welfare program. There was to be no politics, and I was to go ahead and straighten out and strengthen the department to carry out the mission and laws of the legislature and of the governor. I soon found that there were some impediments to achieving the objective. One was the counties, which resisted many things that we tried to put into effect, and I will go on to detail later. Second was a veterans preference. Every veteran who had served in the Armed Forces got a certain number of points; I think it was five extra points in the examination, but if they were disabled veterans, they got fifteen points. Now to give an example, in an examination for the chief of a particular county office, under civil service you had to take the first three who passed the exam. The first three were all disabled veterans and they each had more than a hundred points--maybe they got 86 or 88 on their own, and fifteen points extra brought them over 100. No non-veterans could make over 100 even if they had perfect scores on the exam; they would not be in the first three. Now I wanted one of the men who had a perfect score for that position, but he was down at number five. So I called in the first three, one by one, and said I would like it clearly understood that "I am not asking you to waive the preference you have; that would be illegal, and I'm not permitted to do that. I'm only telling you that I will not appoint you because you don't have the background for this type of program. This is not an accounting job; it is a job which needs an accountant, but also someone who has other qualifications to understand the whole welfare program. They need to understand something about the accounting problem of an adoption program or public assistance programs, and so forth. And I'm not going to appoint you; if you see fit to withdraw, I personally would appreciate it, but I'm not asking you to do so." Well, I was protecting myself by my careful words. What I really was doing was putting a little pressure on them to withdraw.



Three of them withdrew, whereupon the man I wanted came into the first three and I could appoint him. The State Personnel Board asked that I come to a public meeting to defend the charge that I had brought pressure to bear upon the three veterans. I said I would be glad to, but you are going to see repercussions in the press; I'm going to charge that these three were incompetent in terms of our needs and the only reason they got up there in the list was veterans preference. They were disabled veterans with zero percent disability, the same as I with zero percent disability. I was injured in an automobile accident and was hospitalized for two weeks in Germany, and I was given zero percent disability. I'm not disabled whatsoever. I am a veteran.

The second thing that inhibited the objective of developing an efficient department was the system of promotional preferences within the department. People in a job which was just below the job for which you were offering the examination, got also a point preference. I forgot what the number of points was. It meant that a person from outside taking an open competitive examination could get a much higher grade in the examination but would get a much lower grade relatively because those who had been in a job would get these extra points.

FELDMAN: Were these points for a number of years or service with a plus evaluation?

SCHOTTLAND: No, just anyone in the job who was satisfactory in the lower job. I called together the staff supervisory personnel and said, "I need you to assure me before I go ahead with this exam that you explained to your staff my position, that I do not think we can get three top regional directors out of the current staff. I hate to say this, and I have great confidence in the current staff." That was a little exaggerated statement on my part maybe--"I have great confidence in the current staff, but they are not trained in overall management; they are not

trained in the political problems that need to be worked on by a regional director with the local board of supervisors to upgrade the program.” They have to work with county directors, and they must bring skills that are more than social work skills because very few of the county directors will be social workers. Since they get preference, I don’t think that they ought to object, for if they objected, there couldn’t be an open competitive examination at all so that it would be exclusively those who were in the job within the department who could take the exam for promotion to regional director. There would be no chance to go outside; it was almost automatic that the California Employees Association, representing workers, would usually object to the State Personnel Board having open competitive exams. They would have the authority, but they wouldn’t hold an open competitive exam. I said, “Will you explain to all the workers on your own staff, and I would be glad to meet with any individually or collectively but only after you have explained that they ought to be willing to have an open competitive examination. If they can’t place higher than the outsiders after getting extra points on the promotional basis, then it shows that they are not as competent as the outsiders--the outsiders had to overcome those extra points.” So they came back to me and said they had met with their people who unanimously agreed they will not object to an open examination. So I asked for an open competitive examination. I talked to many of the workers who assured me that that was their position. This sounds terrible, but I’m giving you the facts.

FELDMAN: I think these strategies are important for other people to understand.

SCHOTTLAND: There was a big open meeting of the State Personnel Board to consider the open competitive examination. I came there and found, particularly, all of the social work staff

sitting there. This concerned me a little for I didn't have a chance to talk to any of them. I wondered why they were coming en mass. I made my presentation and said I regret to have to make a public statement of this kind, but I think that the open competitive examination would produce persons who are more likely to have the skills needed in the regional director. In accordance with the rules and procedures I have checked, through the supervisors of the department, and have been told that all the employees do not object to having an open competitive exam. When I finished my presentation, the executive director of the lawyer, I forget which, of the California State Employee Association, got up and said, "I'm a little embarrassed because we have a very good relationship with Mr. Schottland, and he has been helpful to us regarding some of our recommendations. But I have to say that he is completely in error in his statement, and we are here to say that we represent every single employee who is eligible to take the promotional examination and every single one of them, 100 percent, object to Mr. Schottland's recommendation for an open competitive exam." So I had to get up and say, "Now I am embarrassed. All I can tell you is that my supervisors, all of whom are sitting here, told me that all of the social work staff have agreed to an open competitive exam. Something had happened after this agreement--I do not know what it was--maybe the State Employee Association brought pressure to bear. Their heart wasn't in the agreement about regional directors, but at least I am in the position to defend why I want an open competitive examination. That's embarrassing for me as well as embarrassing for all of my staff sitting right behind me, but I have to come directly to the point that I do not believe that we have among those eligible for promotional examination, three top persons who could be, in my opinion, adequate regional directors. For all my great confidence in the staff in their current roles, I do not feel that they

would become the regional directors we would like to have.” Well, you can imagine what a difficult situation that was, and the Personnel Board really put me over the coals. They asked for an example as to what I wanted in a regional director. I wrote down a lot of the things that the regional director had to do to work with the boards of supervisors of various counties; they had to be able to handle public relations; we had to get a merit system established in every county, which was a federal requirement we didn’t have before I became director. We had civil service in four of five counties and no merit system in any of the others. The regional directors have to handle the public relations with the voluntary agencies that also were involved in some of the operations of the local public welfare department which had farmed out to some of the voluntary agencies certain of the programs. And they had to help the counties establish the standards for the non-social workers who were taking up social work positions because there weren’t enough trained social workers. I went on and on to note the various things that had to be done. After a long argument, the Personnel Board voted to have an open competitive examination. Out of that open competitive examination came two of the three persons who were not former employees of the department. Ralph Goff was the one former employee of the department, and he passed at a very high grade. But the other two were outsiders who beat, in terms of their points, the other social workers who got promotional preference. The other two were from the open competitive list; Wedemyer, I forget his first name.

FELDMAN: Richard Wedemyer.

SCHOTTLAND: Dick Wedemyer was an excellent regional director, and the other was a woman who was the director of welfare in San Francisco. She came from the federal program. I forget her name but any of the old timers will remember her, maybe even the old timers in Los

Angeles. She became regional director in San Francisco, Wedemyer became director in Sacramento, and Ralph Goff, director in Los Angeles. This illustrates one of the problems in any large organization in the difficulties of raising the standards when a single professional group--accountants or lawyers or social workers--are more interested in getting the professional people instead of getting competent people.

Now we had a number of problems we had to address. In the first place a lot of things had been decided before I came in, and two of these political decisions were are terribly important to the program. One, in the 1939 study all my recommendations had been implemented by Martha Chickering who was the director. She had asked me to come in then and practically all of them had been implemented. Some had been changed before I became director, and they'd gone back to the old system. One of them was to put the Division of the Blind into the Division of Public Assistance in my 1939 recommendations because it had seemed to me that the problems were exactly the same as the problems of the aged and the problems of dependent children. Each had a little difference, but there was no more sense, in my opinion, to have a separate program for the blind and a separate program for the children and a separate program for the aged. Both the children's and the aging programs were under the direction of the Public Assistance Division, and I recommended that the blind go into it. That was done but later, because of the pressure of the blind, they were put into a separate division.

FELDMAN: Was Perry Sundquist there through all of this?

SCHOTTLAND: Through all of this, yes. When I came into the job, when I was appointed, at least one of the blind groups was headed by Jacobus Ten Broek, a blind Berkeley law professor, who did much public speaking for the blind.

FELDMAN: He was a lawyer?

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, he was a lawyer and quite a writer in the field of welfare, with several books to his credit in the field of welfare. He was a very powerful speaker, very, very intelligent and very clever and the blind group opposed my appointment. The way my appointment came about was that the governor appointed a committee, chaired by Donald Howard, the Dean of the UCLA School of Social Welfare and including the head of the AFofL of California (I forget his name) a group of professionals and civil servants, and they recommended me. They were supposed to recommend three people to the governor, but they concluded that if I didn't want the job, they would recommend three, but they would like to make only one recommendation. I said I wasn't ready to accept it. I had been director of the Jewish Child Care Association in New York, the largest child care association in the country--2400 children under full-time care. We had to move because of my son's health and so without immediately being able to get a decent paying job, I opened up a law office. I never really intended to practice. A friend of mine made it possible for me to live the first month. At any rate, I went to see the governor and I agreed to accept the position.

