

AN INTERVIEW WITH FRANK MCNAMARA

Ed Hummel: I'm here with Frank MacNamara and we're doing an oral history. This is Friday, January 10th, 1997.

Frank McNamara: As I understand, what you'd like me to do initially is to give a background of myself. I'm Frank McNamara, Francis X. McNamara, Jr., which I always used to use. I was born in H____, Mass., I went to school in H____, a parochial setting; I went to Holy Cross College where I received my B.S. degree and also my naval commission in February of '45. I then served in the South Pacific, came back and had three years of the G.I. Bill.

Initially, I had no knowledge of the social work movement; I was getting ready to go to Harvard Business, although I couldn't get in the September '46 Class. So having three years of the G.I. Bill I decided everybody I knew was going into Law School so I'd take a year of Law, it'd never hurt me because I never wanted to be a lawyer. So I was going to Boston University Law and commuting from H____ to Boston on the B&M train when a fellow by the name of Bill Carrigan, who was a classmate of mine at Holy Cross, was going to the Graduate School of Social Work at Boston College. Bill started talking to me about this whole new program of community organization which only Boston College and Ohio State were offering at the time. B.C. was only taking four students in a seminar type of program.

Well, about April of the year I was going to law school I finally went over to the Graduate School of Social Work and interviewed with a person who had the responsibility for admissions. I found out more about the school, got interested in it, then found out that of the four spots, three had already been taken. So, I applied, right then and there. I also applied again to Harvard Business.

Interestingly enough, I went down to visit a favorite uncle in Washington, D.C., who happened to be the head of the CYO program for the Washington archdiocese, when my mother called and said, "What are you going to be doing?" She said, "You've just received a telegram from B.C. admitting you to there, you have a letter accepting you to Harvard Business, and a letter from B.U. Law School asking if you wish to live in."

I said, "Well, this is surprising, I never anticipated it." But I had made a thing in my mind that if I got the first seat, then the Good Lord must want me to be thinking of that field. So I ____ with my uncle about the future of the Social Work Movement, and then I made the decision to go to the Graduate School of Social Work rather than Harvard Business.

Following obtaining my Master's degree in Social Work, in which I had interesting things happen: in my second year field placement at Lynn, Massachusetts Community Chest -- the executive director, who was a graduate of Ohio State, on the day the board was meeting to set the goal, he was only thirty-two years old, he ____ a virus and that evening choked to death. So I was left by the school to be there during that campaign without there being an executive and I watched a group of volunteers run that campaign and I did learn a lot of how not to do something, in actuality.

After the campaign was over, I was sent down Quinsey, Mass. for the planning and allocations phase of the Community Organization program. When it came time to graduate and we were putting out our papers and resumes, the four of us had great discussions on whether we should go into a large community chest or go out on your own, initially. Interestingly enough, two thought they should go into a large community chest (there wasn't a United Way in those days) and two wanted to go individual. I was one of the ones [who wanted to go individually], and the job in my old home town opened up and I applied (I was twenty-four at this point) and I got the job as Executive of the H____, Mass. Community Chest and Council.

One of the things I learned is that if I had another life I would never [have gone] back to my home town because everybody I had known as Mister Ewing, Mister McGregor and so forth, I had to all of a sudden change over and become George, Lawrence, etcetera. And they were that much older than I and I had always been told to respect my elders.

Now then, the first campaign was really a learning experience. My campaign chairman (it was a community chest and council so we had both the planning allocations and they were separate parties), the followers campaign chairman had a leather business and he had determined he was going to liquidate his business because he was losing money. So all of a sudden this twenty-four year old novice didn't realize that he still had a lot of assets. All he talked about was how troubled he was and so I learned you can never have a campaign chairman who's going to cut his gift as the kickoff to the campaign. [It was] probably one of

two of the hardest campaigns I ever had in my life. However, we raised about eighty-nine thousand dollars but it was a ninety-six thousand [dollar] goal.

Following that we got a good campaign chairman; a person who was truly committed, a fellow who'd never had a college education, who was a Ford dealer, but who really believed in people having needs and programs.

On the question of campaign structure, I started to learn a little bit about but ...[tape is paused]... more horizontal than vertical because the volunteers get more involved if they were at the top. It was just a little learning experience at that point. I also learned that the campaign chairman had to give more than the year before to set the tone. It was a learning experience.

One of the most interesting experiences I learned about was employee campaigning. In the first campaign, H_____ being a city with a great number of shoe factories, and shoe factories were very depressed but also very seasonal, and my father and my grandfather had been in the shoe business all their lives. Now they weren't H____ and H_____ at this time anyways, and the first year I ran a campaign I found nobody was working in the shoe factories.

So I said to my father, "When do they work?" and he told me the seasons ...[tape is paused]... a shoe employee campaign the first part of July with wood heel people on up as the shoes progress into the cutting and so forth, you went through the various stages. I also found there further that there was no loyalty because people would work for whatever the length of the run was. Well, I also determined that therefore you couldn't develop a committee inside the company that would have much spirit about the company. So I knew that if you could get a group of people together to tell the story before you ask them for any money, the people were much more generous because of the fact that they'd heard in the group what it was all about and their minds were open because they're just a part of a group.

So I suggested that what we needed to do was to get the owners to allow us to come in to present our stories and shut down the power. Well, because of the shoe industry the people were on piece work and the union complained: you couldn't do that, you'd have a rebellion. Well, I found that ...[tape pause]... they convinced ...[tape pause]... similar. Now what we do is bring agency volunteers in and we'd organize every morning a group of agency volunteers. They would come in as the solicitors and on these two shoe factories that we'd picked, we'd shut the power while one of the volunteers in there would go around and the other place the volunteers just went in and went around. Well when we shut down the

power we had no reaction but we had proceeds that equalled nine times what we got when we didn't shut down the power. The union fellow was just a happenstance, so we took two more factories and it proved out that it was twenty to one!

So we also started learning a little thing about the group dynamics. What happened with industry is that people go back after hearing the story and if you're for example in the stitching room where you have a whole line of women who are stitching, if the first person took out a dollar and handed it to you, the whole row gave a dollar, if the person signed a pledge, [etc.], so we learned a little group dynamic, we learned to say even if the person wanted to give a dollar do you mind having it done through the payroll so I won't have to handle it. You know, this is an agency volunteer, I don't want to handle something ...*[tape pause]*... so we'd put the dollar back in their pocketbook and sign a card. So then the other people would start doing similarly.

Really what you found out also was since we didn't have films in those days it was all just from the community and so forth. I spoke at every one of these floors and could watch the faces of the people and their interests and also took note that as you talked about services it was best to try to identify yourself with some services, that would then put themselves thinking about services they were using.

For example, I would use the fact that I, as a kid, had used the Boys Club, paid a nickel for the membership, etcetera, and everybody might think that was enough to run the club, but it wasn't. What we were doing was -- we used the fact of it ...*[tape pause]*... in need of a visiting nurse, he could afford to pay, but the nurse had to be available for those who couldn't afford to pay. And you're through a few agencies like this, and then you might, since there was a Society of Prevention of Privelege of Children in the state of Massachusetts, you learned to bring in one or two cases of that.

But you had about five minutes and then you'd try to save . . . you would ask the bookkeeper coming in how long the run was and if it was ten weeks you'd talk about (and this is 1950) a dollar a week for ten weeks, a dollar a week for five weeks, two dollars for five weeks, and you'd try to relate that to seventeen agencies and what that represented to each agency. And so, making it human, making it a group orientation and then an easy solicitation thereafter because there aren't even solicitors in the talk. So, this was a great learning experience.

Now, in the second year of the campaign we set a goal of one hundred and eleven thousand [dollars], and we got to one hundred and six and we were close to closing when the top volunteers said, "We can't allow this to be a failure." And so

we had five night meetings in a row, at people's homes to review and then our campaign chairman and the bank president even went to a local bar and sat in there all day when the shoe manufacturer's came in and resolicited people, came back and we'd then get together and say what they obtained that day, and in five days we went five hundred and eleven thousand and we just saw it. It was a spirit that really grew with the community, the community was fantastic.

Unfortunately, at that time, in the middle of that campaign, I came back from the Holy Cross - Syracuse football game to find a big brown envelope recalling me into the Navy for the Korean War. I got a deferment until December the 1st to finish the campaign, these volunteers were so hyped up they all came together and they froze themselves into the positions they had until I would return. So for two years, the volunteers with my bookkeeper ran the organization. This is one of the things about a hometown.

I came back and the campaign had been a . . . they had raised less than I had raised the year that I left. And there was a particular individual who was really a strong campaigner and a Jewish philanthropist who felt he had accomplished everything he could accomplish and the community could not go any place and I happened to sit on the allocation meeting before coming back full-time. And it happened to be that there's a person on that committee who was executive V.P. of a savings bank, whose name would not identify that he was related to me, sitting there. This person, who had led the campaign and was board chairman, we had to send our word to the agencies that the greatest amount of money that could ever be raised here has been raised. any expansion is going to have to come from within each of you, etc.

So, this fellow said to me, "Do you think that's true, Frank?" . . . (laughs) . . . and I said, "I'm positive that the greatest amount of money that could have been raised this year has been raised. However, I think we can get more involvement of a lot more people."

The president said. "You're a young man, you'll see."

So anyways, we had a very interesting problem with that and this may have to be eliminated. I found out that this particular individual and my bookkeeper were having an affair! And this made it very, very difficult to say the least to come back into. She was a capable person, very capable, and she was married. We had a campaign chairman who had a successful local business, who happened to be, at the time, the chairman of the American Red Cross chapter there and in a small

community the pay levels and so forth, the amounts of who you're recruiting to be executives ...[tape pause]

What ultimately happened was that my bookkeeper became the executive of the Red Cross chapter! And my board chairman became the chapter president of the American Red Cross! Well, it was the greatest agency that ever existed at that point. However . . . (laughs) . . . there we were and we set a goal of . . . they had raised a hundred and six, I think, the year before I got back and set a goal of a hundred and twenty-three and raised about a hundred and twenty-six ...[tape is paused]

And there are a lot of interesting stories, a lot of work done with agencies which I could talk about but not many people are going to know about H____, Massachusetts. It was a nice community which was the perfect size community to go in and learn. You have all the aspects of what needs to be done in every community, the various larger communities just need to be broken down into segments or structured in such a manner as to have the same flow of information and understanding and commitments by volunteer leadership.

In 1955, I had an interest in some opportunities and actually I almost decided to go to Sioux City, Iowa, when I was called by United Way of America which everybody should realize is nothing but a trade association, in fact. Most people think it's run by United Way of America and not their local communities and this should really be highlighted because, especially of late, everybody starts talking about local chapters and all this, if you want to be a part of United America you can be, you don't have to be. Well, the person _____ value to the communities was because of the fact that they kept resumes on people and the fellow who was heading up United Way of America's personnel office called and said they wanted me to hold up in making my decision [about Sioux City, Iowa] because the people in Newport, Virginia wanted to interview me. Well I knew my papers had been there since April, this is now June, and so he asked and ...[tape pause]... so I said, "Why?" and he said, "They think you're too young, that's why they haven't had you down there."

So ...[tape pause]... came and the fact that I went down, and here's a community that never raised its goal in history and had raised a hundred and ninety-eight thousand versus Sioux City which was raising five hundred thousand. Now, I really got bothered by the fact that the administrative assistant of the chairman committee called me and asked me to come down and not the chairman. But she did a tremendous sales job on the community and how it was really coming alive and

business and so forth, so I said, "Okay, I'll come down." Then, nobody even met me at the airport!

I got down and I went to the local hotel there and walked around the corner to the office to find that the office of the Newport News ____ Community Chest was on the second floor of like a hole, what do you call it, a tenement. I walked up this narrow stairway and I walked up to the front office where the two women were working, the miracle workers, and they had hanging lights, no fluorescent lights! They had two dark rooms back in the executive's office and the executive's office had a window out and they had a piece of cardboard! . . . (laughs) . . . Everything you wouldn't think of.

Interestingly, what had happened was, the board chairman who was a great volunteer but did not have much ...[*tape pause*]... an old time name in the community. What he had done was he had created some committees, and not just the board members; and for the personnel committee he had gotten a guy to be chairman who was really the second most powerful person in the community. Of course I didn't know that at the time but it was a very strong committee, one of whom was the publisher of the newspaper, and so the interview was to take place at the newspaper board room. I have to tell you there was about eighteen people there. Probably the best interview I ever had in the social work movement.

So, there was an other person out in the hall when I came out of the interview after me. I had taken note of the chairman of the committee having stated that he had never really been involved in the Community Chest ...[*tape pause*]... He said, "Here's the keys to my car." Showed me where I could find it. "Why don't you ride around the community and come back to my office at five o'clock or six o'clock."

It was a hot, hot day and it was a dry community. So I went off to the Officer's Club at Langley Air Force Base and had a cool drink . . . (laughs) . . . coming back from the Air Force base the rearview mirror of his car fell off! I don't know what caused it to, but anyways. Interestingly enough, I'd always had a deal which I would never state what I wanted for my salary, I never have indicated a salary in my life. I'd say, "This is what I'm making, now it's you to offer me what you think you should offer and I'll make the decision of whether I'll come." It'll be based on the professional side of it and not on the fun.

Now Sioux City (you have to go back to those years of difference in terms of money) had offered me eighty-five hundred which was a good job ...[*tape pause*]... I got back to his office and they offered me the job and they offered me

eighty-five hundred! And I always [wondered] how the hell they determine this, but anyways.

I didn't give an answer then, and I told them a couple of days later, I said: "There's two questions. One of them has to do with the factor that you haven't been involved with the Community Chest _____. If I say yes to you, will you be involved, personally?" ...[tape pause]... was sixty percent Black. Now _____ was a residential community. "You know, I'm gonna be coming in and I'm going to be known as a Yankee. What I wish to do is I wish to be able to sit with you and maybe one or two others to discuss these difficult positions, and see where I think you should be. And I want to be able to know that I'm going to have support."

...[tape pause]... and he was old at the time ...[tape pause]... Sioux City sues when they hear the news!! But, anyway. We got down there . . . I went down on August the 15th, 1955, and a fellow by the name of Herbert B. Kelley (by the way the name of the chairman of the committee was Lloyd Nolan; and at the time, Nolan Plumbing & Hardware was the largest independent hardware and plumbing supplier to the Southeast); now Kelley was a young attorney ...[tape pause]... a very, very bright and interesting story of a person, a fellow who was the son of the police chief of Williamsburg, who later, after I left, became the chairman of the board of Regents of _____. He's a fellow that is still today, about as close a friend as I have.

So, the start of August . . . they had voted the goal when I got there, a twenty-five percent increase! I had indicated in my interview, because I had done it in H____, that I believed in having _____, and I had been successful in H____, the four years that I did it. But I assumed that they would wait until I got there! The goal was two-hundred and fifty-two thousand, they raised one [hundred] ninety-eight. Outside of the campaign chairman on August the 15th, they didn't have a single other person contribute. They had no kind of structure and my campaign chairman, my first night there, he gave five times more than he had given the year before, which was still not right for what he was earning I found out later, but it was still five times more than what he'd been giving!