I soon found that we had a number of problems that we had to work out. One was the administrative organization and the setting up of three regional offices in our three regional districts and getting them organized. Second, I had an extremely competent staff in the hierarchy. I appointed as the executive director of the staff, the statistician, Edward Silvera. I had known Silvera in the Army. I was in charge of the Displaced Persons Program for the American Army and Eisenhower's staff, and he was one of our most distinguished people. He worked with the displaced persons after the concentration camps were freed, and he worked in

Italy in a very distinguished way. I wanted him as my deputy, and I appointed him as my deputy. He took the place of a person who had become the Director of the State Employment Service, who still had the civil service right to come back as deputy. He later came back; he didn't get along on the job in the State Employment Service. I had to let Silvera go and let the returnee take over as my deputy, and I didn't want him. In my opinion, he was not trained for any of this work. I forget his name. But I had very good people at the head. Elizabeth McLatchie was head of public assistance. Perry Sundquist was head of the blind program, and I decided at that point, not to go to my original recommendation of 1939 because the blind had an established constituency and politically there didn't seem any sense in fighting that because Perry Sundquist was doing a very good job. He had his supporters in one faction of the blind, not the strongest political faction of the blind because that faction was headed by Jacobus Ten Broek, the blind professor of the University of California in Berkeley. I decided to leave that the way it was. We also had Harry White, who was in charge of the Aid to Dependent Children program, later becoming Aid to Families with Dependent Children's program. That, however, was under Elizabeth McLatchie, who headed public assistance with both the aged and the AFDC programs. I had some competent people in the accounting department, and I appointed one of them as the head of accounting. He had trained to be a Catholic priest, had graduated from the seminary in Santa Barbara, but then decided not to become a priest, married and had nine children. Do you know who he was?

FELDMAN: Well, I recall the situation, but I can't remember his name.

SCHOTTLAND: He was a top notch person and terribly competent and although a Dutchman, he was born in Holland and spoke with a little accent, he had the best command of English of any

member of my staff, and I used him to write some of the complicated letters. He was a terribly competent person; we became close friends, and I am embarrassed that I can't remember his name, but that was many years ago. And there were several other problems that needed to be tackled. In the first place, many of the counties did not have any type of civil service system at all for any employees. Los Angeles County and San Francisco County did have civil service systems and a few others. We were required, under federal regulation, to establish a merit system which either could be civil service or a merit system exclusively for those handling federal funds, which meant for the public assistant coming through the state department and child welfare funds.

FELDMAN: Lucille Kennedy was the other.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, Lucille Kennedy. Now we appointed an advisory committee on personnel in some of the counties, and we required every county to have a merit system, which was like civil service with standards that we would approve and all persons had to meet those standards. It was not completely civil service, but in many counties, it was the only type of merit system. Otherwise, they were political appointees. They may have had some kind of minimal standards but many counties appointed just anybody to these jobs. The merit system had several beneficial things. One of the problems was that it was difficult to operate with a merit system in some places and not in others. Without a merit system, it meant that employees were not transferable, particularly in the small counties where there were only a few employees in the welfare program. It was very difficult because you had large programs of general assistance run by the counties with county funds, and they didn't have to have a merit system



except for the two big counties that had a civil service system. If you wanted to transfer workers over to a child welfare program, they had to be under a merit system. This forced many counties to devise a merit system for all of their programs and eventually, they put everybody into civil service because it was just easier to operate than having half of them in the merit system and the other half under a political appointment system. That didn't mean that there were enough political appointments because in the merit system, you could take any of the first three who qualified on the examination list. We had no control over who the counties would appoint except they had to be the first three of the merit system. You could have political appointments, but they had to be among the first three. However, there were ways of getting around this. You could appoint one of the first three to a vacancy and someone new moves up and number three was number four. You'll appoint and then you can appoint number five if he comes up. In effect, you are skipping over the original second and third persons. But that didn't happen very often because, after a while, it was just too complicated to work out the logistics. They began to accept the first three in the merit system. That was actually a great contribution by the federal government; we had set up merit systems to get federal money. Because of the merit system, more and more trained social workers got into public social work. Outside of San Francisco and Los Angeles Counties and, to some extent Alameda County, there weren't too many trained social workers in the public welfare departments. There were a number in the State Relief Administration years before, but in 1950, when I became welfare director, many of the counties had few and some no trained social workers. The merit system helped raise the standards in all of the counties and was really very important.

The second thing that I would like to mention is that we began to get a Social Welfare

Board which was more in tune with a progressive and liberal set of regulations. When I came in, the Social Welfare Board was similar to social welfare boards in the majority of states of the country. They had complete authority over the appointment of personnel and complete authority over the policies under which persons receive services. They were the administrative and policy-making board with complete authority. The only area that they didn't have some authority over was the civil service system; they didn't have authority to make appointments and they didn't have authority over the personnel qualifications. They had to approve the qualifications and recommend them to the Personnel board but that Board held the authority. In the course of my incumbence, 1950-1954, there was a gradual change following the national trend. First, the boards that were administrative as well as policy-making, no longer had the administrative duties, and they no longer had the power of appointment, but they retained an advisory capacity. They still were asked by the director, who had the power of appointment subject to civil service and the merit system, to approve the appointments but in an advisory position. Later they developed rules and regulations, but they did not have the authority to put them into effect to govern the organization of the department. The administrative arrangement and other matters were in the hands of the director. That was a fundamental change in the rule of boards from administrative and policy-making to advisory.

FELDMAN: And that was a statutory change, wasn't it?

SCHOTTLAND: Those were statutory changes and it was nationwide. It was not a requirement of the federal government, but it just came about as natural in the relationship of the state to the federal government. The state was required to follow the regulations of the federal government. The regulations of a commissioner or head of a department in Washington takes

precedence over California legislation or any other legislature. It becomes federal law and federal practices and regulations are governed by three bodies that make the law; the Congress, which makes the statutes, the administration or the executive branch, which enforces the regulations, and the courts, which interpret the regulations. All three make law. And contrary in the political science textbooks, they can contradict each other so that you can, through regulation, sabotage the intent of Congress. And the courts can declare actions of both the legislature and the executive branch illegal so that all three branches establish new law, all three branches administer the law, and all three branches interpret the law. I won't go into that for reasons of time, but the separation of powers is wonderful for the textbook and is an overlying principle in the Constitution, but in practice, all three branches establish law, all three branches administer the law, all three branches interpret the law. We had to do a number of things when I came into office. One, I had to get rid of George McLain's influence. He and I actually became very good friends, but always with some tension between us. He had no power, and I had to criticize what had happened prior to my coming. We did return by the referendum the work to the counties. I had a very good relationship with the counties in the earlier period because we were working side by side. The relationships became very strained after a while because the counties were protecting their turf and didn't want any interference from the state. Under Wollenberg, the counties were pretty autonomous. The state really didn't crack down. Wollenberg had been a county director in San Francisco, and he was in his eighties and this was a day and night job which no person could handle alone, although he was a good person, and he understood the political arena. The tensions came about in several ways. First, their tensions about establishing merit systems, combining all the non-civil service counties, into a state-wide

system. Second, there were tensions in getting the civil service counties, primarily Los Angeles and San Francisco, to have reasonable standards, particularly for the employment of professional social workers. Third, there were problems in the state-county relations because of regulations and controls which we established. The governor appointed to every vacancy that was created, every person I recommended. So I had a good relationship with the governor around the political situation. Forgive me for being personal, but my personal experience....

FELDMAN: We want your personal experiences.

SCHOTTLAND: A lot of regional directors of the state department considered me the governor's pet. It really was the fact that he liked the program of the welfare department, and he related to it more closely than to the other departments. He was very much interested in the poor. He was very much interested in old age programs; all the old people's organizations supported his elections and re-election. The Townsend Movement was very much behind him in the election. This got me into an embarrassing situation. He called me in one day and said the Townsendites were having their annual convention in Long Beach, and he asked me to speak. He didn't see how he could really turn them down because they fought for his election as governor, but he thought it would be embarrassing for the governor. Would I take the speaking engagement? So I spoke there, and I mentioned the fact that we were putting many of the aged back to work, and we had a work program stimulating the counties to put some of the aging back to work and get them off old-age assistance. The crowd of several thousand delegates went absolutely wild. One of them whistled and shouted; it was wonderful to put them back to work. When I finished, Dr. Townsend got up and said, "This young man made a very good speech, and I agree with most of what he said. But this business of putting us back to work.... We made

our contributions to society. I don't want a job, do you?" Several thousand voices shouted, "NO!" after applauding that same thing. At that point I decided I'd better get out of that place very fast.

The counties objected to several things. Some of them objected to the fact that we had been promoting cash relief long before I came into the job because this was a Washington regulation, and they still had remnants of programs of non-cash relief. Second, they objected to the merit system. I did have a good group of executives. Elizabeth McLatchie was a top notch person who was in charge of public assistance. Perry Sundquist, although very narrowly engaged to the blind, was an expert executive. Harry White was in charge of AFDC, and was a very conscientious person. He was under the supervision of Elizabeth McLatchie; she was highly informed about every aspect of the law and the regulations, so we were always right when it came to interpretation of federal regulations and state laws. And then there was that child welfare person.....

FELDMAN: Lucille Kennedy.

SCHOTTLAND: Lucille was just an outstanding person who knew her stuff. She unfortunately had the psychology of the Children's Bureau, namely, child welfare was a different profession and shouldn't mix with public assistance. The factor that the person was a trained social worker did not make them a child welfare expert. It might be okay for public assistance, but not for child welfare. One of the problems that states were having was the fact that the federal child welfare regional representative felt that their relationship was directly with the director of child welfare in the state. The Children's Bureau insisted that the children's department program must not be associated with public assistance. They had to be separate

agencies, and they opposed the development of family and children services in one unit under one head. And they fought Alaska, which tried to put them under one head.

FELDMAN: You were talking about the issues, the first being the standards of the merit system.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, the issue had to do with sort of a party line of the counties, that certain persons eligible under state law and regulations were ineligible, and we were interpreting for the state. The most prominent of these differences had to do with the problem of residence. Many people would come to California, where we had a five-year residence law for old-age assistance. And we had a one-year residence law for Aid to Needy Children. The aging would come from other states. Arizona would send them to California to get rid of them. And Arizona would agree to pay them their Old Age Assistance for five years until they establish California residence. Now they came here, and they voted. They had the say as far as Arizona was concerned; they had to sign an affidavit that they were residents of Arizona. At the end of five years, they would come to the Los Angeles Welfare Department and say, "I'd like my Aid to the Blind or Aid to Old Age Assistance and Aid to Needy Children. I've been here for five years, and I have established my residence in the sight of the law." The California county would say, "Oh no, you said you were a resident of Arizona during those five years. You said you were getting Old Age Assistance. You are ineligible, you have not established residence for public assistance purposes in California." The county would appeal then to the State Social Welfare Board and was overruled. We made that stick because, in the first place, it was a federal regulation; in the second place we just said, yes, these people were lying; that that does not make them ineligible to get public assistance under California law. They established legal residence

here. They had been voting and in order to live, they just lied about the fact that they were residents of Arizona. So there were serious problems in those regulations. A third difficulty came when we sought to establish anything new, such as Aid to the totally Disabled. That came in later as one of the federal categories of the aging and blind, and aid to the children. The counties unanimously opposed the extension of the program to the disabled and so we had quite a scrap about that.

FELDMAN: The counties would pay their share of the non-federal money?

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, right. The counties would be paying a share, and they had a right to make their views known because county money was involved. Now, we had county advisory committees and all of our regulations and all of our forms were presented to the counties through the committees. In most cases we got concurrence. In some cases of the important ones, we would have a fight before the Social Welfare Board. It wasn't a fair fight because, after all, it was my Board and all or some of the members were holdovers who Governor Warren had appointed when Wollenberg was the director. More and more they were my appointees. For example, I recommended Jacobus Ten Broek to come on the Board. The blind were still angry at my appointment, and I met with some blind at the home of Jacobus. I had already cleared with Earl Warren that he would accept my recommendation for the blind appointment. I decided we ought to have Jacobus Ten Broek, and when I was finished with my presentation to the Governor as to what I planned to do regarding the players, they attached for my initial recommendations in 1949 to integrate these programs with public assistance, I just said, "Look how much water has passed under the dam, and I'm not going to upset the apple cart right now. It is working very well under Perry Sundquist, and I will leave it at that." They said they

thought a blind person ought to be a member of the Social Welfare Board for life and a representative of the blind. I said, "Well, you make a recommendation and we'll see what we can do." They said, "We'll recommend Jacobus." I said that would be fine; then there was a long silence. Finally, Ten Broek said he didn't want to engage in the campaign; he'd like to be on the job, but what insurance was there that after I left the meeting, I would push this. I said I was making my statement very clear for someone as smart as he is, and I couldn't guarantee that he would be appointed; after all, it is the governor's appointment. I repeated that a representative of the blind would be appointed. Then someone asked if it would be Dr. Ten Broek. So I just laughed and said he's probably the most intelligent of all the guys present, so we'd see what he can do. *They knew* I was going to recommend him.

The disability program was a very bitter issue. The disabled were very angry that they were required to make out, they said, were so many forms in connection with public assistance. They went before the legislature and said this was done to the Department having all kinds of new forms; we don't know how they were so stupid on this department because there are so many intelligent people there. A fellow named Bill McEagle was the executive director of the County Supervisors Association. He had been in the Department. He knew the Department, but he was carried away by the momentum of the counties to attack us on the forms. The counties came before the legislature to complain that there were dozens and dozens of forms that we were requiring, and that a lot of them were completely unnecessary. We should be prohibited from having any forms made mandatory on the counties without prior approval from the counties. So we played a dirty trick on the counties. I had Verne Gleason, do you remember that name? I had Verne collect forms of the major counties to vote for what they required. Then I had him



take out another pile of our forms. There were about fifteen or so in each pile.

FELDMAN: So it was just about an eighth of an inch against three inches.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, right, that was just about it. I presented that to the legislature and asked if the members in this legislature committee feel, after consulting without staff and the county staff, that any of these forms should be done away? Some were required by the federal government; actually, some of them were required by the state controller, and several were required by our department for reports to the federal government.

FELDMAN: What about social work education?

SCHOTTLAND: Just a few comments about the development in social work education. In California we probably were quite a bit behind other states--or other larger states--in the development of our social work education. In the 1930s there was no school of social work in the University of Berkeley. There was a curriculum in social work headed by Martha Chickering. It was in the Department of Economics, and it was many years before social work was made into a separate department. The program was very strictly limited to the old traditional casework, group work, and community organization. There was very little in community organization and certainly nothing in the area of planning and policy or other administration areas. The University of Southern California, although a little ahead in terms of catching up with the practices of many eastern schools in the 1930s, was also quite a bit behind, in my opinion, the development in many of the eastern schools. The social work program was in the Department of Sociology and the leaders in the social work curriculum were sociologists. Bessie McClenahan. Dr. Mangold--I forget his name.

FELDMAN: George.

SCHOTTLAND: George Mangold and Dr. Neumeier. The field of practice in Los Angeles was in many ways far ahead of the School in terms of what the social workers in the field thought the School ought to be doing. Social workers were very close to the School and they differed with the faculty regarding some of the development which was taking place throughout the country. The field of social work expanded generally in the 1930s and 1940s, but social work curricula in schools, in my opinion, did not present very many original ideas other than what was coming out in casework practices and the conflicts within the casework field in eastern schools between such approaches as the Ronkin and Freud approaches, which split the University of Pennsylvania and the New York School of Social Work, now the Columbia School of Social Work. The University of Chicago made a major contribution, capturing the attention of social workers as Chicago began to emphasize an administration and actually combine the name of the school with the work administration--what today we would call social policy. They didn't use the term social policy at that time although they really were involved in social policy. The development at the USC School of Social Work is illustrated by a different controversy that erupted in an advisory committee to the School of Social Work. On that advisory committee were faculty of the school and Bessie McClenahan and Dr. Neumeier and Dr. Mangold were advisors to the committee. I don't recall whether they were officially involved in the committee or if it was sort of ex officio since they were faculty.

FELDMAN: Did Dr. Bogardus take a part in that?

SCHOTTLAND: He stayed in the background pretty much. I don't think he ever attended the meeting of the advisors. Now there were a man and a wife in a relation....

FELDMAN: Erle Young and his wife, Pauline.

SCHOTTLAND: Erle Young was a member of the committee. His wife was a statistician-researcher. The faculty of the School were present at the meetings when the controversies arose; Dr. Neumeier, Erle Young, Dr. McClenahan. One argument centered around the role of community organizations in curriculum. The faculty unanimously took the position that the whole concept of community organization had been seized on by professional social workers as a speciality separate and distinct from group work, but that community organization was just another form of group work, that group work could be with two people or ten, or it could be with a whole community; there wasn't any need for a separate major in community organization, that community organization was a process of groups with a larger community, that the essential purpose of social work was the development of individual potential, and that the social work contribution and the only claim to being a profession was that it was developing techniques in a one-to-one relationship. The people from the field were about the same in number as the faculty--I think there were about eight people in the meeting and I only remember two of them--I was thinking about it last night--they were Arthur Greenleigh, my brother-in-law and myself. Arthur Greenleigh at that time was assistant director of the county Welfare Department, and I was the director of the Federation of Jewish Welfare organization. We took the position that community organization was as much a field study, as much a discipline as social casework or social group work. It was separate and distinct from either one. That may have all had the same goal, the fundamental development of individual potential, which was the big deal in the 1930s. But casework group work, community organization, and social administration, which we brought into the debate and which was way out in left field at

that time, were all processes to achieve social work and that the processes were quite different. Social group work to a great extent had been promoted in the field of education, brought into social work, and that that was essentially a matter of dealing with small groups. If you wanted to organize a community of a million people or a county of a million people, you had to think in terms of programs, processes, and so forth, that were over and beyond social group work. You had to think about public financing of programs; you had to think of the totality of programs, you had to think appropriate community planning areas such as the Council of Social Agencies. One could not say that the Council of Social Agencies and its work was social group work. And that was the basic argument and it sound kind of silly now. But it was very bitter. Someone said--I think it was Neumeier or Bessie McClenahan, who was acting as chairperson (only no one would have dared to use the word chairperson)--"Let's settle this by vote." The vote was even: four to four, with the faculty on one side and the community people from the field on the other. But it wasn't long before the faculty began to talk in terms of organizing the community, and then discussions in class of what kind of organization does it take to promote the social services, particularly the two basic processes of the field social caseworker and social group work. This kind of rigidity and thinking really affected people who had much more progressive ideas as to the role of social work. Donald Howard, when he first came to the school at UCLA, made a talk in some conference where I was--I don't remember what the conference was about, it might have been the State Conference of Social Welfare--in which he said that social work has claimed to have made contributions in the area of social casework; it has made no contribution to the concepts of social planning and social administration and community organization, that other fields had developed these concepts much better and much more significantly than the field of

social work.