So, he said, "I assume you have some sort of commitment from Lloyd Nolan, who was the ...[tape pause]... and I said, "He should really be chairman of our advanced gifts division." Lloyd had also invited us down and had a nice dinner for my wife and I ...[tape pause]... a nice conversation ...[tape pause]... broaden the campaign structure more than it ever had been but not as broad as it should have been and ultimately wanted it.

Lloyd was away and was not due back until after Labor Day ...[t.p.]... could we get to. We had a date with Lloyd about the first day after he got back ...[t.p.]... and so we went back and forth and so forth and Lloyd finally says, "I'll give you a call tomorrow."

So [the campaign chairman?] says, "Lloyd how long would you keep an employee downstairs in the business if he allowed somebody to say, 'I'll give you a call back, I'm selling a bathtub.'" (laughs)

Lloyd says, "Not very long."

And he says, "Well tonight I'm selling bathtubs." I remember these discussions as vividly as if they were yesterday. So, Lloyd's wife called a couple of times, and finally he says, "Look, I'll give you a meeting tomorrow then."

So we went back, we had a meeting for two o'clock and we said, "We can't go into this just the two of us alone." So we brought a third, another volunteer with us and brought a baseball bat! Sitting there as he came back from lunch -- he accepted!

And he says, (and he's all tied up in his father's estate), and he says, "I don't have any time until October the 4th at 4 p.m." This is now the first of September, and the campaign is to be that fall! We don't even have an advanced gifts list, never mind run a campaign!

So we went back on October the 4th and decided we had to get an evaluation committee. Who should be on the advanced gifts? But before we could do that . . . nobody was a giver. Because they hadn't run any campaigns, really. All these people had to be oriented and solicited first before they could be on the evaluation committee so they could evaluate properly. Well, Lloyd and R____ run up a role and responsibility of an evaluation committee person.

I recall the first person he called was the president of the Bank of Virginia, and he says, "Eddie, you gonna be there for ten minutes?"

And he says, "Yeah."

He says, "I'm gonna come by and it's gonna cost you time and it's gonna cost you money."

So we got a group of about fourteen but we needed to have the right chairman. Well, I find out later, that a key individual in Southern politics is the judge (in the legal system) ...[t.p.]... Smith was the perfect person who had everybody believe in Herbert. And the job entailed meeting for five days in a row the review list -- and these are all the top people, it was really . . . and he had solicited every one of these people and won. We also realized that we needed to get

. . . by the numbers of people we needed to make it successful, we had to get twenty-five captains who didn't want anybody between themselves and the twenty-five captains. So, he would go out and recruit the captains, and at the same time he would recruit them he would solicit them.

But he had the evaluation and he then had a meeting of the twenty-five captains at his home for them to pick their prospects. They decided that they needed to have something to get these people to feel the change at the (then) Community Chest. [We decided that] we'll have a dinner at the only ____ hotel in all the ____ _____, they had five hotels. So they had a dinner and invited all of them there, and he said, (____ had a great speaker at the time, I forget what his name starts with . . .) [t.p.] And so he had about three hundred people come to this dinner ...[t.p.]... it was a dawn to-dusk campaign.

He had a breakfast for all the workers and in that one day we raised about a hundred and forty-thousand dollars. Within fifty thousand of what the ____ had ever raised, in this period. So the campaign was very, very successful, it was being very successful, and they've never had a victory, they've never had anything to celebrate, and so I said, "Herb, the community has never had a success, we're going to have great success but I can't say that we can have any kind of an affair unless everybody's there."

[t.p.]... from the black community, from ...[t.p.]... dinner at a hotel which at that time still didn't recognize ...[t.p.]... and he says, "I think you're right, but I don't know what we should do about it."

Well, I don't hesitate to have my first board meeting discuss it. So we brought back the selection committee, with one exception, who was ____ black and had been on the selection committee ...[t.p.]... thought it was a great idea. Once again I ____ go see what Judge Smith had to say.

He said, "It's a good idea, probably, we probably should allow it. It's good for the community. About fifteen or twenty of us might have problems, but we might be out of town that night. If you can get the hotel to allow it."

Well, hell the hotel was one of the chairman of advanced gifts, so it was chairman of ____ who had brought me there. So we got them to turn their back on the fact that we had a dinner of over four hundred people out of which about eighty were black. First integrated dinner ever held in _____. And from that time forward there was no problem.

I can recall getting to the hotel because of course people were working as volunteers and particular divisions and residential areas and so forth, so I thought perhaps they should be sitting at tables that might be ...[t.p.]...

". . . you tell them, I'm not going to go and tell them!" No problem came out of that. We had a campaign that went from 198 to 286 [thousand dollars], thirty-four thousand dollars over the goal. Interestingly enough, the following year, the Hampton Community Chest, which had raised seventy thousand dollars ...[t.p.]... We set a goal the following year with just the Hampton Chest coming in which was, now we had a ____ of three hundred and ten thousand. So we set a goal based upon the budget of the agencies and all that, of four hundred and twenty-five thousand. So we hit five [hundred and] eleven [thousand dollars]. The following year we brought in the Red Cross and made it a United Fund and even created a health foundation, since the health agencies were ____ing because national policy was against them. We created a health foundation with an allocation of ninety-eight thousand and set a goal of about seven hundred thousand.

The following year was an interesting perspective. By now we have great rapport with the gal who covered us with non-profit people. Meanwhile while we're bringing the Hampton Community Chest in ...[t.p.]... a vote better be taken, that November of Hampton, ____, and ____ merging into one city politically. And of course, the business people really wanted it because ...[t.p.]... whether I want this quoted on tape, we'll strike it out if you . . . it's a very sensitive situation. Certainly the business community which -- the power of business was all located in the city of ____ which was only four and a half square miles, which had this ____ balance of six to one black and they wanted the base to be broader to the total community because it was really one residential area. But Hampton was a very . . . they tried to stay separate from ____ and everything going, so when this was coming up for a potential merger the calls I got from business were: "Don't you allow this thing to come to a vote on the Hampton Chest merging with ____ unless you're sure they're going to vote for it." Well we got the vote, we got the merger, which was really a . . . quite an interesting ...[t.p.]... some other way out of the side. It's the first community which I found . . . they talk about the buying of votes. Well you used to see precincts would vote (within the black community) 847 to 2,950 to 5, I mean there's no doubt what was happening it had to be . . . I mean, it's impossible to have such one-sided votes!

It was a great learning experience, though and we had a great planning council, which we had as a separate entity. And we did a lot of merging of

agencies during this particular period of time. I found a very interesting thing from a social work community's standpoint, they had both a white and a black YWCA. The black YWCA was probably the most successful YWCA model that I ever saw in my life. Before or since. It had, within the school system, a great program -- I can't imagine any groupwork agency being more successful than this one.

Anyways, from seven [hundred and] ninety-six [thousand dollars], the amount we raised, we now ...[t.p.]... fourteen ...[t.p.]... when the budgets came in the following year, the budgets were less than what we had raised.

So I can remember saying to the Executive Committee, "I said lookit, we got to set the goal by what the budget committees have recommended. But with a campaign of eight-hundred something-odd thousand dollars you can put some money in for a reserve. It's a disaster to set a goal less than what you've raised." I can remember saying to the executive, "Lookit, you people hired me as a professional, just believe me, I'm standing on my head in the middle of this table telling you -- don't do it!" And they did it.

They said, "We've been honest with this community . . . " Well, you talk about a tough campaign. It's the only time we've had to extend our campaign in all the time I was in _____. Interestingly enough the city of _____, by the way the election -- Hampton voted against the merger . . . The city of _____, the city of Hampton and the city of _____, had each been giving, it's the only place it ever happened that I know of ...[t.p.]... thousand dollars to the ...[t.p.]... the reason they were, no, one of the reasons that they did it was they were turning down people like the visiting _____ and paying fees for services. They had a real bargain! Now interestingly, the publisher of the newspaper has now become the mayor of the city, the merged city of _____ and _____. ...[t.p.]... covering us happened to be at the desk next to the political reporter. ...[t.p.]... "I'd like to do a story on all the other communities in Virginia whether they give gifts to the United Way or not."

We had great relations, in fact, the personal head of development for the Hampton Institute was active with us. So we went out to his office with the reporter, our reporter, the non-profit reporter and we set up a whole series of questions and we called each of the same cities that we knew they were calling. ...[t.p.]... how much was going into _____, how much was going here, how much was going there. The day that the newspaper article hit saying: "_____ is one of the only communities giving money directly to the Community Chest." The afternoon newspaper, which was run by the same people had a story saying: "_____-_____ is saving over five hundred thousand dollars by giving the _____!"

(laughs) So we just knocked them right on the head. So it's just the fact that we had a great relationship with the reporter who was willing to tip us off and we then developed a story that knocked them into the no man's land.

So we got our twenty-five thousand for each of the cities or fifty thousand now with the merged city. So it's just another interesting aspect of ...[t.p.]... I would say that if a person were looking to live in a particular size community, a community of about two hundred thousand people is perfect from the viewpoint of . . . the social life is pretty much all centralized, the cultural life is big enough to bring culture in and afford it and it's just a -- well, you have to have other things that go with it, we were fortunate enough to be there when the community started to emerge as a result. It was a fantastic experience, we raised near ninety thousand my last year, and the campaign chairman my last year there was the fellow who was the chairman of the selection committee when I went there and interesting aspect, by this time we'd done a lot of things new. He had developed a whole thing of line solicitation which was ...[t.p.]... you orient them and then ...[t.p.]... instead of doing that you let them try for about three or four years.

Interestingly as far as I would only solicit personally the board chairman or the campaign chairman or I would one and then the other person would come with me to do the other. I thought of myself as to who to go see this fellow who I knew by now a very well off person -- this was still 1959 -- and so I decided I'd go by myself. There were a lot of interesting aspects to it. He had had his administrative assistant sitting in on the selection committee. ...[t.p.]... challenge me or something. So we had a guideline of over three hundred thousand dollars -- for this person a generous gift would be four percent. I never say figures I just say the concept. He said, "Well I'm not going to give you a figure until you tell me what you think that is."

...[t.p.]... ". . . well, you're just not going to get a figure."

So I finally said, "O.K., Lloyd, I think you should give twenty thousand dollars, personally." ...[t.p.]... ". . . dollars to my wife!"

I said, "Lloyd, I had no idea. You said you wanted a figure . . ." There was a story in the paper about a tax problem and it mentioned five hundred thousand and I didn't know whether it was one year, two years or three years but I wasn't taking a chance. So he gave twelve thousand five hundred [dollars].

All these things are so intriguing from a personal perspective. You learn that if, well, I learned quickly and easily that I'll never have to . . . you know, people think of a two on one solicitation being a pressure solicitation, that was no

pressure. A pressure solicitation is when it's one on one. The person who's being solicited and the person who is soliciting are both defensive. Whereas if you have an orientation meeting in a group and then you have a two on one sit-down discussion, you make it a discussion -- you discuss ____ the orientation meeting in the group and do you believe in this, do you believe in that -- you never say figures, you let them come to their own guiding factor. That really makes it an easy type of situation.

So, I had the opportunity, then I was offered an opportunity to be president of a company ...[t.p.]... and I had the offer for Rhode Island, to go to Rhode Island as the executive and I went to this Herb Kelley who was a lawyer, the ____ lawyer for the company and ...[t.p.]... my wife loves it here, we ...[t.p.]... in the process of getting a doctorate from Ohio State. ...[t.p.]... chairman called him and asked him to get back. He completed his dissertation and while he was back getting his doctorate we were discussing firing him. So this big release from Ohio State, the youngest doctorate . . . a month later he's fired.

Now he's a young enough man that I try to protect him, which I did. And he got a job ...[t.p.]... Council of Social Services as the research director. But then, well, I'll complete that story. I went to his boss and said, "Look, I don't want to hear anything coming out of . . ." ...[t.p.]... executive and said, "What happened?"

He says, "I fired him."

I said, "Did Dr. Cannon call you to f____ our reference?" (He was the top guy.)

He says, "Nope."

...[t.p.]... the number two person ...[t.p.]... because of this resume. About two years later, maybe three -- I didn't realize he wasn't with the State Health department any more -- he was now representing Medicare for the whole Newark area (laughs), and I said, "Oh, what a resume does that nobody ever checks." So anyways, that's an aside, needless to say.

Well, I left in January of 1960 to go to a community in Rhode Island. I was offered the job the year before but I told them that my papers weren't active, in fact I'd never had my papers active. I told them before I went up that there's no way I could take the job this year.

They said, "We still want to interview you." So I went up and they said, "The number two person we will have as an acting executive."

And I just said, "I just want you to know . . ." ...[t.p.]... Having been through the ____ - ____ situation, I determined I would do one thing before I was going to take it. I asked Lloyd Nolan about the fact of being involved and about the problems and knowing that they didn't have top leadership involved in Rhode Island, to the level it should be ...[t.p.]... philosophies ...[t.p.]... and he would say ...[t.p.]...

". . . to get into the whole allocation process and the planning process and how the total picture is." Generally speaking, at that time, it probably was like a 5 to 1 ratio of dollars that were involved in the budgets of the agencies (like the United Way) versus the dollars you raised.

So you know, I said, "You are really directing not the amount of money you're raising but five times that?"

And in Rhode Island, Catholic charities were separating the _____. ...[t.p.]... a Catholic fellow who was the executive before me ...[t.p.]... and they felt that that was ...[t.p.]... I go to the newspaper publisher who was one of the people I was interviewing and they had given me the vice president ...[t.p.]... so anyways, I had heard that the newspaper was about to do a series of stories on what's wrong with United Funding ...[t.p.]... the p.r. staff at the United Fund and they wanted to take a shot at the ...[t.p.]... finally I said, "What do you think are the greatest weaknesses and strengths of the existing United Way?"

"Well, they're not involved, I guess they don't really have all the leadership they need."

My third question ____, "I can't ask you, but if the community were to ask you, would you accept responsibility as a leader?"

So I [thought] based upon that answer is whether I'm going to come to Rhode Island or not, because you can't do anything without leadership. You have to know that before you have hat in hand, you can't say it after you've taken the job. So, when I got to the publisher, he said, "Well, you know I can't get involved because sure we have editorial comment we have to make and all this."

And I said, "The community is a little bit bigger than editorial comment -- you can still make editorial comment whether you're involved or not. You can even take action in the organization and ____ ____ _____. That's an old time thesis of newspapers."

And he says, "I'm about to do a series of stories on what's wrong with the United Fund . . . " ...[t.p.]... (laughing).

I says, "You can't have . . . you have to have the top leaders involved." And so, sure enough, the stories came out; they did put an extra article about leadership having to be involved, which had not been involved but the Catholic Bishop was really hit and he was a pompous Irishman, and ...[t.p.]... he said yes ...[t.p.]... one person in Rhode Island other than the selection people ...[t.p.]... had been a classmate of my father's at Holy Cross who had been was a speechwriter for John Castori. I called Tom M_____ in Washington ...[t.p.]... he said, "My advice to you, is if it's r_____ . . ." ...[t.p.]... a year ...[t.p.]...

Now I go to Rhode Island and interestingly enough I . . . missed a long time back here, telling you my feelings about ...[t.p.]... the key elements of the allocation process that I believe was ...[t.p.]... in the allocation process is the key to the whole United Way movement. ...[t.p.]... know and feel ...[t.p.]... money for money's sake ...[t.p.]... the allocation process can therefore only be utilized in a H_____, Mass., you know I had the big twenty member committee, but when I got to N_____-____s I had about eight or nine budget panels with about fifteen people. Knowing that these things were all intertwined I had letters sent by the board chairman to the head of Catholic charities, the head of the ...[t.p.]... come to serve on the allocation process.

So, I had two other things going for me, being a Holy Cross Graduate, and of the Boston College Graduate School. I was invited to alumni meetings and usually the Bishop would show up at those meetings. I just went to the meetings and I would up and just say, "My name's Frank McNamara." ...[t.p.]... At the same time we had started adoption proceedings (and I may not put this in) ...[t.p.]... we had a new Catholic community, so since we'd moved we had to start all over again. So, the director of Catholic charities who had come out of the budget panel I had got to just meet, he became my case worker.

...[t.p.]... I could tell you he case worked her, and he discussed business with me (laughs). And, you know, the interesting aspect of it all, to give a little bit of an ending to this whole story and then ...[t.p.]... was a B.C. graduate, School of Social Work graduate also ...[t.p.]... put up the money ...[t.p.]... become a dean of the School of Social Work ...[t.p.]... we never even had met! So, I told him the story of what I had said to the publisher and my _____ said, "Now run a campaign."

I heard the head of Grinnell(?), Jim Fleming, complain, (Grinnell made all the fire extinguishers, the sprinkler systems . . .). Now B.I.F. industries, which is a division there of N_____ A_____, and N__ A__ had a policy of not giving to

denominational campaigns. ...[t.p.]... tell him, tell him ...[t.p.]... So, after about, probably . . . I got there in January and my wife came in June, so it's probably about March of the following year, I and the head of Catholic charities set the thing up with the Bishop, for me to go in. And I told him the story of the newspaper and I also told him, I said, "You know, it's a horrible thing you're going out there, in terms of a bigotry campaign, you got the N__ A__ ...[t.p.]... the systems . . ." ...[t.p.]... complaining, and I said, "Your telephone company isn't making it, because you've got an Irishman running it." (laughs) I said, "Well what we need to do is get some leadership together." I had interviewed these people and one of the people I had interviewed was the head of _____ Electric, and he was my campaign chairman for my second campaign. ...[t.p.]... following our board chairman took over and the two of us went to see the Bishop, we decided we'd try to invite him to the...[t.p.]... major community affair ...[t.p.]... privately ...[t.p.]... There were five things we were gonna ask him but first and foremost was to get him to come to our kickoff. ...[t.p.]... "I don't know if Mr. Ewing is going to go along with this or not, but I'm going to suggest we'll kickoff any night in October you're available." And he gave me a Sunday night. I'd never had a kickoff on a Sunday night in my life. And we had it at the Boys Club in South Providence, and ...[t.p.]... Bishop! Well the newspaper didn't leave anything to the imagination, they took pictures they took ...[t.p.]... the hall, it could be nothing but a success with the height of Catholicism and the height of Yankeeedom sitting side by side. So what we did is we created a structure -- let's get broad, especially as far as the major advanced gifts and corporate gifts and individual gifts . . . and we created an evaluation committee, etcetera. We went after people who had been campaign chairman of Catholic charities to be chairman of a division. ...[t.p.]... Henry Sharp and B____ who was the height of Yankeeedom, going to ask these people to be a part of it, all you were doing was bringing leadership to leadership, that's all it was, it wasn't Catholic versus others, it was leader to leader! And so we created . . . we had nineteen divisions in the advanced gifts group, and what we'd do is we'd hold -- Rhode Island's a small enough state that you could have your report meetings of these chairman in a home and make it personal. We intertwined people of all groupings, because we didn't have just the advanced gifts people, we'd have the chairman of employee groups, the chairman of ...[t.p.]... staff knew what the report was, all we were trying to do was energize(?) the people and the leaders to be responsible in the field. So we had great success ...[t.p.]... made sure everybody continued to be oriented, in fact, out of it I learned to

...[t.p.]... test, we put questions they couldn't possibly know the answer to, to make them feel that they were inadequately oriented! (laughs) I can remember Henry Sharp getting up and saying, "Jeez, I've been involved for four years here and I can't get sixty-six [percent?]" But you had to make it fun -- we'd have dinner parties, we always had dinner parties for the cabinet, the divisions had dinner meetings at their homes for their people who were working, having a personal, real, fun time, and I think that one of the most interesting things was that we ultimately got the Bishop, he came every year after that. And Henry Sharp sent him "Winnie the Pooh" in Latin, saying, "I don't know who else could enjoy this." (laughs) And the Bishop sent him some organ music, etcetera. Henry Sharp set up a clergy division for the Catholic clergy campaign and we had the (deaneries?) represented and we met Senior Cassidy from P____, I could call Henry Sharp stopping by the rectory saying, "You know, I've never been in the Catholic Church and I'd like to see your confessional." It was really a . . . it became . . . we just had fantastic success, in terms of bringing everybody together, we made it a statewide United Way with the exception of West____ (that was too far south), and Newport come in and the Newport-(Summer?) colony and so forth. We just had great success. I learned in that community, and I used to say it to the staff ...[t.p.]... When I was in graduate school, I had heard about how it was, the building of a community and inter-relating the . . . making the community ...[t.p.]... I said it as words, as I physically involved people in N____-N__s and I saw the aspects of it as I saw the success in campaigning, but even though I had the first integrated era ever held and I had a lot of integration thereafter it was not the interpersonal life that took place in Rhode Island, I said, "I really saw it happen." When I went to Rhode Island the Catholic person and Jew didn't know one another and didn't speak to one another; and within the Catholic community the Irish, the French, the Italian didn't know one another or speak to one another. This is one of the things I spoke to the Bishop about that day we were getting him to come to the first kickoff. I said, " ...[t.p.]... a chance to chat with you about the black and the white problem in the South, but you've got that problem here with the French, the Irish, and the Italians. We're not the only one's with a problem, you have it. And so, it's going to help you to be involved and be a part of it." And so a year after I left Rhode Island, in National Geographic, which is _____ political magazine, they ...[t.p.]... Rhode Island! And Henry Sharp was quoted as saying when asked what had all of a sudden brought Rhode Island together, he said, "Rhode Island was known as a _____ part of the country, _____ for seventy-five years we've never

melted, it was only six years ago we found the vehicle, which was the United Fund, which got the water boiling and the people melting together.

And I'd say to the staff, "What you have to do is keep in mind what you're trying to accomplish, in terms of structure and so forth. While I was still in Rhode Island before I came here, I was invited to come down to Houston and interview for the job in Houston. I was offered a job and I insisted in interviewing fifteen to twenty people ...[t.p.]... Ferguson, the executive V.P. of Exxon was the board chairman, and he was chairman of the selection committee. . . Well, I didn't get a true feeling of a tremendous commitment by Harry. So after the wining and dining and they wanted an answer and so forth, I said, "Well, I'll give you an answer on Tuesday." ...[t.p.]... in Rhode Island if I want to go see Holy Cross play football, I can go see Holy Cross play football! (laughs) She says, "You're not making the decision based on that are you?" I said, "No, but it's a part of the living."

So anyways, on Tuesday, on Monday I called them and said, "Harry, I have five very basic questions to ask you," and they were all about doing the right thing in terms of getting leadership involved and responsibility, etcetera. He had all the right answers. I said, "Harry, you surprised me. I will call you tomorrow." I went to mass the next morning and prayed and I went in and I called Harry and I said, "Harry, do you remember my questions?"

"Yes."

I said, "Are the answers still the same?"

"Yes."

...[t.p.]... come down to meet with some of the people I'd met with already, and there were some people who weren't in town when I was down there. _____ the name I came up with. Like Gardner Simons of T_____co.

He says, "Gardner's not going to get involved."

I said, "Harry, did you know that he headed up a Catholic fundraiser?"

"How would I know Gardner? He isn't a guy that's going to get involved in something like this." He said, "There's no sense in that."

I said, "No, Harry, there isn't. I'm not coming."

He said, "How come you changed?"

I said, "I didn't change, you changed." He gave me all the right answers but didn't mean it.

He said, "Don't you want to take some more time and think about it?"

I said, "Harry, I'll be glad to think about it for the rest of the day and call you back tonight, but I doubt that there's going to be a change. You changed me."

So I wrote a letter to all the people I'd interviewed and thanked them ...[t.p.]... I was with the person who took the job, the night before he went over for an interview. He said, "That letter," (laughing) he said, "it really kicked everybody into high gear!" Especially since one of the guys I wrote to was the chairman, the board president of Exxon, who was those guys' boss, who I had a commitment that he'd be a board chairman of later. But, you don't know why it happened, who knows why that happened.

The following year . . . Los Angeles was known as the compromise community of the country, it would so compromise everything a good United Way would be. And meanwhile, the federal government had created a program called the Combined Federal Campaign, which was against every principle that a good United Way would have. I became sort of a leader when I was in Rhode Island of our professional staffs of the country fighting the Combined Federal Campaign. In fact, through John Pastori we initially got written in that a United Way had the right to veto having a Combined Federal Campaign in the regulations.

Ed Hummel: Now by Federal Campaign . . .

Frank McNamara: . . . it means all the Federal employees.

E.H.: All the Federal employees would combine . . . ?

F.M.: . . . have a combined campaign for health agencies, for everything, designations ad infinitum, etcetera, everything, no planning or thoughtful process involved at all. This was an outgrowth . . . you go back into the fifties, late fifties. It used to be, everybody who was heading the federal government campaign, they didn't have payroll deduction for anybody ...[t.p.]... Eisenhower ...[t.p.]... fellow by the name of Colson, who was a ____ graduate, who wrote the initial ____, when I was at N____-N__s at the time when it was one of forty-one cities, it was quite a ...[t.p.]... Washington ...[t.p.]... had to use envelopes, but the United Way Fund could use ____ envelopes, Red Cross could use white with the red cross on it, and the health agencies, green. I could always remember asking, "Why green?"

"Well, I'm a Dartmouth graduate." (laughs) Anyways. United Fund could have a pledge to be billed or a keyman collection, they could not have payroll deduction -- the others could only have cash.

E.H.: ...[t.p.]... no deductions?

F.M.: No payroll deductions. Now came Jack Kennedy. The Federal Personell Office, this is ...[t.p.]... by the time that it all was done, it was started as an idea under Kennedy but was really being implemented during Johnson ...[t.p.]... I get him to set up a meeting with the President that really hits him. Well, I learned a little bit about politics, this is going around the circle a little bit for you, I don't know whether it's interesting for you or not but it's a part of the whole . . .

...[t.p.]... Congressman Fogerty had been from Rhode Island -- Fogerty's the guy who had created the National Institutes of Health, as you may or may not know and he was a very powerful Democrat. The National Geographic Institute was about to be established and he for U.R.I. to have out at the University of Rhode Island. Fogerty dies. ...[t.p.]... to be taken away from the University of Rhode Island.

" ...[t.p.]... Frank, you can only take on one major issue at a time."

And my words to President Johnson are: "If you want a single vote from me this year ...[t.p.]... otherwise . . . if a sergeant can't hold onto something that a congressman got, it is bad."

So he says, "I have been on that issue now, for the last two months so I'm not the best person to put a big bang on," he said, "I'll get the regulations allright, but as far as defeating the whole damn thing . . . "

So he gave me, Ferris Bryant, who'd been the former governor of Florida, who was available at the time up in Washington, and so I met with Ferris Bryant. Well, ultimately what they did was they picked us six cities, they figured would not fight . . . Washington, D.C. which was totally dependent on employee personnel ...[t.p.]... which was a really loose federation to start with did not really have a truly representative committee ...[t.p.]... Los Angeles, which would be asking for it because they had all the compromises in the world here already, they didn't represent anything, and San Francisco. Those were the cities that they hit. ...[t.p.]... discussed with United Way of America that -- there was a whole bunch of communities that wanted to fight them -- "Do you want us to fight the C.F.C. inside the United Way of America or fight it outside the United Way of America?" Limon Ford was the executive at that time and he said, "Fight it from outside because then we can fight it from inside in a different way. They'll know that you really mean business."

So I became chairman of a committee on United Fund principles. ...[t.p.]... And Detroit, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia ...[t.p.]... held a meeting in Pittsburgh -- this'll tell you how I happened to get here . . . so, the executives of Detroit and Pittsburgh were, in those days, very very strong people -- the guy who was from Detroit, they created the first United Fund in Detroit and Henry Ford was his great buddy and he had the Big Three [auto manufacturers] totally behind him. They're the ones who got the American Red Cross to change their national policy to local option. I mean this is another history, if you don't know the history of this, this is the history of the United Fund movement which is another part of the ____ other than my movement, but I'll go back through that maybe -- just remind me to go back through that whole history.

...[t.p.]... was born here in Los Angeles. ...[t.p.]... and that's part of the history of moving up through both. Where was I? We're in Pittsburgh and I had written up A, B, and C ways of attacking the problem. Pittsburgh and Detroit (we had an executive meeting the night before) they had a fourth way (D) of doing things -- they felt that we should, their main thesis was we should try to tell Washington that we didn't want payroll deduction because payroll deduction was creating the problem and that they're forcing them to be with others without any allocation process, without any ____ process, just a . . . they probably had a . . . a reflection now that I can say is that they had a good idea but I think it would have been impossible to knock payroll deduction out after it had once went in to those six cities. I wasn't for that program and there were about fourteen of us in that executive room and I knew where I basically stood, in my own mind anyways. These guys kept saying, "Let's take a vote on this."

I said, "No, we're going to have a discussion, you got it on the table." Then I said, "Tell you what I'm going to do, I'm not going to have a vote publicly, I'm going to ask each person to give a private vote on a piece of paper" and see how we'd come out because I knew if we had voted in front of these guys they'd all capitulate somehow. So, I won that vote. Now comes the question -- I have to rewrite a few things, you know, saying ____ a couple guys out, no I can't do that.

"...[t.p.]... a meeting tomorrow morning and which we'll have the rewrite for this." Well, it was a foolish move because these two guys started politicking during the night. So I came in the next day and they were putting up all kinds of fuss on the new deal -- like, they called for the motion eight times and I didn't take it. (laughs) Finally I lost, okay, so I lost the vote. Now I have to get down with this group of about sixty committee representatives. I'll always remember this poor

guy from Huntsville, a volunteer, got up and he made the motion, which was my motion to start with, and you saw all these people jump up that Pittsburgh and Detroit had talked to (laughs) to knock him down! The poor guy didn't have any idea what hit him. So I said, "It's not the role of the chair to say this -- I think you're right!" But I lost in the executive _____ before him. Well about four or five days later, I had a call from W____ L_____ in Detroit. I had talked to him a couple of times in between.

He says, "Frank, have you heard anything from Los Angeles?"

I said, "Nope."

"You probably will." They had an executive search firm, and, you know, my papers had been out here for couple years, I guess, a year and a half. Well, anyways, I'm convinced that L_____ and Garvey talked to the executive search firm and recommended me basically because I had the guts to fight them. So, I came out here and of course, the single largest impediment to being successful here was an organization called AID United Givers, which had been created by the Community Chest in 1951. That's the history of that . . . and the volunteer leader of the selection committee liked what I was saying and wanted to . . . but I said, "I won't come unless I can interview twenty-five people."