FELDMAN: He came to UCLA in 1948?

SCHOTTLAND: Then it must have been in 1948 or 1949. At any rate, those were the only two schools of social work in the state. When I became director of the Department of Social Welfare in 1950, Milton Chernin came to discuss with us the curriculum of the school at Berkeley. He wanted to get the input of a public welfare point of view. He was quite public welfare-orientated. His field had been prisons. I think that's what he did his dissertation on. I think he got his degree in public administration.

FELDMAN: Yes, he did.

SCHOTTLAND: Then I'm right, and so he had a feel for it. When he came to see us, he talked to us about social work. When he came to see us, he talked to us about social work. One of the criticisms which came from our staff in the State Welfare Department was the fact that the curriculum at Berkeley was related not to what social workers do, but to what the curricula that had been developed over the years by the School was training them to do. And what they were trained to do there was not practical for social workers in reality. The discussion was led by Harry White. Is he still around?

FELDMAN: Yes, he lives in Sacramento, retired.

SCHOTTLAND: And Elizabeth McLatchie?

FELDMAN: She's also there.

SCHOTTLAND: And that woman we had trouble thinking of her name?

FELDMAN: Lucille Kennedy. She's also living in Sacramento.

SCHOTTLAND: And I'm not sure who said what where, but what seemed to come out of it

was that our staff, myself and our staff, held a position that angered Milton Chernin's staff at Berkeley. I think he had one or two people with him. Our position was that social work was what social workers do, that social workers were going beyond what the schools in effect were saying is social casework and group work, and that's not what social caseworkers are doing in the public service; they were doing many more things. They were organizing communities and that wasn't social work according to the Berkeley view. They were influencing legislation, they were developing legislation, they were making an input to, and in some cases, determining definitively the social policy of the states and, increasingly, of the federal government. The principles, money-payment or cash relief, did not develop out of casework and group work. Cash relief developed from the concepts of few people like the Abbot sisters and the others as a way of providing a dignified way of living for the poor. It was a rejection of the old English poor relief laws which were in our relief programs at that time. These concepts really were developing social policy. Now, when Don Howard came to UCLA, he picked up the words public policy and social policy and started spouting them all around. I think that because they were picked up by both Los Angeles schools had some influence in other states. I was at every national conference from 1940 and social policy was never enunciated as far as I know until after it was pretty well talked about here in California.

FELDMAN: You mentioned earlier that Arlien Johnson had consulted you about coming to USC. It was interesting that the sociology faculty in the then embryonic School of Social Work was antagonistic to community organizations, but a community organizer was recruited to be dean.

SCHOTTLAND: Well, you get all kinds of contradictory currents even as the profession was

developing.

FELDMAN: But as the president of the national Conference, Arlien Johnson did make a considerable contribution to thinking about the process and the principles of community organization. She came to USC in 1939, and she was president, I think, in 1945; it was during the war years.

SCHOTTLAND: It was fairly early. She was clearly a pioneer, way ahead of the rank and file of the leadership. Most of the leadership did not accept the whole concept of community organization for many, many years beyond that. Even when we organized the Florence Heller School at Brandies University, I was in a reception line in the national Conference, standing next to Clara Kaiser. She said, "Who is going to do your social group work sequence?" And I said, "We are not having a social group work sequence, we are going to concentrate on social policy and social research and social planning and social administration." She said, "Well, you are not going to be involved in social work." I said, "Well, I think we are. This is what we are going to be teaching." At any rate, that clearly might be one of the contributions that we made, particularly through Arlien. She made two contributions. Number one was the whole concept of community organization and kept expanding it. Second, she was one of the few people who had worked in the area of public and voluntary agency relationships, and I can't recall anyone else who made such a definitive contribution of related issues over time, including her book and speeches and their respective influence on public and voluntary agencies. We had started a long history of believing that the twain shall never meet because Harry Hopkins and Jane Hoey Brown from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration kept emphasizing that there was a

fundamental difference between public and voluntary agencies. This contribution which they made went to real extremes. I'll give you an example. When we got into World War II, I was on the board of the National Association of Social Workers. Maybe it was still the American Association of Social Workers, and the question came up about the position which American social work should take in relation to UNRRA; the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Both the predecessor of the NASW and UNRRA had become indoctrinated with this separation of voluntary and governmental agencies. Through the considerable leadership exercised by Donald Howard and others, they actually proposed and had adopted and UNRRA policy that federal funds would never be made available for services extended by voluntary agencies. Government money had to be expended by governmental agencies. At that time I was in uniform in the Army. We could not dress in civilian clothes during that period, so I had to attend the board meeting in my uniform (I always said I did not want to appear in the minutes). This policy was actually stupid because the European agencies--the allies of the United States, were the majority members of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; they would not understand what our board was talking about. They didn't understand this concept of separation of voluntary agencies and public agencies. When you go to France and Italy and Spain and other countries and you go to a hospital run by the government, who are the nurses? Catholic nuns. They come there from their order; they are not employees of the public hospital. They may get some kind of stipend, but they are there as members of a religious order. In France, public Children's services were rendered through the Red Cross, a voluntary agency. In Poland, everything was so integrated that you couldn't take the position that the funds could not go to the voluntary agencies. What happened was very interesting, and



is illustrated by a meeting with a man by the name of Frenet in France. He was head of the Displaced Persons Program there, released prisoners of war. The French government was running a lot of its programs through the Red Cross. I was representing the U.S. Army but tried to stay out of the selection. Don Howard and three or four others, I forget who else was there, but it might have been Martha Branscomb, I don't know if she is still alive.

FELDMAN: Yes, she is. She is in North Carolina.

SCHOTTLAND: It might have been Martha Branscomb. She was very prominent then, and we had some interesting problems with her in UNRRA. But the conversation went something like this: "Mr. Frenet, you do know, don't you, the regulation and policy of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration that our funds are to be used only by public government agencies?" He said, "Oh, yes, very good policies, regulations." Don carried the ball most of the time. "But you are handling the money through the French Red Cross?" He said, "Oh, yes, yes, very fine agency. Very fine work." Don said, "Well, how do you reconcile this with a regulation that funds must be spent through public agencies?" "Oh, that's perfectly all right because they act as the agent of the French government, distributing these funds." Well, you could get absolutely nowhere because they didn't see why, if the government wanted to use a voluntary agency, it was any different than the government hiring people on their own payroll. It just did not make any sense whatsoever. I mentioned this because I think it is illustrative of the development of social work theory as we finally come around to where we are today, it is a constantly developing thing and a conflict of different ideologies and forces which is much more pronounced than in other professions which do not have as much input from different disciplines and social sciences and other areas of knowledge that social work has. We deal with a very

broad spectrum of problems and therefore, we are involved in a broad spectrum of services.

Coming back to California, I think that we are different in many respects from other states, the old age assistance problem diminished our public welfare programs and this influenced both us and some of the national programs. Cash assistance was easily accepted in old age assistance. It was not easily accepted in the Aid to Needy Children program because it was obvious, even to some leaders in the public welfare field--particularly some of the county directors--that the poor could not be trusted to handle money. If you wanted to see that the children got milk, it had to be paid for by the county; otherwise, the children would not get milk.

The landlords would not be paid their rent because families spent their cash relief on other things. But we easily got across the concept of cash assistance in the old age program; after all, the old people would be able to handle it properly.

With the exception of New York, I think we were one of the first states that really had complete cash assistance for older people. We changed our residence laws from five years to one year--and I think this was due to federal requirements in the Social Security Act. Because we were such a large program, everyone all over the country was interested in how this was working out. With that five-year law, we were engaged, as were other states, in a lot of hypocrisy. What happened in California was that other states would send their people here, particularly in states such as Arizona, as I mentioned earlier, paying Arizona old age assistance allowances for the five years needed for eligibility in California. The counties would maintain that they really were residents of Arizona, and they had to live in California for five years as residents of California. On appeal to the Social Welfare Board and to the State Department of Social Welfare it would routinely be held that they were residents of California.

FELDMAN: They were physically present.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, they were physically present, and their intent was to make California their residence. Under the law at that time, strictly interpreted, residence was determined by presence and intent. And although our policy was very serious, the fact that these people annually, for five years, signed affidavits that they were Arizona residents and entitled to aid from Arizona, there was serious controversy about the legality of our counties' position. Los Angeles County, San Francisco County, and Fresno County were leaders fighting the state on this, particularly Los Angeles County.

Let's turn now to another area where the philosophical differences in the formulation of public policies between the counties and the state came to a head. This can be illustrated by the fight over two practices: one, the extension of Aid to Needy children, to pregnant women, and second, the fight to establish Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The Social Security Act was amended to bring disabled into public assistance, that is people who are permanently disabled, even though not old and/or children. They could be given public assistance as part of a federal program the same as Old Age Assistance and Aid to Needy Children. The counties unanimously opposed this idea and the State Department of Social Welfare had to introduce the bill as an administration measure of Earl Warren, and they fight county government on this.

FELDMAN: What was the objection, the influx of additional dependent people or contributions from county taxes to support the program?