And I was scared to death because AID United Givers was really, by this time, recognized or accepted or believed to be an organization dominated by labor [even though] it wasn't really dominated by anybody but the staff, but I mean . . . who had accessibility to labor and utilized labor. I was afraid if I got into a discussion with S_____ Horowitz that I might try to take this thing too far, too fast and all this type of stuff. I recognize the community comes in its own time -- and I came out and I interviewed and ...[t.p.]... who was the chairman of the B of A, was the board chairman of United Way at the time and he was ...[t.p.]... the selection committee, he was the main account ...[t.p.]... was one of the hundred largest firms we needed as far as employee campaigns were concerned, seventeen were in plant federations which are united funds inside the company which are dominated by a committee inside the company, that left . . . three were in the entertainment industry, which were a separate federation completely, and then you have about twenty-one firms or something like that, let's see: sixty-one, seventeen, eighteen, three, nineteen! They weren't United Way firms. But most of these executives, the leaders that I saw, were people who headed up companies that were in aid. I saw Frank Gillette of Bullocks ...[t.p.]... we're fundraising." "Well, don't you dare try to change the Red Cross agreement." Because he had negotiated

the Red Cross agreement with the United Way in 1964, and got a special agreement because Red Cross at the time had more leadership then the United Way did. Fritz Larkin and so forth. And I saw Lloyd Austin who was the head of Security Pacific, which was an interesting interview, because I went to see Lloyd Austin and I didn't know, other than the fact that Security Pacific was the second largest bank. Well there I'm looking at the ...[t.p.]... well, hell, I didn't ...[t.p.]... this isn't Rhode Island! I said, "This is big!"

So, when I got in it turned out that Lloyd Austin's brother, I knew. Fred Austin was the general manager of _____ in Rhode Island! How small the world. So he took out the total . . . all the giving of the banks at that time was done through the clearinghouse, he took out the total clearinghouse giving and showed it to me. I had an access all of a sudden which I never would have anticipated and ...[t.p.]... everything was basically _____ although the power of the organization was in fourteen areas.

United Way, up to 1963 -- or I should say, L.A. County up to 1963 had thirty-nine ...[t.p.]... totally, I guess, but the key was nobody had control over their own destiny because of AID United Givers and Herman _____'s committee, which was the entertainment industry, and the in-plant federations, they dominated the capacity to do anything. Bud _____, he led what had to have been the most fantastic community organization job ever done . . . I don't know, George Hill may have told you to see Cecil Feldman, I don't know if he ever told you that or not. You see, there's a whole history, Cecil was the executive when thirty-nine, well, thirty-three initially, community chests came together to form what became, what is United Way today. And I tell you, to merge thirty-three community chests . . . I've merged two and three and a few others, and there's a feeling of ...[t.p.]... in their own communities, is terrific. To merge thirty-three at one time, I tell you, is a gigantic job! Cecil had to be very able, but I also have to give tremendous -- well, it really had to require volunteer involvement to the nth degree because -- there had to be somebody who had some access to the volunteer leaders of all of these places and Ticorp (?) in those days did because it represented 85% of all the title work done in L.A. County in those days. So he was able to relate to the corporate leadership and the volunteer leadership of all these communities and so, [in] 1963 the United Way was formed with these thirty-three chests.

In 1964, the American Red Cross joined what became the United Crusade Campaign and in 1965, Cecil was released by United Way. I have no idea what probably was the problem and I never did bother to ask questions, I just figured

anybody who has professionally gone through the merger of thirty-three community chests, a lot of communities are thinking they're not getting what they should get. All these things, all these people who are volunteer leaders out there are going to be attacking the professional head. It becomes a question, therefore, you can't solidify anything with the person, so, no matter what they put out in front of you . . . *[end of tape 1]*

We ended talking about the separation of Cecil Feldman and it becomes a question of the United Way of Los Angeles -- I believe I stated that the name United Way, which is now used across the whole country, was created in 1963 by the merger of all these thirty-three chests and that name became known as the name, since it meant the United Way of Planning, the United Way of Allocating, and the United Way of Fundraising, as opposed to everything prior to that having been basically, on the campaign side, a joint appeal, a community chest, a community fund, a united appeal, a united fund, a united good neighbors fund, everything was related to fundraising until the name United Way itself was born, and it was born right here so Los Angeles has that much to be credited with.

In 1965 through 1966, there was an interim executive, Larry Cooper, and there was a selection committee looking the country for a new executive. *...[t.p.]...* a search firm that, of course I can't remember the name of, I know the fellow who headed up the company had been the person who was a key person in the Walt Disney estate and I always felt the responsibility as chairman of the board of the California Arts College which got created with . . . and so forth. Now, he personally did not do the search but it was his firm and a fellow by the name of Herb Holley was the executive at the, I can remember his name, he was the person who handled the responsibility. The committee had a person by the name of Louis B. Lumborg, who was the chairman of the board of the Bank of America. *[phone rings -- tape stopped]*

So they had interviewed many candidates, and this is what I don't recall, whether I stated this previously, I had a call from Walter Laidlaw (?) in Detroit, who was the executive in the creation of the United Fund movement in 1949, who was a definite power even though every United Way was autonomous, he was well recognized nationally in the field and I had fought him at a meeting in 195- *...[t.p.]...* something about the subject matter of that and he said, "Has anybody in Los Angeles called you?"

And I had assumed, whether rightfully or wrongfully, that he was the person who suggested that Los Angeles interview me, so I came to Rhode Island

...[t.p.]... now I was offered the job after the 1st, but I had insisted as I come to handle all opportunities on interviewing up to twenty-five individuals who were key leaders in the community who were not involved with the United Way. This community [L.A.] was so compromised with its ability to control its own destiny that I knew for a while as a person who chaired the committee on the United Way principles, I had questioned whether I would be the right person and whether we could confront the issues that, ultimately, were dividing the community. The second meeting had to do with the factor of making sure I wasn't going to create a problem by going around interviewing the twenty-five people on these issues. I said, I thought I was wise enough not to do that. However, and as I think I outlined earlier, you know I had three basic questions that I ask [phone rings -- tape stopped].

Anyway, I came out and interviewed twenty-five different individuals and, having done this, having gotten proper answers . . . one of the individuals I interviewed who was not a part of the selection committee was Dan Hartman of Lockheed. He was to be the following year's campaign chairman. Well, Dan had not been involved in the actual merging of the various community chests into United Way but he had been very active at the Red Cross and had just joined the agreement which was an excellent agreement for Red Cross ...[t.p.]... took place when we had withdrawn from being a participant in the ...[t.p.]... put together this whole Los Angeles piece. You get some part of the entire history of L. A. -- why was L. A. so compromised? You know, thirty-nine different community chests all by the same United Funds existing in Los Angeles County ...[t.p.]... of being autonomous and local, they were easily seen as -- probably why, going back into the 20's the 30's, the first years, the first joint appeal was in fact in 1924 in the city of Los Angeles, when the community chest was ...[t.p.]... booklet someplace up there that will tell, because we celebrated our 50th anniversary in 1974, and it has a whole lot of backdrop on this -- I'll have to look and see if I can find that. As the community chests. all of them grew and so forth, and as their geographies got bigger in each of these local areas, they had a problem with employees who went from one city to another to work. The community chest, United Fund movement had a statement saying you give where you work and on into ___ services where you live. That was a conflict and one of the problems in Los Angeles, starting in the 30's, was that the big aerospace industries were all around the circumference of the city of Los Angeles and not in the city. These community chests and United Funds would go to these larger players and ask for monies. And so, ultimately,

what you saw happening was the first breakdown, the development of what we call in-plant federations. These companies created a United Fund within themselves and then they created committees to distribute the money. Well, these committees did not have background of all the social needs of the community. These got divided in various shapes and forms, geographically; in terms of types of service like health services, health agencies. The biggest problem, however, was it became a block and it was a community and they didn't feel any responsibility for the total community. They were just distributors of large amounts of money. So therefore, you block that off and divided them from being a part of the community except in the area of recognition from having given a lot of money. *[phone -- tape stopped]*

That was the first breakdown, in terms of being able to unite a community as a whole. But it was probably mainly because there was greenery between the towns and cities in those days. ...*[t.p.]*... getting on to the provincial aspects of being a smaller United Way, interested in their own local community was very understandable in that era. And certainly the formation of these things were not done to create this division but was a management means of handling the problem. Now, in 1941, the next division came: the entertainment industry, which was basically the movie industry in those days, basically were not a part of the downtown power of Los Angeles, and this was because of many reasons which could be somewhat understood. In order to create ...*[t.p.]*... that they're interested in ...*[t.p.]*... called Permanent Charities Committee of the entertainment industry. They had a campaign and set up a payroll deduction system which was all the workers from job to job, which was a union aspect of it. They'd have a chairperson come down and . . . most of the money would go to the L. A. Community Chest Welfare Federation, the only relationship there was was when the chairperson of the campaign and their board chairman would come to the final meeting and produce a big check. This would give recognition to that community period. But it kept them from integrating into the total community and even today, very little integration exists between the general community and the entertainment industry.

Later, around 1949, which was the start of the formation of the United Fund movement, which was done in Detroit, they asked the American Red Cross nationally to change its national policy to one of local option and gave permission to the health agencies . . . *[phone -- tape stopped]*

. . . United Fund movement got started in Detroit and it brought together, it was started by the Big Three automakers and the UAW were the ones who forced a

lot of the national agencies to give local options to joining or not joining. That was 1949, in 1950 the leadership of the L. A. community chest welfare federation was interested in trying to make a, kind of like a United Fund. Interestingly enough, they tried doing this by having a mass meeting which . . . (laughs) . . . which was not too successful. Especially with the archdiocese which fought constantly. Nothing happened under the 1950 meeting excepting that the business leadership of the time determined that what they should do is create a system-wide campaign for all the major firms headquartered in L. A. that go out to the suburbs, which is basically banks, your retail ...[t.p.]... are in the community in fact. Well the L. A. chest and welfare federation were in support of this . . . it was starting, the initial leadership was a Harry ____ and a Justin ____ and there would be others but I don't . . . those are the two prime founders, in effect, the first board chairman . . . and the L.A. chest put all of its major firms' employee campaigns into this organization called, Associated In-Group Donors/United Givers which was to be an employee campaign basically across the whole area that it covered, mainly the county of L. A., although they spread out into Orange County and Ventura and so forth. As the stores went and the banks went, they went. So, the organization was to be one-third, the board was to be one-third labor, one-third management, and on one-third public. The community chest took the responsibility for running this organization at first, and in first year it was not as successful in what they had wanted it to be and in what they had wanted to raise. So the L. A. chest, in their judgement, did something, they tried to get some corporate gifts in to make a huge success. So they put the banks, which gave through the clearinghouse in those days, and the gas company, and the telephone company . . . The United Givers was run by the L. A. chest until 1953-54, in that era. ...[t.p.]... the executive who was running it left to become the head of the United Appeal in Cincinnati, Ohio, a person who was employed to run there, he had a separate board of directors ...[t.p.]... to talk that board into saying it's wrong because probably about 85-90% of the money is coming to the United Way's community chest ...[t.p.]... for you to be headquartered in the same office as your largest beneficiary and broke it away into a separate office. This entity, therefore, was strictly, became a fund-raising conduit, they never set a campaign goal, they just their own campaigns as much as the company wanted to run the campaign because . . . it became a very passive organization, and the board became quite a passive excepting for the fact of the . . . it was a place where more than one-third of the labor leaders were attending and then the other numbers...[t.p.]... levels of leadership ...[t.p.]... presentation of

needs, the monies were distributed by a formula that was created. They could be massaged, shall I say, in line with the professional staffs desires, to a degree, not great, but to some degree. Organizations that were beneficiaries got the chance to go before an allocation committee, because 20% of the money was to be distributed in line with how the allocation committee . . . I should say it was 20% ____ of designations were taken off ...[t.p.]... was so complex, as an example the ____ volunteers went to make a presentation and Victor Carter was a presenter at this particular time and as he started this up based upon the formula, you know, this, this, and this, the executive of ____ said, "Mr. Carter, can you hold up while I explain the formula to my committee?" So that they could understand . . . AID United Givers controlled the destiny of the community because sixty-one of the hundred largest firms of employment firms in Los Angeles were a part of AID. By this time you had seventeen of the remaining hundred had in-plant federations, three were part of the permanent charities entertainment industry, and the remaining nineteen United Way had the opportunity to solicit directly, so that the control of the United Way movement was strictly by the smaller firms and those larger firms which would not participate, some of which would not participate mainly because of the tremendous involvement and labor in the program and they didn't want to be that tied. Some were due to the fact that they were so tied to the United Fund movement from someplace else like the auto companies which existed then in this community which don't exist today. So those were the major big companies, Edison never joined, interestingly enough . . . so that's what the United Way had to work with. With AID not having expanding campaigns through the 1950's when this place was booming, I mean it went up but it went nowhere close to where the community was expanding, that all the 39 community chests were dying for money. That's what ultimately brought about the urge to bring some county-wide mechanism and they thought that if they could ever have a county-wide United Fund or United Way (United Way wasn't existing yet) then you'd have success. But the question is, it gave a leverage but it didn't give an ability to go to those companies. So their destiny was still controlled by . . . now, that's why I say the place was so compromised and it was well-known across this whole country that this thing called AID was the worst thing that could ever happen to a community.

When I came in 1967, the United Way or United ____ Aid was only raising 12 million dollars on its own. They were getting about a million dollars from PCC and they were getting about 7.3/7.5 million from AID United Givers. So it hadn't gone up more than five hundred thousand in three years, the total amount. So, at

that time when United Way was formed it was a merger of 33 community chests, initially, and in order to get the volunteers of those community chests to vote to participate they had to create structure that the local community chest thought that still were going to have a lot of say. So they created fourteen areas in the structure of United Way and fourteen area boards -- so they went from 33 chests to fourteen areas. Three people were to be elected from each of the area boards to come to the corporate board, and then there would be fifteen members-at-large on the corporate board. But the control of all policy is in the fourteen areas, in order to change a policy the committees at the corporate level which are made up primarily of people from the area would develop a policy statement on any issue, agency relations, planning . . . they would submit it to the corporate board for their authorization to send it out to the fourteen area boards. Then the fourteen area boards would vote on it and make comments and send it back in to the administration. Then it would be rewritten, re-voted by the corporate committee, they'd bring it to the general board to be sent back out again, and they had sixty days then to vote and if ten area votes voted for it, it became policy, it didn't matter whether the general board voted 100% unanimously. Unless ten area boards voted for it, it was not policy. Well, to say that the control of the organization was in the areas is an understatement. The allocations of the monies that were raised were allocated centrally excepting for those agencies whose services were completely within the boundaries of a particular area. Well, most of these areas had only two, three, or four agencies to budget -- Pasadena and Long Beach had more, they had seventeen, eighteen agencies -- so the area board looked at all policies as related to what it would do to these three or four agencies or these sixteen or seventeen agencies, never what it did to the major agencies which is serving the whole area. So the whole allocation process was a very compromised situation.

Upon coming here, there was very little volunteer involvement at the corporate level of the campaign, the campaign was underway when I got here. I actually got here July 17th and I was to take over August 1st. ...[t.p.]... divisions reporting to the campaign plus they had fourteen ____ campaigns going. It was very quick to see that one, the area staff didn't know one another, never mind that as a corporation no one knew one another. Certainly, the ____ out in the areas of the corporate campaign was basically non-existent. I should say that one of the things that happened in the formation of the . . . another aspect of the Red Cross agreement was that the fourteen area boards, they had fourteen area co-directors: Red Cross and United Way -- with no one person in charge, staffwise.

Supposedly, ____ was the director of the Los Angeles chapter of the American Red Cross, was so strong -- they certainly didn't have more volunteer leadership than the L. A. United Way had at the time of the merger, that's why they got what they got. They may have been there for a long time and United Way was scared of them. I came with the knowledge of having these various peoples behind me as volunteer leaders, most of whom were CEO's of companies that were apart of AID.

...[t.p.]... who was to be the next interview which I did not finish, this is going to be all jumbled up. Well, he had indicated, when I went out to him, he said, "I don't want you fooling with the Red Cross agreement, I don't want to hear about the Red Cross being considered to be out-budgeted when reviewed. What this community needs to do is raise more money."

Lockheed was one of the firms that had an in-plant federation, they had what was known as a buck-of-the-month club, which they had then moved up to bucks-of-the-month club because of inflation, I guess. The community had a guideline of giving for the ____ worker 6/10th of one percent to be requested. Here, at Lockheed, where this guy says we have to raise more money, is giving maybe a couple bucks a month which is not close to the 6/10th of one percent. Then we had an executive guideline which started at one percent, so I just . . . knowing where I was and knowing his feelings _____ having done enough study of history before I got there, while I kept bringing forth the ideas of the values of planning to him ...[t.p.]... where he was, which was to raise more money.

I said, "You know, you people aren't carrying your share. You're asking the community for this, yet you're doing this. In order for you to be parallel with what's being asked to give, you should be asking one percent instead your going ____ percent of your money to the United Way or United First Aid, you should be asking your employees for one percent because 60% would be 6/10ths."

He says, "You're right."

He was a giver, he himself was a giver. So, they changed their formula and it was very beneficial to him, as it turned out because in the very first year of that campaign (of which we got the benefits of the second year) their increased giving brought about four hundred thousand dollars in new money. So the question was -- well, I really knew that I was potentially in a difficult spot with this man because philosophically we were not akin to one another and I had not accepted the job at that point so I . . . Louis Lumborg was out of town so I called H____ L____, who was father and creator of the merger, and I said, "Lookit, he and I just don't see eye

to eye at all, philosophically, I don't want to come here and get into an argument the whole year."

...[t.p.]... ". . . one person in this community." So ultimately he did stress that I come. So Dan, Dan was an interesting personality because ...[t.p.]... he was the first campaign chairman when I got there but he was halfway through the campaign and while they had a guideline called Fair Share, Victor was a giver and he used to get up and he never understood fair share -- he'd go to a meeting and say, "We should give Fair Share plus 25% more!" He was interesting. A great, great man. A great philanthropist. A very positive force in the community.

So one of the first things I had to do there was talk to Victor. He said, "I'm going to take you out to a dinner party with the whole staff. How many ____ executives do you have?" ...[t.p.]... so he took over ...[t.p.]... the United Crusade ____ and so forth, a thing that the people who were still working for us always will remember was the greatest thing that ever happened to that staff in their lives. Fantastic roast beef dinner and ____ and all, so, the following night what we did was, he had a penthouse on Wilshire, he invited all the volunteer leadership of the areas to come to his penthouse for an affair. See that reached this whole communities perspective in an informal way, and so during that campaign, those were tough campaigns because you had to really depend on getting all your money from the areas basically. ...[t.p.]... was in line to be a board chairman after that, but he was not a chief executive, so I've never had a person that's from the Jewish community that's board chairman. Now you got a guy who's doing this tough job of campaigning, he really should show the respect to the Jewish community. After a fair amount of dialogue just to get people to understand ...[t.p.]... my first year there, when I first came here, there were four separate planning councils -- I put together a committee to study volunteer involvement, we were basically a campaign run by volunteer executives, not by volunteers ...[t.p.]... the additional staff they are not the people to be the volunteers. They can give you a coverage campaign but they cannot break down doors, they're not the chief executives of companies that have people sent for training and the training should be how to staff volunteers, how to work with them and so forth. That's true even today in a lot of communities and this is some part of the problem. So we had to find out how to get more volunteer involvement.

A fellow by the name of Tom McDaniel (?) became the chairman of the committee, and he was executive vice president of ...[t.p.]... never contemplated ____ being a city of Los Angeles firm because they didn't serve the city of Los

Angeles, they got more of the ____ _____. And the fellow before . . . Jack Horton, was the CEO at this time at Edison, and he had been the campaign chairman -- he had previously been with P.G.&E. up in the north, and the campaign chairman before him had always thought very little money to L. A. because we don't represent L. A. corporately. But, I'm getting into the campaigning aspects of that now.

Volunteerism. So the corporate board had control of his policy with people from the areas coming in. This fellow from Long Beach, an attorney who actually practiced at Paramount, was the leading person fighting with downtown all the time. Jim Carnes (?). ...[t.p.]... ". . . what we really should do is find some way of bringing some of the areas together and make regions and do some . . ." ...[t.p.]... out of the process of trying to consider a regional plan, at the same time, I had to get some money, we were in the banks borrowing three million dollars a year, we had a allocation process which we did in November while we had a fiscal year in March, it was a real convoluted type of situation, we really never knew what we really had as campaign results because A.) they'd never give you a figure that they were going to give you, they just paid your monthly checks that came and ...[t.p.]... committee then became the committee on regionalization and we created a structure of four things: one of them planning, one ____; what we saw initially as potentially five regions; they had a committee of boundaries. The boundary committee came to the conclusion, after having a few hearings, that to change the boundaries of the areas, would be the worst thing we could do. Some of them would have -- two or three or four areas would make up a region. ...[t.p.]... committees in each of these regions on each of these substructures and we would develop papers and we had around four hundred or it became five or six hundred people involved, had over four hundred meetings over a period of time from starting in the middle of 1968 to ____ vote in 1970 to write the process, then to write how we would learn to get a vote and how the structure would be to change and what we did was in order to have everybody in all the areas which were not necessarily level one of the leadership you have a transfer over what we did was too say there'd be a regional committee on structure and so forth but then we would have a nominating committee in the convening committee for these regions after all this was developed by the ____ area people ...[t.p.]... whether it was two areas, three areas or four areas -- it would have three, four or five people from each of those areas come onto the convening committee and on to the ...[t.p.]... in addition, five members-at-large and a chairman or vice chairman-at-large who

would be appointed by the board chairman corporately, so we could come in and bring in new leadership in the convening committee and the nominating committee and now then, came the need for ...[t.p.]... the leaders in each of these regions, because nobody ____ those regions as such, all the leadership was downtown leadership between ____ and aerospace. After the thing finally got voted in 1970, they took us ...[t.p.]... to implement ...[t.p.]... people for the nominating committee and seven people for the convening committee, we had to educate those people as to what this was all about because they had never been involved, they had already gone and accepted the responsibility! Then we determined who it was we were going to ask to be the first board chairman and so forth. So it was an interesting experience, at the same time as this whole regional study was going on we had a planning staff force but we also had a merger committee with the four planning councils going on and to see if we couldn't get them to merge into the regionalization plan and therefore cover the whole geography rather than just their limited geographies, they were going to be bigger and better and so forth. We brought about the merger within about three months before we implemented the plan. So all four planning councils merged into our structure at the same time. At the start of the study of volunteerism I used a non-sequitor to the committee, I ____ to my staff, we had to cut some costs, save some money, so we cut out enough cost -- we cut it down from two hundred and eighteen people to about a hundred and sixty. ...[t.p.]... we had some free money administratively to do something.

Ed Hummel: Now this came after the various consolidations of the planning councils and so on or preliminary to that.

Frank McNamara: This was before, because, well, there was two or three things I had tried to do, one was, I had to get some money, two, I had to get some volunteer leadership so the volunteer committee was a beginning of starting it and after I had just done this, I was just fortunate . . . ____ mayor had created the early coalition, and ____er and ____ were both on the early coalition board, initial group, which had, I believe, forty-eight and ultimately seventy people but forty-eight top corporate leaders {end of side 3} So, the early coalition was thinking of running a campaign and Lloyd Lumborgh and Victor both recommended that this was going to be a conflict for the United Way getting someplace. So, both of them individually came to me and said, "What can we do about this?"

The first that I did was to make sure that there could truly be no distinction between the United Way and AID, I realized that a critical. Our mission [statement] said that in addition we were a federation of agencies and what AID used to say was they were a federation of donors and so the difference between us was they represented the donor and we represented the agencies. We changed our statement [to say that] we were a federation of citizens to provide a system of services through a partnership of agencies, every citizen is a potential donor and every donor is a citizen. So, we made a policy, well the mission statement was bigger than that but that was the important aspect of it and we also had in there that together a system of services together with government made up a balanced system of services to meet the needs of people. So now you have a coalition of these existing. Well, they get it to be, to ask for financing by the ...[t.p.]... So the policy that we would not admit an agency unless it had been in business for over a year or could produce its own . . . We got together a committee chaired by John McClune(?), John was one of the twenty-five people I interviewed before -- his whole statement was: the United Way was no place during the Watts riots and so forth, he had been the chairman of the McClune commission ...[t.p.]... after the first campaign in which we raised about two million dollars more than what had been raised, I got to set aside two hundred thousand dollars to start doing some work in the inner city, we had an inner city committee working ...[t.p.]... Sieg Horowitz(?), who was head of the federation of labor, was on the committee; Frank King, who was the head of the Western Bank Corporation, was another one of the people I . . . which was the predecessor to the First Interstate Bank. As I recall Frank King asked a question: "Why don't you cite the statement or mission for each organization?"

Well the statement of the Urban Coalition and our statement were almost identical. I said, "The only problem is we just voted our mission statement within the last year and we can't just say, 'abracadabra,' and be it within that community today." So there's a reason for a recognized entity to try to . . . so then somebody brought up the factor that "Well, you had to have one year."

I said, "Well, we wouldn't take amendments(?) of member agencies because they are providing a service to us, they would tell us where we should be funding in the inner city." What we'd do is contract with them and so there'd be a contract agency to tell our agency relations people. So that's how they came in and the money we had, was the money I'd just saved for staffing. A hundred sixty-six thousand dollars was the first figure that we gave, so the Urban Coalition ran as a contract entity of United Way until 1974/75. And they were having their problems

because a black caucus, a brown caucus was in there and they were having a difficult time trying to get anything to go any one direction. They needed more funding that what we were able to provide them because there wasn't any success coming out of there so our board was not willing to give them much more money and (we now?) merged the planning councils, we had a public affairs division within the planning area, so ultimately the Urban Coalition got merged in with us, got merged in, and I can't recall when, it was 1974/75, that era. Initially we brought along, not as caucus', but as units to discuss issues as they related to the black community and ...[t.p.]... in various positive ways rather than just having them trying to effect our policies. ...[t.p.]... individualization, which we had going for us, was the fact of, you had big industry in each of the five regions, you had leadership of a common level in each of these geographies. One of the values we overcame by really getting to the real leadership of the community was that you got above what in all major corporations exist today, and existed then, ...[t.p.]... affairs office ...[t.p.]... these people really were protective of their CEO's, that was their role. ____ it was the fact that they controlled the giving budget they all had their own agendas and they didn't go in and ask for a lot more money, they just tried to alter the money that they had, because they didn't want to keep pushing for more money, they weren't in the position to ask the CEO for more money, CEO would only give more money if he or she felt there was a great need for it, so when we went and got the level that we got we were perhaps not loved by a middle management group to get all of a sudden the people who were really interested in ____ the CEO, had power to say what they wanted done. That today, is one of the biggest problems in a community life is the CEO is so protective and even moreso today as it gets more and more complicated with all the major mergers, the bottom line and so forth. You've gone from the era of the entrepreneur up through the era of the professional CEO but still one who was somewhat inter-related to the community to now CEO's who are not inter-related to their communities at all.

Ed Hummel: Currently, hasn't there kind of been a seat change with the whole globalization of everything and CEO's that aren't any longer even here? [Executives] that at one time were in L.A. now are in some other city or maybe even another country.

Frank McNamara: This has become, we've gone through an era where we had bigger companies, now global companies and what you've lost particularly in local

communities are the major banks and the utilities were always the business functions of the community. Members of the local community sat on their boards. Those two entities had the most to gain by a healthy, successful community. They saw and felt what the banks and the utilities were giving and therefore you'd see the effect when they went back to their own companies and how they thought. So that's really become a huge problem and that was the biggest thing against First Interstate and Security leaving here. And now Pacific Enterprises is leaving here. And now deregulation of the electrical, the power industry, you have just changed the whole thing of power. *[phone rings. tape stopped]*

By funding the Urban Coalition in 1968/69, we established a relationship about seventy business leaders that were something more than a fundraising entity and it gave us an entree, in fact, that was the fact of that. We now had the mission statement, we now had the _____ involvement, we now have the Urban Coalition being funded, we are now funding some inner city programs, we have a philosophy that we're talking about in terms of the allocation process that most people don't realize that the allocation just makes a lot more money available to the budgets of these agencies, at that time, probably five or six times, when I retired [it was] about seven times. You can say that your dollar opened up the opportunity for six or seven dollars more of program because of the total budgets of the agencies would increase as you were able to provide the core funding, and so forth, to establish a program and to allow fees and endowments and so forth. This was an easy type of sell.

But, when Dan Hartman became campaign chairman, as I indicated, it's easy to _____ fundraising wise. So initially what was interesting with my first meetings in the planning of this campaign, the Red Cross executive had to be a part of all our meetings, which was just a meeting of planning with Dan Hartman, Owen McCoy was the executive of Red Cross, and he'd bring a fellow by the name of Doug Wood, who was to be his in-between for getting things done and so forth, and also we had a campaign director, Jack Chenker and Red Cross had a campaign director, Art Slauson, so it really made it a meeting of our group. Dan would always call for early morning meetings because he usually got to work about four thirty in the morning. He had a wife who was very, very ill and he was a very thoughtful guy in terms of always visiting his wife who had multiple sclerosis, developed _____, and he was a great man in terms of his thoughts, his giving capacity, but he was concerned about anything that was going to mesh the power of the Red Cross versus the _____, he wanted to stay in this powerful position.

Interestingly, though, there was a time ...[t.p.]... interesting, strong, a good man and as we chatted and we got to know one another socially, as well, he understood how ridiculous it was to have two people responsible for everything. Somebody has to be the administrator, somebody has to be held responsible, and so the exact year ...[t.p.]... fourteen areas, thirteen were people who were employees of United Way, and one was a Red Cross employee, it was very interesting because he was the right person, that person, the Red Cross person, ultimately became the executive of the Red Cross Los Angeles chapter, he was by far the best person in their chain of operation. Now, one of the things presenting to Dan Hartman was the fact of, my belief, as opposed to business, a non-profit organization should be very broad at the top, horizontal in terms of organizational structure. Volunteers respond as they feel and know their responsibility is going to be perceived and down the line, in terms of their responsibility and nobody knows but the one guy that recruited them, they don't have any feeling. I've always stated that every level of volunteer structure deadens the organizational structure. The fewer levels . . . so we went to fifty-eight divisions as opposed to five the year before. ...[t.p.]... luncheon at Lockheed, in which he invited fourteen CEO's, all of the CEO's of the aerospace companies ...[t.p.]... out of that group were probably ...[t.p.]... in-plant federation ...[t.p.]... were part of AID. Well, Dan said, we'll help AID raise the money, if they're not going to raise the money we'll help them raise more. Of the fourteen people there, he asked them to each be a mission(?) chairman, only two people put up question marks -- _____ McKenzie who headed up Aerojet was having problems, financially, with the company at the time, and the other person was Tom Jones of Northrop.