SCHOTTLAND: It was both, and one or two other things. First, it was the fear of what would happen; the welfare departments in many states would tell their people to come here. As state welfare director around 1951 or 1952, I wrote a very strong letter to the state director of

Arizona about this practice, but never received a reply. We had Earl Warren take it up in a governor's conference with the governor of Arizona. He did make the presentation to the Arizona governor, who said he would look into it, but he never responded. The second thing counties maintained was that they already had taken care of disabled people who couldn't work and didn't have any income, who met the requirements, that the imposition of a federal program for the same people might help a few of the large counties such as Los Angeles and San Francisco, but would add a further large burden to the other counties who were taking care of the disabled on a much lower standard than was federally required.

FELDMAN: The General Relief program?

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, they were taken care of in the General Relief program and that even though the Social Security Act disability provisions we were proposing would result in state and federal money coming to the counties, their share still would be larger than they were paying in General Relief. The rural counties also had a feeling that if the requirements of the federal Act was enforced in all of the counties of the state, that would mean that they would have to have a program similar to those in the bigger counties, while now they could finesse taking care of many of these people on any kind of basis they desired.

There also was a beginning of a revolution in the 1950s against big growing public assistance programs imposed by the federal government and, also, the requirements of a merit system. The introduction of social work into the program, the necessity for uniform standards throughout the state, the establishment of the merit system--all of these things they resisted. They brought Jane Hoey out--she was Director of Public Assistance--to plead the case for the

counties. I'm not sure what kind of conference this was, whether it was the State Conference Association or whether it was a meeting of the County Welfare Directors Association. A large number of their staff attended, maybe 300 or 400 people. I presided at the meeting. It was very embarrassing for a visitor like Jane Hoey. The counties gave her a terrible beating. The argument was presented by the director--a social worker--from Fresno County. You probably know him, I don't remember his name. Mark Neil of Los Angeles, was also part of the team, and so was the welfare director of San Francisco. They opposed the state vigorously, and it was a rather bitter fight, but we got the program through the legislature. I mention this to illustrate the importance of community groups and some of the voluntary agencies in the counties with public welfare programs. In our testimony we did two things that influenced the state legislature; the Protestant, Catholic and Jewish agencies united in testimony; we had two nuns, both of them from Los Angeles, from the Saint Anne's Adoption society, and one was Sister Winifred. One of those two nuns was sitting next to me and, as the county made presentations--some of them made by social workers--the disability program would follow the pattern of Aid to Needy Children. Sticking now to disability, I'll come back later to ANC. We had a united front of the religious agencies. Then what we did was very corny, but very affective; if I had been an outsider, I would have criticized their bringing in the most terribly disabled people in the community. But every one of them was self-supporting and they could say, "I don't have any interest in pleading this for myself." We had a woman who was a paraplegic, was completely bedridden and chair bound. She smoked during her testimony; she had a wire which she had in her hand and she put the cigarette in the end of the wire and her only motion was being able to turn the wire to get the cigarette in her mouth. She was

self-supporting. She sold insurance over the telephone with equipment which she operated from her bed, and she was making a living. At that time her income was \$14, \$15, \$16 thousand dollars a year--in that range.

FELDMAN: That was pretty high for that time.

SCHOTTLAND: Vern Gleason orchestrated this. I don't remember all the details, but he worked it out very, very effectively. That was a bitter fight. We also had a bitter fight when it came to including the unmarried mother in Aid to Needy Children. There was a controversy at the federal level about this. There's no question in my mind that when Congress passed the Social Security Act and later amended it to include Aid to Dependent Children program, they envisioned aid to children who could be seen and touched and so forth. The day a woman became pregnant, that embryo would be eligible to Aid to Dependent Children with the mother getting a caretaker's benefit. That was the interpretation of the federal department. It meant a great deal to the country as a whole, changing a substantial portion of social work practice in terms of volume and quantity because when it was adopted by the legislature and became accepted in the country and state, provision changed the whole view of pregnant women, particularly the unmarried mothers. The voluntary agencies that had been taking care of this problem, had been touching only the surface; they were just overwhelmed if they were rally trying to take care for the unmarried mother. Volunteers of America, the Salvation Army, and other homes for unmarried mothers would have been closed in many cases, and they were closed, but along came money and enabled those agencies to stay afloat through having these women getting Aid to Dependent Children. They could take care of many more people and do a much better job. That elicited a bitter controversy in California. Again the counties opposed this,

when the social workers in the counties testified that women would get pregnant in order to get ADC. Sister Winefred and her colleagues were sitting next to me.

FELDMAN: Sister Rosemary Markham?

SCHOTTLAND: But she was a Sister of Mercy; she had a different uniform.

FELDMAN: She was a member of the Sisters of Mercy in Social Services, and she headed up the children's social welfare programs for the Archdiocese in Los Angeles.

SCHOTTLAND: Well, maybe she was there; it seemed to me that these two nuns were from Saint Anne's Adoption Bureau. At any rate, I kept saying to her, just take it easy, you'll get your chance to testify. Whichever one it was got up and blurted out, "I'd like it clearly understood the girls in our agency who got pregnant did not get that way with the implications to the Aid to the Needy Children law in mind." It was very impressive. Again illustrating, I think, something that you found in most states was that the counties were always a deterring influence about the liberalization of public assistance and child welfare programs. They were going contrary to the philosophy that is so prevalent today, that the closer the services come to the people through the government, the better they will be. I think that counties and the social welfare administration became better because of leadership from Washington, not because they pushed Washington into more liberalization. It was Washington that introduced cash assistance; it was Washington that introduced into public welfare the importance of trained social workers; it was Washington that enforced the introduction of a Merit System or civil service, and when we established the merit System, the only reason we established it so quickly was because we did not have to do the same in San Francisco and Los Angeles Counties. The result was it was the rural counties that had to change and go out and social workers, untrained or political appointees, the

supervisor of some counties were given the privilege of appointing one-fifth of a certain number of participants. We didn't have to fight Los Angeles and San Francisco; they were the power groups. We were able to put over the merit system without too much difficulty. Furthermore, we were over the heads of the county welfare directors; we met with the Board of Supervisors and the Supervisors were easier to work with than the county welfare directors. They were more practical, practical politicians.

Let's get to adoption, child welfare. First, child welfare services. I'm not sure of this, but I think some things we did had some influence in the child welfare field; I know they influenced Alaska, and were talked about nationally. The child welfare people had taken the position almost from the beginning that they were a separate and distinct holy group in the welfare field. They did not want any one but trained child welfare workers touching children, they implied that public assistance workers were very unholy and shouldn't be trusted with the fate of children. They operated with terrific zeal and conviction, as they thought, in a protection of the children, particularly the children who were in the need of child welfare services. This attitude was promoted by the United States Children's Bureau. The regulations went from the Children's Bureau to the directors of Child Welfare. The contacts of the field representatives from Washington were with the Child Welfare representatives. When I came in as director, I took the position that when the field representative from the Children's Bureau came from Washington or from their regional office to Sacramento to discuss child welfare problems of the California Department of Welfare, she would call on the director first, and I would decide



whether she would talk to anybody else in the department. I had the responsibility for the Child Welfare Program. Very politely, she practically told me to go to the devil, and I had to tell Lucille Kennedy that she was not to talk to the representative of the federal government without my permission. That created a big bru-ha-ha in Washington. In the first place, I had been Assistant chief of the Children's Bureau and so they couldn't understand how I could be such a traitor. Martha Elliot called me, just furious. I said, "Well, we've got to get over this nonsense that Washington is running California's program. We have a Department of Social Welfare director and I have the responsibility of what goes wrong; I know what is going to be playing and we have got to decide the channels of communication." They gave in after two or three times when it was understood that I told a field representative we had established the principle. Now if something did not have to be discussed with me, Lucille was very reliable as far as I was concerned, and she'd keep me informed. If you want to save time and go directly to her, that is okay as long as you understand that I have to approve everything that you discuss with her in terms of what needs to be done, and I'll discuss this with Lucille from time to time. Now, Alaska immediately picked this up; they'd heard about it and they went further. They integrated their Family and children Services. They were the first, I think, in the country to have a Family and Children Services. Now many welfare and state departments had had it, but the Children's Bureau destroyed these. They separated the children's services from family services; I think Alaska was the first back to using the term Family and Children Services and they integrated the services. We were the focus of great discussion around the country, and I think this was one of our contributions. The Children's Bureau people did not think it was a contribution, and they always held it against me. When I became Commissioner of Social Security, it came up in a

very peculiar fight, which again illustrates there is still a problem. This is what it was.

Mississippi said, “You people in Washington are forcing us to spend a lot of money unnecessarily. We are not permitted to discuss children’s problems through a public assistance worker or you won’t reimburse us for the time spent. Now, we have a family 200 miles from the office. They are on public assistance, getting Aid for Dependent Children. We’re sending out a public assistance worker to have the annual or six months’ reaffirmation of public assistance eligibility, and we would like the public assistance worker to arrange for the family to bring Tommy in for his tonsillectomy.” Children’s Bureau takes the position that the amount of time spent cannot be reimbursed from Child Welfare Services money even if careful records were kept about the time involved; it cannot be reimbursed on the ground that they are not legally entitled to it. Mississippi appealed, and I ruled that this was a perfectly good use of child welfare funds provided that there was an accurate time record of the time spent of Child Welfare Services. If the person spent five minutes on Child Welfare and thirty minutes on public assistance, the department was entitled to receive pay for the whole expense of the trip based on five thirty-fifths of the amount. This created a horrific problem, and Children’s Bureau was very angry because they wanted to keep the thing entirely separate. I think, starting in the late 1950s, the states began to assert themselves on this business of not being able to use one worker for both, and so now on the other hand, this devotion of the child welfare workers and the Child Welfare Bureau and their promotion of Child Welfare Services made it an unusually important contribution to the totality of social welfare in the United States. California is an example. In counties with no trained people either in child welfare or public assistance, the Child Welfare Division brought trained people into the field, and Child Welfare Services money many times introduced the first

trained social worker in the county. They were vigorously militant and dedicated, getting their impetus from the Children's Bureau. What was done in California was then done all over the country, with California an outstanding example.

California Child Welfare Services got every county to separate arrested children from the adults in the prisons; before that the counties would mix them and put the children in a cell right next to the adult criminals. The CWD put these arrested children into foster homes that were a little more disciplined than the normal foster home. Or they got them segregated so they couldn't mingle with the adult prisoners. They got many counties to establish a juvenile court, even though the same judge might be used, but with a different atmosphere; instead of a judge sitting up high, they were all around the table. They brought the social work evaluation studies to the judge; they began to make recommendations as to the disposition of the child in the courts.

They began to develop child welfare divisions in the county welfare departments. They brought in the voluntary agencies to work in the child welfare program to assist the public welfare department or to be referral resources for child welfare programs. The result was not only to upgrade all the children welfare services in the counties, but to upgrade all of the social services in the counties. Some jurisdictional problems were created; child welfare workers were generally paid more than the public assistance workers. Public assistance workers felt that child welfare services were easy jobs whereas they had the hard jobs. They had to deal with the very poor, with the families thrown out in the street because they didn't pay their rent. They had large case loads--larger than the child welfare workers, and there were real tensions. But the contributions of the child welfare workers were really outstanding, and when I was in the Children's Bureau--no, when I was Commissioner of Social Security, I urged the Children's

Bureau to use the case records which child welfare workers had developed on community organizations in child Welfare Services. Martha Elliot wasn't interested in doing anything like that, she just didn't see that as something they ought to be doing.

FELDMAN: I heard that the primary interest had been child health and these other aspects were secondary.

SCHOTTLAND: I don't know if this is important for this interview. There was a real conflict between the health side and the child welfare side. And it had some influence on social work relationships with the health field. It came to a head when Martha (Branscomb) resigned from the Children's Bureau. The secretary had delegated to me the responsibility to head of the Children's Bureau and recommending it to the President because under the law, the President appoints the head of the Children's Bureau; that was established in 1912. The American Medical Association sent a committee to see the secretary, and he asked me to come to the meeting. They were cleverly organized, very cleverly prepared. They said, "We know there is controversy as to whether there should be a health person or a social worker as head of the Children's Bureau. We think that it ought to be a health person because people in the health field have to deal with the totality of children's problems, social workers do not. There isn't any aspect of social work where literature covers the subject of health more adequately and in or greater quantity as the health field. The social workers cover their own field." I looked at them as if they were crazy. They said, "Now let's take various fields and I bet," I wasn't prepared for this. They said, "Name a field of the child welfare." I said I didn't know quite what they were getting at, but let's pick adoption. They said okay. They pulled out a stack of publications on

the adoption of children written by doctors. I knew some of the articles; they were very good, and they talked about the responsibility of doctors, and many of them were very good from a social work point of view, namely that doctors should not be selling babies in connivance with lawyers, that they ought to think in terms of going to a voluntary adoption agency because there weren't too many public adoption agencies at the time. Then they asked me again. I said, guardianship of children. They produced an article that social workers are not interested in guardianship proceedings. They weren't completely fair, you know, they weren't pretending to be. They had a cause. In regard to juvenile delinquency, they produced similar articles by psychiatrists and by others. So I met with a group from NASW, I told them about it and said now they had to come prepared to take positions supporting the heads of the Children's Bureau, there had been four of them, three of them social workers; Julia Lathrop, Grace Abbot, Katherine Lenroot, and one was a doctor, Martha Elliot. The Children's Bureau made its mark on the country through the work of the three social workers, that social work extends to all problems of children, and it was the social workers who fought the problem of child labor, with the Children's Bureau the leader. Social workers had pushed, in the original Social Security Act, for the maternal, child health, and crippled children's programs. You have to make that pitch. The people I talked with were in the committee to meet with the secretary. The chairman of the committee was the only male, and he said, "We don't think its very important as to what the discipline is. We have to get a very good person who understands the field of children and the problems of children." They never pushed the idea of having a social worker. The doctors were mounting a campaign, and Martha Elliot proposed two psychiatrists to take over the program. They were good psychiatrists, but they didn't have the background of a Martha Elliot.

Her background in the non-health field was awfully good too. She had been deputy chief of the Children's Bureau. I tried to get a number of leading social workers interested in the job, and they all turned it down. It was hard to understand because this was a very prestigious job. The leading social workers, the executives, were developing better salaries in the 1950s. I went then to some of the women in academia because I felt the chief had to be a woman, the President indicated all of the directors had been women, and he wanted to appoint a woman. They all turned me down; too big a job for them, they did not want to leave their tenured position, and so forth. Finally, Marion Folsom said to me, "You have to come up with a candidate right away; the white House is pressuring for political appointment. And you may have to make an appointment of an untrained person. And the longer there is a delay, the harder we are going to find it to appoint someone who is not a Republican because the White House is saying you are a Democrat and you are not interested in getting a Republican person in there." And a lot of the white House people didn't like the idea that Eisenhower appointed those damn democrats.

FELDMAN: I remember the press releases about that.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes. I was scouting around and I talked to Katherine. I had lectured at her school a couple of times. Katherine had a good background, had been active in birth control and community programs in the whole area, planning areas, and so forth. I was really frantic; I had to act quickly or otherwise we would be in trouble and she was the only top social worker in the academic field, a top woman and a Republican. I didn't know the other Republicans. All the women that I knew and that they talked about were Democrats or Independents. I consulted with a lot of people in the child welfare field, and so I went ahead.

Now, coming to adoption in California, the child welfare people in California,

particularly at the state level headed by Lucille Kennedy, had an extremely good relationship with the voluntary agencies that were handling adoptions. Independent adoptions did not go through an agency and the child welfare people did a good job of investigating the suitability of the adoptive parents. Their reports to the court were good reports. It was as good a service as in any state public welfare department, much better than New York. She was very good in her politics with the voluntary agencies; they would have regular meetings and one annual meeting in which everybody was represented. I think Lucille Kennedy really wanted to do away with independent adoption. I was in favor of doing away with it too. I felt that you could not regulate independent adoptions, that adoption should be handled by agencies with trained people, because it was so important for the welfare of children. The fact was that many people had money enough to pay doctors to take care of the pregnant unmarried woman and enough money to pay such high fees to attorneys who were making it a business to charge for their legal services and place the baby with a particular family. The situation in California and Montana was very bad. I don't know what it is today. But there were a few attorneys particularly who were making a large sum of money working out deals with doctors. We decided that we had to strengthen the adoption law. The adoption law had been weakened in practice in a number of ways. First, the two adoption agencies and maybe the State Welfare Department, had opposed the organization of adoption agencies in Los Angeles, which would have worked with doctors to get the doctors to give them the babies and then they would place them with all the due care an agency gives, and place them with the priority given that the adopted parents be recommended by the doctor. We decided to license agencies against the opposition of the leaders in the adoption field. I don't know what the ultimate result was--

FELDMAN: Several sectarian and non-sectarian agencies took on adoption programs and continue today. The Adoption Institute lived for ten years, and then went out of business because there seemed to be no further need for it. We had a very good dissertation written on its life story by Carl Shafer who then became a member of our faculty. And the Los Angeles County Adoption Bureau was formed then.

SCHOTTLAND: I think some of us felt that we had to work out somehow to compromise, not to shut out the doctors completely, because the lawyer would take over. There was no way we could control the situation. Second, we found it very difficult to grab hold of the independent adoptions and the sale of babies. Where do you start? Many of the courts were not sympathetic with strict interpretation of the law. We had a situation with St. Anne's Adoption Society--I don't know if you remember this case--it was very famous. We had a case where a woman whose only asset in anything that we knew about was that she was one of the most beautiful creatures, the Hollywood type. She was married, and they took a baby for adoption placed by Seman's. Shortly after the baby was placed, they were divorced and Seman's refused to go along with the adoption. The woman somehow or another got hold of the records, I think, and found out who the natural mother was. She got the natural mother to relinquish the baby to her with the regular form of relinquishment. Therefore, she claimed that this was an independent adoption and the agency had no authority over it. This caused a real bru-ha-ha in the State Welfare Department. We all felt that at the time this would really break down the laws that when a child was relinquished to the agency, the agency becomes the substitute parent and we couldn't have the natural parent coming back, negating the relinquishment to the agency, and making a relinquishment to an individual. It became a really fundamental principle with us and



we urged St. Anne's to get the very best legal counsel that they could. The purported adoptive mother was represented by a woman lawyer, not terribly competent in comparison to the lawyer that St. Anne's had, who was much more competent. The woman had one thing on her side; the judge was a man, and the adopting mother was fantastically beautiful. She didn't have any other qualities that were apparent. All during the trial I kept looking at her. Lo and behold the judge ruled in her favor, on the ground that this was an independent adoption. She could adopt the child and under the general rule of the court of California, the adoption was to be based in the best interests of the child, and the best interest was to leave the child with her. We then went to St. Anne's, suggesting to them that they appeal, get a top Catholic lawyer, top protestant lawyer, and a top Jewish lawyer to handle the appeal and that they must be the best. They must be obvious in their belief that they represented the three major religious heavens. And they did. They got three top notch lawyers. The Appellate Court upheld the Superior court. This constituted a real threat and the first infringement on the rights of voluntary agencies in the adoption field. The deputy attorney general, who was assigned to the welfare department, came to see me and said, "The next issue of the state bar journal will have an article by one of the attorneys, a leader in placing children for adoption. Almost the solo practice in the area of adoption was advising lawyers how to get around the law.