...[t.p.]... "I'm going to tell Frank here, that he's got to go out there and convince you."

So that became one of my first chores in terms of recruitment leadership. I went out and had lunch at Northrop and the senior VP was there and I told Tom, (Dan didn't bring it up in his presentation, the whole question of the dollars that are given and how much they throw off in terms of agency programming), when I told him what the total budgets of the agencies were and that we were this, he hung on to that and he became a chairman -- so I had won!

Ed Hummel: It was the large amount, the large percentage that went to direct service in effect, right?

Frank McNamara: That and the fact that your dollars multiplied when they went into the agency monies. The fact of the total budget at the time we were allocating maybe sixteen million dollars and it was producing programs of perhaps a hundred and fifty million and so therefore, it was . . . he said, "That's a thrust I'd never thought about." You've got a system, you don't just have an individually good or bad agency, you have a system. So, every agency comes into being because a group of people see a need, then band together to meet that need, sometimes that need changes, sometimes it goes out of existence, sometimes it expands, sometimes it doesn't, you have to have some review of how it's operating. We had fifty-eight division chairpeople that year, and we ran, in effect, seminars at the Biltmore Hotel with Dan _____ giving a overall presentation, he would never bring in the budgeting story, he would talk about the responsibility of the community and its needs. At the same time, as I said I was relating to the Red Cross executive, the other _____, let me put that in, Owen McCoy, the chief executive of Red Cross and who had been the head of Red Cross for, I think for thirty-five years or something like that, he hosted a cocktail party where all the Red Cross chapters, there were thirteen Red Cross chapters that were a part of this.

McCoy and could just talk eye to eye, I mean, I fired our campaign director because he was not able to do the job, and all of a sudden he called me, he wanted to talk to me to tell me he wanted to fire his co-director of the campaign, well, and then we went into this question of campaign administrators and he held a cocktail party and he wrote a statement for these area Red Cross executives and fourteen area co-directors as to what was happening and he was the person saying it. Needless to say, the outside chapters thought he had sold them down the river, because what ultimately happened was, there were forty-six positions that we were either partially funding or _____ funding through our expenses, that ultimately came down to fifteen people, I don't even know whether they have them today.

So this is all happening in the late sixties and then the regionalization first came into being, was implemented in 1971, the first campaign, with Sy Ramo (?) was the first campaign chairman of the whole thing, but we had key leadership in every place, we had Ray Edwards who was the head of Glendale Federal Bank head up region one, and we had _____ down in Long Beach . . . So, probably fifteen of the leadership levels that we had . . . I mean from one region to the other . . . all significant leadership and so, when I came in 1967, the only gift I truly tried to impact that first year since I had interviewed Louie and Lumborgh, who was chairman of the committee, I interviewed Frank King of Western Bank, Lloyd

Austin of Security Pacific, and St___ Brady which was Western Bank, they gave through the clearinghouse but they gave their corporate gift through AID, so I told them about what we were doing, putting two hundred thousand into the inner city and so forth, the bank giving at the time was seven hundred and twenty thousand dollars -- they took it up to a million. So in order to force AID to become somewhat responsible, as opposed to just sitting over there and giving us what they got, I created a committee of top level people to indicate what amount we should put into the campaign which should come from AID, if we were helping them, they should be responsible for some of that ___ too. Well, John McOwen headed up that committee.

Ed Hummel: And what period was this?

Frank McNamara: This would have been starting in the 1968 campaign and with Dan taking this position ___ get AID companies to give more money, Doug tried to break AID, "let's get them to give more money." Of course, we didn't know how much we were going to get in the 1967 campaign into July of 1968 when the extra two hundred eighty thousand should have been coming through from the banks because it was designated, now the committee comes together that I had formed which was take the top ten corporate gifts that are on AID find out what they're giving, ...[t.p.]... from these figures, the first year they told me to put in 7.7 million ...[t.p.]... they told me to put 8.3 million, needless to say, this money wasn't coming through to us. The banks in particular noted that their money wasn't going to ___ -- they went from ten or twenty to a million, to a million two, but my pushing outside through Lumborgh, St___ B___, Lloyd Austin, and Frank King -- and we got 7.3, 7.5, 7.6 ...[t.p.]... putting these figures in, I started increasing the shrinkage accordingly, once I'd found out, well, the banks created a study to find out what should be done. and they funded a study to be done by John McOwen but I had notes that I had sent to Louie Lumborgh, you know, John was a tough guy to deal with . . . Louie could do the greatest study in this world if he has only eight people, only those eight people are going to f___ it, he cut out like a million twenty or a committee of fifty or sixty that he's going to report to or something. _alley came out with the fact that AID/United Way should merge, this was at the time when I'm doing the ...[t.p.]... Planning Council and the Urban Coalition and the question of what should happen to their structure. Well, the Planning Council should merge with us but the Urban Coalition should remain

separate. Well, they just turned it down right out of hand. But what they did do at that point was they decided they had to show that there was another major difference to us.

Ed Hummel: Now "they" meaning this committee?

Frank McNamara: No, AID United Giving. They went with creating a sweetheart deal with the union and became unionized. Professional staff and _____. Well, the McOwen study hadn't gone anywhere, _____ Brady picked it up the following year to see if he couldn't _____ something from that study and its recommendations. The following year Stan Avery became our board chairman -- he said, "this is the worst study there is." So the first thing that was to be done was Stan was going to have lunch with _____ and get as many chief executives as he could to come. By this time I had pretty good relationship with the Heart Association, ...[t.p.]... Cancer, who really was the spokesperson for all the health agencies, and I felt very comfortable with it, and I wrote out a suggestive program of how they could get representation and all this and so forth. And I met with Stan -- it was the only time our family ever took a three week vacation in my life!

So I end up for a trip to England, Norway, Sweden and Denmark, and so we go and he had a meeting set up with _____ Brown and Stan and myself and four _____, but I felt comfortable, I had set this thing up with Stan. ...[t.p.]... the most beautiful man in this world. He doesn't have a cross bone or a bad bone in his body or mind. ...[t.p.]... the papers I had given to him with the ideas of _____ of how ultimately ...[t.p.]... active in such a thing that had been so developed she took a copy of that, came back and held a meeting with the health agencies and blew it out of the water.

I came back and I found that out and that was . . . so another year goes by and now we get a meeting of _____, Ed Carr, Franco Murphy, and Sieg Horowitz at the time _____ . They said, "Lookit, we can't just have another committee come out of nowhere, what we need to do is -- why don't we get Bradley and Jim Hayes with a chairman board of supervisors ...[t.p.]... board meeting with the executive committee of AID, the executive committee of United Way, and the board chairman of the health agencies for lunch at the _____ center. ...[t.p.]... comes the _____ study of all volunteer giving in which representation would be had by each of these groups. He'd also given me a very good thought about a year or two before that, to get a person by the name of D_____ Beaumont, who was the head of the

communication workers of america, to be on the region five board, which was a central region, so she could find out exactly what the philosophies are *[phone rings -- tape stopped]*

So Dena was on this new committee that was formed as well and we were doing we l_____ out the information we were going to gather and so forth and we were going down the line when all of a sudden Sieg Horowitz died of a heart attack. So, I go to see Bill Robinson who was *...[t.p.]...* formally elected, we all of a sudden get a letter from AID cutting our gift by 823,000 dollars. Well, Paul Miller was our board chairman at the time and he was a very good, strong guy, very bright, tremendous character, he was at home, sick, and I called him at home and he said, "I'm not really sick."

He says, "Go down and see Bill, see if he knows anything about it." So I went down to see Bill Robinson to see if he knew anything about it and Bill Robinson knew absolutely nothing about it. The board chairman of AID, at this point, was a fellow by the name of Ed Chedlock(?) who was the head of the union for the gas company, which made it interesting that the head of the union was the head of the gas company! Anyways, Robinson didn't know anything about it. Now, he was to determine what action we should take, so we set up two committees -- one was a review and action committee, the other was an audit committee, the auudit committe to check over all the years as to progress and what had happened in terms of funding, in terms of results to the United Way, and as far as the review and action we had thirty-nine people, chaired by Norman Barker vice-chairman Tom McDaniel(?) --well we had everybody on the committee, Ed Carter, Franco Murphy, Martin Bradshaw. Next thing we did was, they kept saying how 1/3 of their board was labor, ____ said, "We want one-third of the committee in each of these to be labor -- well, we got three on the audit committee and we got about eight on the review and action committee. After reviewing all the facts and so forth, I think ____ some of these ____ statements. Murphy said to me, opening remarks of the committee came together, he said, "I'll tell you these people don't want you." ____ Bradshaw (?) says "I've been in a lot of towns ____ with two fundraising entities with a similar purpose." Back and forth about this pulling out, finally R____s suggested, "Why don't we create a seven person committee to meet with a seven person committee from AID, *...[t.p.]...* we'll be willing to stay with them for another year, if they'd be willing to do the following things: one, to discuss ptoential mergers; two, to go back to the level of funding (per year) that they've been at . . . "

Well, the seven person committee, and I don't know if I can name all seven but I do remember Ed Carter was on it, Franklin Murphy was on it, Dena Beaumont was on our committee even though she was on their board . . . we met for about three hours. Now they were looking right at the biggest of votes, it was ridiculous, McDaniels was in there he was the only one, I think, that was not a _____ account. ...[t.p.]... came out we had to then take the position we withdrew from s _____ . Anticipating the monies from the past campaign to come through to us, and the fact that used our name, because you cannot use our name, you cannot use our agencies name, you cannot use our agencies saying, ...[t.p.]... the salvation army was a key part of that, they would tell them a check for 90,000 dollars a month and I had to meet with them to make sure they sent back that ninety thousand!

Well, after a while, the question was when we started getting firms to come, particularly those who were ...[t.p.]... and we . . . I knew what the basic card values of these companies were with AID. So _____ out I tried to stop when I had enough card value to cover the amount of money I had been responsible for allocating and left other companies _____ so the health agencies would not get hurt. So with this , after the first year, when they saw how successful they were, they started talking to us, that was our more than we could deal with in terms of inter-relationships we had a better understanding by the executives now, and they were _____ cancers five different chapters all related to a cancer society, so the state was really a viable entity. So having developed a _____ relationship which included allocation processes ...[t.p.]... So I had said to Paul Morris, I said, "Paul, you know we know what we're offering, the community doesn't know what we're offering and they're going to wonder why. . . " ...[t.p.]... hundred and eight people showed up ...[t.p.]... they would not vote for this. Bill Cam, who was the head of our community center(?) at the time ...[t.p.]... you know, the problem is, they're scared to death of you, they think they come in without any guarantee that you can cut them back significantly, so that's your problem."

...[t.p.]... if that's the case, why don't we say that we will give them twenty-five percent of any increase dollars and take them in at a basic figure and that above twenty-five percent what we allocated them on an _____ basis. ...[t.p.]... association ...[t.p.]... five percent and fifty percent ...[t.p.]... figure out to be if we had all the health agencies in. So then ...[t.p.]... was having a similar, was on a contract of twenty-one and a half percent of everything raised. We had to get them out of percentage. Then came a series of meetings which ultimately put them in on

a pro-rate of basis but would go up or down with our fundraising and the second fifty percent would be allocated the same as the health agencies.

...[t.p.]... this p_____ meeting that I was trying to set up, "You got to do it the times the people are available." That time of the year Paul was just not available. So we set it up at seven o'clock in the morning at Security Pacific bank, we got that, then we got cancer.

Ed Hummel: This had been fifty percent of their budget? What were the fifty percent figures?

Frank McNamara: Fifty percent of any increase in the amount of money we had raised would go pro-rata based upon the amount that they brought in at the time -- of their level of funding. Any increase over that, that we had as a total corporation, fifty percent of that would be on a pro-rata basis, the other fifty percent . . . there was also in there, before we figure the fifty percent -- ten percent of the new money would be set to discretionary fund distribution, which I can't remember if that was done at the time of the original contract or if it was done after we all got together. It became a very valuable thing to have available because it ____ like two million dollars a year to go to good programs. But, we got sued by AID, and that forced us to take a million dollars so we could use on AID(?). Well, we finally went to court and we had all this leadership we kept sending up memos to all these people as to what was going on. What happened in that lawsuit was the court thought it proper for us to take the million dollars but that AID could not use our name or any of our agencies names. So, they had been cutting back the health agencies that had joined us, so we took the million dollars and first we gave back to our agencies that amount of the cut we had had to take from when we had the cut of eight-hundred something-odd thousand on us, then we gave that differentially(?) because the health agencies couldn't run without money much longer. We just made everybody whole is what we did, so as the third year came along, it became a question of a potential merger, I had a meeting with the executive and at this time, I had brought in under contract, also there had been another vehicle in the community called Southern California Building codes, which got started back in the 1940's, it was a way by which a lot of the major corporations and banks, retail stores and all them, made their gifts to our capital campaigns . . . [end of tape 2]

Having won that lawsuit I can recall we called a meeting at the First Interstate Bank and invited all these leaders back to hear the ending of our _____. I

remember Jim _____, who was the CEO of Great Western, said, "That's a pretty good deal you get the million dollars and you win the case! I like those conclusions."

In 1978 we sat down the two executives and I said, "You know, ...[t.p.]... bring us ...[t.p.]... was running under the contract of Southern California building codes and he was getting close to ...[t.p.]... so what we did we took ...[t.p.]... we moderated, we took all but two and the two, I think it was three, ...[t.p.]... protective device of giving through P.C.C., and P.C.C. by this time is getting very ...[t.p.]... that they'd be next ...[t.p.]... was going to the entertainment industry. So during the course of all the things happening with AID/United Givers in L.A., the executive of PCC was going to agencies and telling them how the _____ and _____, and how AID's going to win and so forth. All that type of . . . so, the ...[t.p.]... came in to see George Schultz(?), I knew Don because he'd been chairman, no, vice-chairman of the nominating committee for our region one which was the Valley and Glendale/Burbank where we reorganized. But they wouldn't serve on the board because it was part of PCC and basically, he saw fundraising coming at him and he didn't want that. His statement to George was, "I'm afraid if I come with you all, I'm going to have to work and give." *[phone rings, tape stoppped]*

The _____ didn't come in, I never did know why they didn't come, because Braille(?) is very well endowed and now they have a tremendous program, the state government passed a tremendous program which funded a lot of their stuff, which it used to be. The freedom of getting their dollars without having any allocating committee coming to being . . . the size we were being such a small percentage of what their total budgets would be, I think that probably had something to do with it.