I called the president of the State Bar Association. He was a member of the largest law firm in California and the most prestigious. I told him this was coming out in the Bar Journal, and I thought that it was disgraceful. He said, "We don't exercise censorship in the articles," and it makes sense from a legal point of view. I replied, "Mr. Smith, what you are doing, I think as a member of the California bar, advising lawyers, is advising lawyers how to violate the state

law and that's what the article says--here's a way of getting around the law." I didn't make any progress with him and the article was published. Because of its publication, the Bar Association tried to liberalize the law so lawyers could have a bigger role. Earl Warren said, "Let's not oppose the liberalization. Let's propose amendments tightening up the procedure, not giving the opposition any opportunity to pursue their position; we'll just be for an administration measure which opposes theirs; and it will make the law stricter and more in accordance with what you like." It was a very clever idea. I never would have thought of that political approach. You know, he was a very astute politician. So he did that. Lucille Kennedy worked on the administrative regulation with Vern Gleason and actually got a better law than was opposed by the Bar Association. The lawyers were really out-manuevered, and we got a stricter law. I don't know how the situation is now, but this did have some influence nationally. The child welfare people were aware of this controversy, and I think it influenced some states to move toward the position that all adoptive children had to go through agencies. A number of states did adopt those policies. Since I retired, I've been interested mostly in problems of the aging and disabled and health problems; I don't follow adoption, so I don't know what the present situation is, nor what the trend is in adoptions today.

FELDMAN: The trend is still for agency adoptions, which continues to be in equal proportion to independent adoption. I believe that comic strips provide a window on social issues, and the current Rex Morgan strip is describing the sale of children to potential adoptive parents. Whether that is reflecting change, I don't yet know.

SCHOTTLAND: Unfortunately, independent adoptions often have been quite successful.

Helen Witmer made a study of them many years ago--I guess she is no longer alive--and found that independent adoptions were turning out very well. I told her in advance what she'd find, for several reasons. One, the independent adopting parents generally have greater financial resources and can give the child more. Second, most people with greater financial means are better educated than those without them. You'll not find independent adoptions among many poor people. Very many uneducated people are found in agency adoptions, particularly in the hard-to-place children. Hard-to-place children may be slightly disabled or they may have a little Negro blood in them, or the mother couldn't remember who the father was because she was very democratic in her relationships. Frequently the child was placed in a home that the agency would not have described as its very best home, but because the agency--particularly in the southern states--was wary of a possible racial problem. Generally the people who go in for independent adoptions paid as much as \$50,000 for a baby; five or ten thousand here in California. More generally, in spite of the fact that we didn't like what they were doing, they were probably a better family than many of the others who went through the agency. Where the agency would be judging the character of the person, the need for a child, the fact that they would be devoted parents, and the fact that they may not have too much money and couldn't give the child much--these were not as important as the emotional devotion to the child and character of the parents. At any rate, I think the movement for tightening up adoptions got a big boost from this state particularly, when we began to disseminate some of the case stories that occurred in the public adoption program. We were one of the first states to really develop large public adoption programs. Most of the states still maintained their adoptions and the public's interest in adoption through the voluntary agencies. The states where the Catholic Church was especially

important, such as the New England states, stressed the agency adoption much more than did the other states. Now, when Los Angeles County developed its big adoption program, it was vigorously opposed by the voluntary agencies, but the idea spread like wild fire over the country.

Here is a big county now developing a big public adoption program, and I think it influenced the other counties in the other states to have public adoption programs, which I think was a very, very good development.

FELDMAN: Before you leave the field of children; when you were with the State Department of Social Welfare, was there a great deal of attention to abused and neglected children as we have today? Do you recall anything special about that group.

SCHOTTLAND: We talked about it. We used the term neglected children at the time, and we included child abuse. It wasn't a big issue as it is today. I'm sure there was as much abuse as there is today, maybe a little more because of the breaking up of families. But I think there were numbers of areas where we didn't pay the attention that we should have and are paying attention to today. One was child abuse, another was child guardianship. We had more guardianships appointed over children than we had adoptions in California, no social investigation at the time at all. The courts would appoint anybody as a guardian, particularly for the wealthier children where there were no parents. Since the banks were frequently the trustees of the estate, the court would appoint one of the bank officials the guardian of the child. It seemed to make sense to the lawyers; why separate the money from the child? Have one guardian. So they appointed the damnest guardians, who were just awful. It was really child abuse, and I think it was one of the areas that we basically neglected.

FELDMAN: So it was pure luck good luck if a child landed in the care of someone who was a

caring person.

SCHOTTLAND: There was no social investigation of the guardianship at all. Our child welfare program in California was pretty successful for its time. A lot of things we did were not the best practice today. But remember, we were going through a period, a time when it was a bitter fight to get children out of county institutions. We had a bitter fight when the cottage plans, such as the one in Vista Del Mar, swept the country. We had a bitter fight to get children into foster homes. This cottage plan would say we dislike foster homes. Then the fight became completely logical and there were some social workers who would never send a child to an institution. Even people like Marilyn Monroe should never have been placed in a foster home because she hated adults, and she had been much better with her own peers. It was proven time and time again that certain types of institutional care was much better for children, they were more easily socialized because peer pressure was so great; the peer pressure was generally good pressure. With all those developments, Lucille Kennedy and some of the child welfare workers kept a kind of even hand upon all of them and really, I think, had a profound influence on the totality of child welfare in the state. And Lucille's impulses were all good. The only objection I used to have was her view that nothing else was good except her child welfare program. But that's all right; it is good to have such devoted people in programs, whether delinquency, the program of the Youth Authority, adoption, child placement, institutions of foster family homes. Lucille's hand was felt all over the state. And she did it just by working at it. She wasn't dogmatic in her relations with the agencies. She was dogmatic when it came to fundamental principles and following the child welfare program's regulations. But she made a really outstanding contribution. I don't know if you can measure it; I don't know if you can if you

wanted to develop a case for it, it would take a lot of research, but it's my impression that she was an outstanding individual. Along with the aid of the child welfare workers, she made really a profound impression on the state.

FELDMAN: I have the same sentiments about what she accomplished and, often, over great odds.

SCHOTTLAND: Yes, because you remember there were changes of directors and changes of bosses and there were some people in the department who were not so much interested in the programs. They didn't understand.

FELDMAN: I'd like to ask you about another dimension in the public assistance field. Was it during your time in the State Department of Social Welfare that efforts were made in the legislatures to have a state-wide general relief program? I know there were several bills because all the counties didn't have general relief.

SCHOTTLAND: No, I don't recall that this had any big push.

FELDMAN: I know that there were several efforts in 1939 and 1940, which failed because the legislature still maintained that it was a county option, whether to have a program or not.

SCHOTTLAND: There wasn't anything in 1950-54 when I was there. Primarily, I think it was no great issue because of several things. The counties did not have much of a general relief program outside of Los Angeles County. Even San Francisco didn't have such a big problem.

FELDMAN: San Diego had a small one.

SCHOTTLAND: The reason why the counties didn't have big problems was that the federal categories had taken away their general relief clientele. First was the expansion of ADC to include the unmarried woman, to include the disabled. It took away from some counties the

majority of their relief funds and general assistance people. Many counties did not take care of the unemployed single man or the unemployed father. Therefore, their clients were pretty much those who were unemployable. The totally and permanently disabled program took away that load--more than maybe were entitled under the strict definition of Totally and Permanently Disabled. But the counties administered the program in their interest to get rid of the cases that were costing the county money and to get people on to the disability Assistance Program so they would get state and federal money. I soon learned that their original argument against the programs really cost them more than was saved. If you look at the statistics during that period, the actual dollar amount of money spent on general relief went down in most of the counties because of the Aid to Dependent Children and Disability programs. I think those were the reasons why there wasn't a big push to take over general relief. Later as the population began to grow, general relief began to get a little more expensive. That's my impression, but I wasn't here and I didn't follow it too closely.

FELDMAN: Let me ask you about something else. Do you have any recollection of the Workers' Alliance of America, an active organization of clients?

SCHOTTLAND: The active groups were pushing in the Townsend Movement and then the McLain Old Age Movement. There was no big mass or popular movement affecting children. The movements with reference to the basic welfare policies were not organized primarily around welfare programs. The voters were very important in defeating the McLain program which was passed by the voters originally. When they got the votes, the elderly put in one of McLain's girls. The law took away the power of the governor or the director to appoint, and we voters did a terrific job. Of course they got plenty of money from the big businesses and so forth, but they

did a very good job. Put the Workers' Alliance was not active.

FELDMAN: You have given us very rich material about your role as a professional employed as a social worker. But there were periods when you were a volunteer in social agencies. I wonder if you would say a few words about that. I recall, for example, your activity in the Council of Social Agencies in Los Angeles and there you spearheaded other things as well, implemented toward having adoption programs in more than the Children's Home Society and what was then Sons and Daughters of the Golden West.

SCHOTTLAND: Although other persons involved in that were true volunteers, I still was professional social worker in a professional social work job and looked upon that as part of my job. Probably a lot of people would not consider at that time that I was a volunteer. I was being paid and I considered it, and my board of directors would consider it, part of my job to represent these social service concepts and social work ideas in the community agencies which I was representing agencies through my paid job. On the other hand, many of the other people who chaired committees as I did in the Council of Social Agencies were true volunteers. We did exactly the same thing; maybe I brought a little more knowledge because I was a professional and they were volunteers, most without any background, special education, or anything else. But probably it's a little different from the things that I do today. Now I am truly a volunteer. Although I bring a social work background, I'm not being paid for all my activities on boards, etcetera. Some of them are not strictly traditional social work agencies. I have been connected with The National Seniors Citizens Law Center, which represents the poor aging, for instance. I'm not there as a social worker; I'm there as a person interested in aging.

FELDMAN: But you bring your professional knowledge to bear. And how do you do it?



SCHOTTLAND: I keep up an interest in professional literature so that I can keep current with a lot of the social issues. I could keep current with those same social interest issues by reading literature from other fields--in the field of public administration and the field of health. I read those things too, but I concentrate on and keep up with social work literature.

FELDMAN: Are there any roles a volunteer can play even when the social work background would be more difficult for a professional because of affiliation with another organization?

SCHOTTLAND: I think every professional is influenced in his attitude by the core interest of the professional. It is hard to get away from it because we believe in things, depending on where we sit and where we stand. For example, it's difficult to get caseworkers who had been in practice with individuals all their lives, as volunteers to translate this interest in assisting the individual into such things as legislation to assist masses of people. This is a little exaggerated because it depends on the individual, but even some of the great leaders of social work who were leaders in the casework field would stretch beyond belief in their papers and writing, their approach to social policy issues. For instance, one of them would say in writing as well as orally in lectures that the great contribution of social workers as social workers must come out of their realization of the effect on individuals of social policies. And that there is no way in which social workers can be effective in social policy without the recognition which is brought about in their casework skills and the effects on the individual of the environmental and other forces. Now I'm expressing it as well as I can, and I think a little even better and less dogmatically than they were expressing it. But all the professions do this. The new approaches of many professors in schools of public health is that public health involves the totality of all of society's

activities, that therefore, public health professionals must be interested in and try to influence every aspect of our life because a person's income affects health, a person's relationship to his health affects his health, the relationship between husband and wife, parent and child affects the health of all these people, as does the person's housing. Therefore, the public health profession has an overall responsibility to be involved in everything that affects the public health and everything in the human existence affects the public health. Thus the public health professional has both a responsibility and a great awareness of the impact of all of these influences on society.

But at the same time, every profession has this kind of orientation. Educators can say education can affect a whole lot of societies.

As I think about it, this kind of argument came out in my experience in the Army. Before I went overseas, I was in charge of the program of recruiting people from civil life to be commissioned officers in the Army for military government. We had a large staff doing the recruiting all over the country, but it finally came down to five or six officers under my guidance.

It was very easy to decide if we needed a good lawyer. What were the qualifications of a good lawyer? What were the qualifications of a good public health man? What were the qualifications of a good businessman that would take over the business operations of the community? But then we came to the question about what kind of people do we recruit for the mayor of a city. Who is going to be the type of military person—a major in rank-- we want to run Hamburg or Berlin, Rome, or other places when we set up a military government. Here was the generalist, and we had a real difference in opinion, and we were very close and all friends. We always agreed on the individuals but philosophically, when we began to develop our requirements, we split. When it came to the generalist, Buddy Folgelsen--whose wife was Greer

Garson the movie actress--a multi-millionaire oil man, took the position that the business executive was the best type because other people did not have the totality of experience a business executive has. They dealt with finance, which a town major had to deal with, he dealt with personnel problems; he dealt with labor unions; and so forth. Now one captain took the position that there was no place in American education for training any professional except the schools of business administration, which weren't very good up to that point. The training needed was the way engineers did it to bring men, money, and materials together to achieve an objective, and that's all any type of administration in government was about; your tools were men, money and materials. And he said engineers are the only ones that have that training. Another chap whose name I forget had been superintendent of a school in one of the cities in the state of New York. He took the position that the re-education of Germans was the only way we were going to get Germany back on its feet; so we needed educators. I took the position that all of these people could become a major, but that we had to recognize we had to have people who knew how to organize communities, who knew how to deal with the people who were being dispossessed and poor. Many social workers had the attributes, but recognizing them was a little hard. As an example, I asked who are the outstanding government officers in Italy? Who are the best officers, asked Ernest Witte, a fellow from the Council of Social Agencies in Minneapolis? He mentioned four other officers in the argument and didn't realize that they were all trained social workers.

FELDMAN: It is often harder to sell the good qualities of social workers.

SCHOTTLAND: It is harder, but public health people might deny that I think the value of volunteers, true volunteers, whatever their background, once they became a volunteer, they are

not quite as dictated to intellectually by their professional associations. The thing is that they are free to express themselves without worrying about offending colleagues. I think the value of volunteers is that they don't just represent a profession. They represent the community as a whole; whether they think they do or not, they do. They may not be very good at it; they may not intellectualize it. Take for instance the registration of social workers in California. The leaders originally promoting this were professionals. Father Lucy, Herbie Witchief, but a lot of these earlier professionals were not professionally trained, did not have an MSW degree because people couldn't get an MSW degree in those days. They didn't even go to a school for social work. But by any standard, they were professional social workers. When it came to pushing for the legislation, it was first a lot of board members on the boards of the various agencies that began to push the idea in the State Conference of Social Welfare. Out of the State Conference came the movement which later resulted in the voluntary registration and then, from then on, the job was to get registration through the legislature. But here was a particularly professional goal; yet the ball was carried by volunteers. I think there is importance in getting volunteers involved in social action things.

FELDMAN: Are there any additional points you want to mention that you think posterity ought to bear in mind?

SCHOTTLAND: Let me first go into a little sermon. I think the future of social work depends on the decisions to be made in the political arenas of this country. The fundamental decisions are not going to be made by educational institutions or by the professions; they may influence the basic decisions, but the battles are going to be settled in the political arena. This is

a nation of laws. Our type of democracy and what Congress does in Social Security and public assistance will affect the income of the masses of our population. What they do in the economy will affect unemployment. What they do in terms of laws, rehabilitation programs, mental health programs, will affect juvenile delinquency. The whole breakdown of the family or the strengthening of the family will be affected by laws of marriage, divorce, child support, status of the housewife--all these things are affected by the basic social policies in the political arena. So there is importance in social workers and the profession getting involved in social actions; these political arenas become increasingly important as our society becomes more complicated. And we must remember that in a capitalist society, money plays a terrifically important role against ideology. The overwhelming majority of the funds in the social work field comes from public sources. Whatever field of social work it is, the majority of the money comes from public sources either directly or indirectly. Although the profession has in the last 25 years recognized this, and has been more engaged in social action, the social action has been more of the old fashioned kind of social action which involves letters, parades, mass meetings, etc.; its not the kind of social action which in my opinion in this modern complicated society is the most effective. That is the development of a good factual case for our programs and placing it in arenas where it needs to be placed. We are still taking social action primarily in the legislative branches of our government and that's not where all of the action is. The action is also in the executive branch and increasingly, in the court. Policy and law are being made not by the legislative body alone, but by the executive branch, and the courts. Frequently the regulations of the executive branch are law just as much as the statutes of Congress. The regulations of a commissioner of Social Security or Surgeon General are properly published in accordance with

federal procedures and take precedence over a statute of the California legislature if it involves federal funding and federal programs. They cannot negate the intent of Congress through regulation. The courts are increasingly making law. Some states are now governed by them like a decision that says that a mentally ill person has the right to professional treatment. There is no statute that says that. The courts reasoned that a person was denied civil rights when he was committed to a state hospital; he didn't have the right to have a trial or be confronted by witnesses. In some states, two doctors can sign off to general practitioners. The convicted person could say he was mentally ill, and he went to a state hospital. Therefore, being deprived of civil rights, he had a right to treatment since the purpose of depriving him was to treat him. The courts established a new right in America.

Review of the budget never gets any real pressures from the social work profession, from social workers generally except for a few individuals, who are not necessarily organized. The administration makes up a lot of policies. Ronald Reagan issued a directive that says we will not pay for legal services for the poor; that is not a program or an interest of the federal government. I suppose Congress couldn't override the President, who was strong enough. He would have made the law and not the Congress. My sermon is that we've got to get more interested in the other two branches of government where many areas of the action are. The arenas are in the bureaucracy and in the state and the local legislative bodies, the counties, the cities, counties in California, cities in New York.

FELDMAN: Your sermon is compelling, instructive, and interesting. Charles, I want to thank you on behalf of our group for the very rich material that you have given us on these cassettes. We are going to make good use of them and make them available to scholars. Thank you.