Now the metro YMCA. George Hill can tell you what happened and why the metro YMCA pulled out in 1953, but the metro YMCA is a very big, significant organization in this community and has a great board of directors, in terms of leadership. We had fourteen YMCA's as part of our campaign; we had the Glendale, the Burbank, the Pasadena, the Pomona, but we didn't have the metro. And in trying to negotiate with them, because they had power, in terms of people to negotiate, and Bob Flour(?) was capable of negotiating with their power but he was the person doing the negotiating for us, they wanted to come in under a deal whereby they could solicit all our corporations in addition to getting the money from us! Any corporation that was on their board of directors. *[doorbell rings, tape stoppped]*

So the metro-Y never came in and I always felt badly because I had had a great relationship with a fellow by the name of John Jacobson, who was the executive at the time and all of a sudden I found him playing some games around me which I . . . which dissuaded me a little bit from having as much . . . I just thought he was a good executive and had done a great job. But they never have come in. We gave them the three hundred thousand dollars for three years and that was it.

Following that . . . with the planning entity becoming bigger and bigger and more responsive and the ...[t.p.]... one of the ...[t.p.]... C.E.T.A., the government program, for all the non-profit agencies for the city of Los Angeles. It was an eleven million dollar contract. We had very good results from it, however, during the course of the merger ...[t.p.]... go to Bill Robinson's office ...[t.p.]... let him know that AID's organizing, you're not. ...[t.p.]... said, "I'll tell you what, if you're able to organize a ____ staff, that's one thing against you and I'm not asking ...[t.p.]... professional staff." ...[t.p.]... program and they came in, so then ____ to not the seat ...[t.p.]... because ...[t.p.]... to organize both ...[t.p.]... communication somehow or another, but I can't say that for sure, but I have a feeling because it was a weak union. That became another part of our United Way system. ...[t.p.]... sell this discretionary fund distribution committee and initially that was very difficult because the committee to distribute had to have a percentage of people from Red Cross and from the health agencies so they could feel that they're not being left out, so you could see everybody is getting somewhat of the same percentage into those fields or into those agencies and it was about four to five years really ...[t.p.]... good, we did a lot of things that were good but it was not necessarily a free spirit type of looking at total needs, but we overcame that and that was the key part. The percentage started changing for United Way because we started putting in for five hundred thousand to go funding new agencies. ...[t.p.]... hundred thousand dollar grant to the underserved geographies. You had to know that L.A. as a community, as a county, grew up where the major cities were, the smaller communities never really had any infrastructures. So we were starting to do planning in these areas that were completely isolated. We entered a situation by which day care became a major issue in our planning ____ -- now this did not get funded by the discretionary fund distribution but we funded . . . we made a loan of five hundred thousand from United Way to fund a capital for a day nursery on one side, we wanted to develop a day care center on each of the quadrants of downtown L.A. so people could . . . unfortunately that didn't always

happen but. We funded a study relative to food distribution and we developed an agency which later got a Bush, President Bush, what do call it? points of light. ...[t.p.]... got president of this entity by that time, this study of a fellow by the name of Malcolm Curry who was a trustee of 'SC, he was a former head of Hughes Aircraft, we had him involved in the study of all the supermarkets, the food and how it was being sent here and there but it was not in an organized fashion and we had the trucking association to do some . . . it was really, the studies, the various studies that might be valuable if I could find the paper, update it too, which I couldn't find after taking one quick look but I'll keep looking.

But it was talking about -- we got the county to look into a program, we found out that the foster children had no health programming from childhood up, to get a program whereby they got this, this and this and we got that passed. We got the county health department to work with us in setting what should be and then we went before the board of supervisors and . . . one of the things that's interesting is the supervisors kind of vote on transferring the county employees from AID to United Way, which we ultimately got ____ on the vote but it was a very interesting thing, I'll come back to that, when do we want to get together again? You didn't know you were going to get into this did you? *[tape stopped]*

At the time that we regionalized or decentralized, one of the key elements was how to distribute the money to the regions. It became a major factor and with the diversity of the community, how to make sure we had a belief that we were understanding the problems of the inner city as well as the total suburbs of Los Angeles. A committee was created under the chairmanship of Victor Carter, who had real acceptance in each of the minority communities for all that he had done with each of them. And we had on it: Herb Carter, who had been a person, in this era around 1970-71, who had come into from front of lack of doing particular things in our life; a Richard Martinez, who at that time was the vocal, strong activist of the East side, who was completely against anything to do with the ...[t.p.]... original makeup of our community and that anything that had happened, the traditional aspects; and Arthur Takay(?), who I just saw has just died, who was a labor leader. Interestingly enough, I can't tell you who the other two members were but I can tell you those three because of what they represented and we tried to come to some conclusions; one, we had the basic support of a lot of agencies ...[t.p.]... we had to come to the conclusion that we're not going to do allocations centrally, all agencies were going to have to go to the various regions for their money, so the local areas would come to know that the major agency headquartered

in downtown was serving them, which they probably didn't know, and to also make sure we did not impact them in a way that they couldn't keep on punching. What was determined, and this was before the merger with the planning councils, we asked the private councils to give us some methodology by which we could come to a breaking up of the money. They came back with an objective criteria of sixteen social objectives, breakdowns, that could be utilized in an averaging, showing what the impact was in each of the regions. Sieg Horowitz, who was not on the committee, after seeing it initially suggested that we then put an application of a weighting of one to five, since there were five regions, according to an average salary, average income for each of the five areas showing the ability to pay for these services. So in coming to this forty-one percent of the monies came to the central region. We weren't aiming for it, it just happened to be, and as far as the agencies themselves were concerned as to how they would be budgeting, we indicated that every agency that's total service was within the boundaries of a region, that agency would only be budgeted by that region. If an agencies services went across two regions they would have hearings in both regions and then there would be a coming together to make sure the agency didn't get compromised by the actions of one versus the other. If they're all five, they went to all five regions. I think I indicated this, that when I first came all budgeting was done centrally unless the services were completely within one of the fourteen areas. We took note, that in 1968 the Catholic charities was about to close the Long Beach office because of the lack of funds and we then realized that we didn't have a single person from the Long Beach area on the budget committee downtown analyzing what should be done with the Catholic charities budget. It gave a true indication to us that we had to make sure that the geography had a voice in how the money was spent. So, what we had accomplished by regionalization was to bring an objective criteria to allocating the monies, we did say in the first year of regionalization, all agencies would be grandfathered at an allocational level on what they had the prior year and we would work to make sure that nobody could compromise that first year and by that time we'd be able to work out the problems. Now, following that aspect of allocations come the question, how does a region allocate its money? Because in each region we had created a similar type of structure with a budget committee but now we had budget panels with divisions for youth services, family services, health services and for general committee(?) organization. ...[t.p.]... division chair and the panel chairs because there would be two, three, or four panels under each of these divisions, would make up their regional budget committee -- and the chairman,

vice-chairman, and three members-at-large would come down to be a part of the policy setting of the overall allocation committee with the corporation, and this was similar for agency relations, this was similar for planning, in terms of how they would bring representation to the corporation. This, therefore, made sure that the committees had the voice of the total geography and not just who you happen to put on from downtown.

The question of priority setting, after we had merged the councils, became a key element. United Way of America had, at that time, it had just been about five years, was developing what was known as the United Way of America Service Identification System. UWASIS. This had definitions of programs within functions. So we had these definitions accepted in each of the geographies and the planning group within each region set priorities of one to five to be enhanced at the ultimate to be phased out at the lowest. That gave priorities to each of the regions and this was brought into the corporation as a whole, in fact, as our policy and our direction. It became a very important element of studying how to allocate money to geographies. As I have indicated to you, the discretionary fund distribution committee was the setting aside free money became an important element in terms of how to use some of our new money in other directions. And this followed what was coming after the priorities from the regions. I had gotten up to the point or the question of the food shelter and the transportation aspects.

Ed Hummel: Before you do that, now the time frame on that earlier period was?

Frank McNamara: The question of the setting of the sixteen objective criteria -- weighted -- would have been done in around 1971. The question of the priorities, well the development of UWASIS, would have been around 1973/74. The implementation of it came in the latter part of the 1970's, which was following actually the merger of AID, which took place. I don't know whether I touched upon the merger of AID or not, and how we brought them in. Yeah, because I think I got into the question of CETA and all of that aspect. The personnel aspects, back in 1971, of who should be the regional vice-presidents since we had fourteen area executives was a significant thing because now the regions were going to be much bigger with much broader responsibilities. I just came across up there, the letters from the various area executives had volunteers sent to me trying to say they shouldn't be their regional VP for our office at all, even to the extent that we had a group from one area come in and make a demand to our chairman and vice-chairman of our

personnel committee following which our board chairman involved said, "You're going to have to be very big and take him." But I said, "Well, just give me time." We were able to offset that demand because what we also had created was major jobs at the corporation and so with the regional VP job being a big job and with the central geography being key in terms of what it weighed upon the representation how to work with the minorities I went to a fellow by the name of Joe Maldonado who had hid(?) on the County Poverty Program for years here, who had left and gone back to the Poverty Program in Washington and become the number two person nationally. He being of Hispanic background, I said if we could get Joe back he certainly has the reputation in the community and so forth, I don't know whether I could get him to come back. I called him in Washington, he was taking a trip for the Poverty Program to Denver, and I asked him to come on over to visit. I got him interested at which time he then said he would be willing to be an applicant. Now, I had a committee of eighteen people for the personnel . . . to pick this: three people from each of the five regions but they were selected by the board chairman and instead of doing . . . certainly the two regions where I had the most push. We had leaders who were well recognized as leaders in their community but who had not been involved directly with United Way, but it was a way by which we could get them involved as I interviewed twenty-five people this was a way to get them feeling the responsibility of whoever we put in there. The major entities in that particular community, they were not really representative for the Jewish community so I got the volunteer head of the Jewish Federation of that particular community to be one of them. I got the volunteer head of the Boy Scouts which was the one powerful agency in that particular region as well as I picked a key person who had been a former board chairman of the United Way in that area but was the head of a retail company. We went through the interviews, we had eight people interviewed for the five jobs and we certainly had the two people who had the local pressure put on them interviewed. Now the question is how do you come to a conclusion amongst eighteen people as to who the five should be and where they should serve. I have to tell you, Judge Roberts, who was then the head of Teledyne, who was on the committee, came up with a fantastic solution. He said, "Why don't you prepare a slip of paper and we vote one, two, or three whether we think the person would be very good regional vice-president, whether they would be a moderate, and three, we don't think he should be a vice-president. Not assign them to a region but just vote and see how you come out on a balance of giving weighting to one, two, and three situations. So that's what we did. It was amazing. Maldonado came out

unanimous and Dave Sanders came out unanimous and Lloyd Nolan came out unanimous. So those three were easy. Now, the interesting part of the story is that the second board chairman of United Way had been a publisher of a newspaper and a key leader in the community where the most pressure was coming out of. I called him and I said, "Lookit, this fellow didn't rank in the top five, it's been a very objective thing. We'll put a person down there who was unanimous and who relates easily to that particular community makeup. What I will do, I want to make sure if I work them, I will have that individual become the head of corporate agency relations as a vice-president." The feeling down there was all I was trying to do was bring him into the corporation so that I could fire him! That was so far from the truth, all I wanted to do was use a person who had been an agency executive himself and he would relate. So, that's what we did in terms of . . . I was able to have other staff person become the head of agency relations and an assistant vice-president in the central region who was black, so therefore we had the minority aspect completely able to be interfaced with. That was a key part of the regionalization aspect was getting the right staff and I have to say that I feel very proud of all that we had. When Maldonado left us he went to become the head of region nine H.E.W.. Ed ____ what you saw in the film, who had been the head of our sort of community relations, what had been the old urban coalition which we had merged in, went with him to become the associate head of H.E.W., for region nine. Al Cooper who was my number two person not responsible for campaigning went on to be an executive in Minneapolis and then to New York and then to ...[t.p.]... time when we were vulnerable, fellow who's the region ...[t.p.]... relations at that time, went on to become the head of Miami's United Way.

Ed Hummel: They did some good choosing, everybody.

Frank McNamara: Fellow who was my number one region vice-president became the head of the Cleveland United Way. So it was some interesting staff aspects so the question of following regionalization, change of our policy was determined, the voice going to the regions, the conclusions of the health agencies after the merger with AID, we had a smooth running situation until all of a sudden we had a situation whereby there was interest by the west end of San Bernadino of becoming a part of our United Way.

Our region in the San Gabriel Valley really was not a natural in so far as once you go over Kellog hill, Pomona did not relate to Pasadena really, nor

Pasadena relate to Pomona. The west end in Pomona was a natural region because they did it to relate one to one _____. After a due amount of process a merger was brought about and we brought up a . . . we separated the Pomona valley and put it with the west end of San Bernadino and made it a separate region ____ Mount Baldy.

Ed Hummel: Is that part of greater Los Angeles United Way?

Frank McNamara: It was at that time. It went over the ____ boundary. I had always felt, personally, what was necessary, in truth, decentralization working as it was working, but the natural for this particular area was the Ventura-Los Angeles-the west end of San Bernadino and Orange County, should be one United Way with about nine regions, because even in our existence with the five and the six regions certainly the northern part of what was our Long Beach region, Long Beach-Palos Verdes which came up through Whittier. Whittier and Downey were more related to Br____-Placencia than they did to Long Beach and Long Beach related to Garden Grove more than Fullerton did to Garden Grove. You might have had to create two other types of structures in between and certainly if you ____ off the west end of San Fernando Valley to go with the east end of Ventura you would have knocked out all the types of competition which was taking place over accounts as to whether there was people from L.A. or people from Ventura working there, and you would have had a similar set up priorities being able to be established with the social indicators and all. From a business standpoint, the major accounts were headquartered in downtown and we were running system-wide campaigns or coordinating campaigns out of L.A. for these communities and it created a whole lot of "who struck john(?)" over the production of whether they were getting their fair share or not getting their fair share and you would have gotten all of that written off and able to take place. But, it was unfortunate that my successor evidently, I mean, you had an area out there in the west end of San Bernadino which was the greatest growth area there was in the whole area, but he somehow created ill will and it had been a new coming together and by the time the board fired him there was lack of confidence in that organization and they were meaning to pull out and take Pomona Valley with them, needless to say. Prior to that I, some part of this might have to be edited out because of the difference in personalities. ...[t.p./... DeWahl who was the board chairman at the time this person got fired had called me to see if I could keep Mount Baldy together. I had a meeting with a couple of key leaders out

there and came to the conclusion that it might be able to be done and was agreed to that by the time they hired a new executive and they said the one person it could not be would be Herb Carter, not that they were against Herb as a person necessarily, but the letters that had gone up there which had created the ill will they knew probably were drafted by my successor but they were signed by Herb who by this time had been board chairman and therefore he was as much at fault as Lear was. But if he was not the executive, it was agreed upon that there would be a meeting at Edison with power structure from downtown L.A. meeting with the power of Mount Baldy to say that they wanted it kept in one . . . but as soon as Herb Carter was elected the executive, the thing never _____. And M___ DeWahl had been told that this was _____, so therefore. I don't think that they had been b___ by anyone, one of the reasons and one of the bad things in the succession was that they felt that the board of United Way was running away from their own financial status prior to his being fired because they were spending monies out of reserves and the cost aspect had gotten too high and they were the only ones raising the issue and nobody else was following up with it so they were being held to be people from the outer-lands that were not respected, and that was the other aspect of it. And this is one reason why I said the person should have been fired at least a year earlier than he was. One of the things he had done was -- they come in with the idea, we had a long-range planning process about to start, he spent untold money on that process and it was all on diversity but nothing upon leadership and by the time he was fired there wasn't a single chief executive left on the board of directors of United Way. This was a key part of things that happened thereafter, diversity is necessary and valuable, but it has to be the leaders of the groups and it has to be the leaders of the business community to effect ...[t.p.]... at the time of the merger of the planning councils there was all kinds of debate going on nationally, in the major cities as to whether the planning council should be a part of United Way or whether it should be a separate entity. Those on the other side said, you compromise our ability to be objective when the planning council is tied into the funding vehicle. The argument, which is my side, is planning councils without an ability to implement anything lose leadership and therefore could never implement what they objectively plan for, whereas if they're a part of the funding entity and the leadership sees a need to find a objective study on a particular issue and they delegate it to the planning entity, the planning entity has the ability to bring, because they can be nominated by the board chairman, some of the leadership into such a committee to make that objective study as well as to come back with some

recommendations which would therefore be accepted because it has been delegated to them and some of the people have been nominated by them and then you have the monies to implement _____ study. That has always been . . . but that was a fight that went on ad infinitum across this country as to whether they should or should not be merged. Unfortunately _____ times, there is very little planning taking place, in my estimation, there is always the middle-size community which is somewhat homogeneous, can still do it, but the major big, big cities, with all the mergers of business and the lack of any homegrown leadership and different expectations of chief executives and with the development of community relations, offices, and public affairs offices there's no buy-in to the social needs by the leadership of the major cities, they react but they don't act and that's unfortunate. That's what we had going, where we were acting as you'll see in those folders of the ten social problems we were addressing, we addressed major issues and we had the ability to go before the County Board of Supervisors and Health Services for Foster Children and we had the head of the Health Department coming with us, saying this wasn't necessary. We could get a five-to-nothing vote to put some money in to developing such a system. This, today, does unfortunately take place, the whole development of the Info-Line is a situation which had been existent for years before we took over the study and then brought in the County Welfare Department to be a partner with us as we were called(?).

Now, we increased our allocation _____ing the InfoLine of about a hundred-forty thousand to five hundred something-odd thousand, in order to match 1.5 million from the County, it was a separate funding situation so this is what could take place when you did your planning with the funding and you had some available dollars. Now, leadership had structure . . . I've always, and I don't know whether I said this earlier or not, I've stated that any organization can be successful if they address themselves to two sets of initials. S.L.S.: Structure, Leadership, and Standards; structure in which you can reach the total community of which you're responsible, the program is responsible, United Way you talk about the total community, an agency, depending upon the geography, a constituency, whatever it may be; leadership. *[end of tape]* . . . because leaders never recruit upward you always recruit at the same level or down in order to have freedom of speech type of situation, so while you're talking labor, management . . . standards, standards of programming, standards of involvement in terms of timing and time given, etcetera, standards in terms of giving, because while you had a guideline to giving called "Fair Share" that guideline was always an average of your most

generous forty percent, that meant being an average that someone was above it and some were below it but it was the standard by which the more generous givers gave. So you needed to have that type of giving done by the leaders who were involved because as a second set of initials, E.O.S.: Enroll or "I" Involve, you got to enroll those leaders or enter them into the program to the concepts, to the philosophy, to what standards are, and then you solicit them for their level of giving because what's going to happen is the most generous givers are going to give at this level and by the time it reaches the most uninterested person, it's going to bring the average down so what you're hoping to do is bring up the average of the overall community to a level that brings success. Now, in order to bring that if you're going to solicit the corporations of the banks or the utilities which are going to set the standards for your community, you had to have some idea of where the most generous giving was of these groups elsewhere as well as _____, so you challenge the leadership to set the same set of standards for this community. So, the Cleveland executive used to say, because Cleveland was the highest per capita giving in the country overall with United Way, there were higher gifts per capita in smaller communities but in major cities . . . he used to say, "Frank, you know the giving levels of the people in Cleveland better than I do!" I was always trying to get the information from there, and as Paul Miller said to me one time when we came to the _____ gas corporate gift, which was a very big corporate gift, he said, "I think Frank, from what I can study from the gas company perspective, you're asking us to give the upper sixteenth!" (laughs) It was that type of rapport that we could have because they knew what we were doing was trying to build success and service to people and in the discussions, I think I said earlier, when Dina Beaumont came out of the meeting with AID, when they turned down I request to go for another year and she just said, "Frank, I've been a member of labor and AID is known as a labor organization _____, they were talking about their institution, the chief executives were talking about human needs, I learned a lesson -- that everything is not stereotyped."

But that came off because of all this involvement and the question of success therefore becomes enroll or in solicit. At every level of voluntary structure, dead(?) is the structure, a lot of campaigns say, "We can't staff that many places if you have all these people across the top." I say, "What you're admitting to is you're not going to staff them down at the bottom." It's better to try to get them exposed and so, in a voluntary system, the more horizontally your structure is, which forces you or requires you (since Louie Lumbourgh says you never force a

volunteer), you make it possible, require to get more volunteer leadership into your act and that's true if every community organization would think that way. There is no rationale for any of them to be anything but successful, there's so much leadership, so much money in the Los Angeles area. Well, that is, and you know, it built up . . . when I came here we were raising about 12.6 million as a United Way and AID was giving to United Way about 7 million dollars, so we had about 19 million. Upon retiring we were at 85 million. Structure-wise we had gone from, in the allocations process, from 200 people being involved at the corporation to 1200 people being involved through the regions, we had from 5 divisional chairman on the campaign we went to 210 division chairman in the campaign. Through the ability of soliciting the staff first then the board because in "How to Interpret Social Welfare" in social work graduate school, if they have the book "How to Interpret Social Welfare" -- it starts with a series of circles, it starts off with staff and then it says the board, then it says the committees of the board, then it says volunteer involvement and then out to the general public. It just goes out that way. Well, we had to set the standards inside with 210 people giving properly for their campaigns, and then with the merger of AID which brought about the ability to have an ability to speak about controlling our own destiny with the major corporations all apart of one with the exception of the entertainment industry. Now the entertainment industry, unfortunately, is a very serious problem to this community, it is still a separate entity, and the arguments they use are the fact that they are not accepted downtown -- the reason they're not accepted downtown is because they're not a part of the community vehicle. If they would get involved in that one entity, you'd all of a sudden see people coming in and being a part of the allocation process, being a part of the planning process, being a part of the campaign process, and they'd develop a philosophy and, hopefully, the new administration of United Way can develop the community organization techniques to bring them in because now there has been such a change in the entertainment industry most of them don't remember why the Permanent Charities of the entertainment industry was ever formed. For the monies that are available in this community, the greatest amount of money potential lies within the entertainment industry which is headquartered here and in which their leadership could really be a part of helping to bring this community along.

I'm going to end there until I see the transcript, except to go back into the national movement which you said you wanted to have some knowledge of:

1887 is the first joint appeal in this country and that was in Denver. It was when two ministers, a rabbi, and a priest joined together to have a joint appeal. 1913 was the beginning of the community chest movement and that was done in Cleveland, who really held on this heritage to the extent that when I was called back into the Navy 1950-52, the assistant navigator who was on board ship with me (I was the navigator), we were talking one day [and he] knew that the community chest, he had worked in a small machine shop and he knew the community chest movement had been started in Cleveland! That just impressed me tremendously. Around 19-, in the middle '20's, I don't know the exact year, there was in Pittsburgh, I believe, the first council of social agencies called the Council in Social Planning. Now you had a program during the Depression to highlight some monies who were in international starvation and hunger deals, but there were part of the local chests. Following the war the (by the way, none of the community chests had Red Cross, none of them had health agencies, etcetera as part of their campaigns), after the war ended, the health agencies became a very significant thing, mainly led by polio, who the person of Basil O'Connor(?) was the leader of the law _____ and who utilized the government resources to build the campaign structures in each of the states. I know, in Massachussetts, [he helped create] a free lunch program.

Ed Hummel: So they used people affiliated with that program to do it.

Frank McNamara: That's how they did it and they built the volunteer structure through that and they got other than those people but that was the foundation. With the National Health Agencies being more prominent and the Red Cross now having come out of their war-time fundraising, which was really a tremendous job of administration and I'll go back and tell that little story which is something I think that most people don't know. Then came the desire by the three auto manufacturers in Detroit and the U.A.W. to consolidate and they created with the staff leadership of a fellow by the name of Walter Laidlaw, who brought about the creation of the United Foundation of Detroit and the United Fund of Detroit. Initially the Red Cross would not come in because Basil O'Connor(?) was also the president of Red Cross and he did not believe that f_____ campaigns. This is in 1948/49. Detroit just said, "Fine, Red Cross chapter in Detroit will just withdraw from the national Red Cross and we will fund . . . the resulting discussions . . . ultimately, the national Red Cross voted a policy of local option to the Red Cross chapters with approval

to come from national but the ability to consider it and therefore, Red Cross went into the united funding to try it . . . all the major health agencies went in with the exception of _____. Basil O'Connor(?) resigns as president of Red Cross over the change in policy.

1953-54, the American Cancer Society decided they were going to test their own way of going in to _____ off polio and they knew they had a problem if they stayed in any united fund so they told Detroit they were getting out. They withdrew but then Detroit set up a Michigan Cancer Fund and all the monies were allocated to the Michigan Cancer Fund. Now came 1955, it was really basically, desires by community chests and then united funds at that time to organize to try to get national health agencies into their campaigns. I recall, because in 1955 I went to New____-News and in 1957 we created a united fund and we wanted to have it include health agencies and when they would not come we did a complete study, at that time, of how their monies were being spent between research, services, education, and we determined if we raise 98 thousand dollars for them we would do sixty percent more in all areas than the

1____ health agencies were doing. We created a health foundation which, the first health foundation had been created in Durham, North Carolina when the health agencies were joined, where there were three medical schools, and they were giving the money for research right there ____-North Carolina medical. We created a research committee which we had the local volunteers, including some doctors, meeting with the deans of the two Virginia medical schools and the three from North Carolina and they said the biggest money needed in research was money to get a project off the ground so they could apply to the national institutes or to apply for a large foundation grant and so . . . they each were raising money inside from staff to do that so this was how we started allocating our money for research for that health foundation. It became a situation right up through 1961-62 . . . it was a movement that took place for a period of probably ten years, Pittsburgh created one, the fellow who ran the Durham one went up and ran the one in Pittsburgh, a fellow by the name of Ed Graeff. Now in about 1965-66 the national organization decided to have a study done on the s____ industry, a trade association as I've indicated to you, how should they be structured, up to this time they had a mix of volunteers from communities and professional staff, like all of the ten largest cities' executives sat on the board, what was originally Community Chest and Council of America then became the United Community Funds and Councils of America, which later became the United Way of America. Now this was still the United Community Funds and Councils at this time in the 1960's and I came here in 1967 and became a part of the study in, which was 196- .../t.p./... ultimately did, which was key to United Way boards(?), too. All of us voted that it should need no professional staff on the board of United Community Funds and Councils of America.

Ed Hummel: You're talking about nationally?

Frank McNamara: Yeah, because what would happen is we're in that stuff day in and day out we're talking the thing day in and day out, we go to a board meeting and we inundate the poor volunteers who're sitting there trying to make a decision on something and you got the various feelings of each community coming at you and so, therefore, we were killing what we needed to have which was some volunteer leadership. So one of the recommendations of the study were no professional staff should be on the board of United Community Funds and Councils. Secondly, that there should be a structure within the organization whereby the professionals met to

give input that later became the National Professional Advisor Committee. There is another thing that the study came with a "retirement" (this was 1970) of the National Executive ...[t.p.]... this meant have the recommendations come in and that what we needed to do was develop real leaders, because there were more national corporations and we needed to have access to them for understanding what the social needs were in the various communities they were in. We needed to have input to the large national media and these leaders would have input and so on. So there was a personnel committee and all, some of us, I know I was interviewed and asked to take the job and I had just been here for two years so I wasn't about to move and I wasn't interested anyway, that wasn't my type of leading.

...[t.p.]... Bill _____ who has been _____ cited of late, unfortunately, came in as the executive. He had done, in various local communities, he'd been at Columbia, South Carolina -- South Bend, Indiana -- Miami, Florida -- and then took _____ jobs, he was bright, energetic, and Bill took over as the National Executive and I have to say that he did a fantastic job, he unfortunately ruined the last two or three years of his life but he did a job that really helped every community in this country. He built a leadership structure second to none. He had happened to have two or three key guys in Miami who helped him (volunteers) Jim(?) -- a writer(?) for the newspapers, and a fellow by the name of Brisco who was with Exxon, he became the head of Exxon, those people were really key leaders almost right from the start.

Pete Malrich(?)'s company did the study, nationally, of what should be the role, and you might want to look through the archives to find a copy of that, there might be a copy, it might be interesting. I'll always remember the interview of firms, Charlie Davidson, who was their Chicago partner came in and it happened to be the B____ Ewing who was board chairman of the United Community Funds and Councils of America, who you saw in this film who had been my board chairman in Rhode Island, _____ was the board chairman at the time this was taking place and Charlie Davidson was the partner that came in, well Charlie Davidson happened to have been the partner in a local accounting firm L____-B____, Hanover in Rhode Island before it merged with Pete Malrich and he then became a partner and so in came Charlie Davidson who had been a leading volunteer in Rhode Island, here sits the chairman of the committee being B____ Ewing, here sits me as a Los Angeles now, executive. It was interesting.

I'll always remember the question was asked as Charlie made the presentation, "What's the difference between a manager and a partner?" -- because

we talked about the manager . . . Charlie's quick reaction was, "Money" (laughs) and that was it. That's on the side.

The study did a lot of things in terms of really creating a strong national interest. One of the things that Aron Way(?) did was have a study made of whether the office which had been in New York should stay in New York or should be in Washington near the governmental programming because of our tie to some of the governmental programs. I was a part of that study committee, ultimately ...[t.p.]... head of the airlines ...[t.p.]... made the recommendation to move to Washington, because we had so much relationship with the government. The name United Way had been created in Los Angeles just as the name Community Chest had been born in Cleveland and the United Fund had been born in Detroit, it identified the fact that the United Way was just not fundraising it was planning, allocations, it was a united way of doing things, not just fundraising. Aron Way(?) ____ the name got a committee to look at the factor of trying to get everybody in the country to have a similar name so that people wouldn't get confused by Community Chest, United Fund, United Appeal, that we should all at least try, not that he could enforce that but that he could ____ pulpit(?) the idea and the concept and bring it through the National Professional Advisory Committee which would get people involved and so forth.

So the name United Way was created; they had to get permission to use it from us. The name here is really not United Way, Inc. -- Los Angeles, it's United Way Inc. period, if anybody wants to really be technical. He's the one who created the UWASIS getting some definitions ____, he created a thing called N.A.V., National Academy of Volunteerism, which was a technical educational program for staff who didn't have the social work background to get the know-how of how to do the job and write programs and so forth. A fantastically . . . and then bring in agencies, he was bringing in agency executives and they were being taught in these technical programs, a fantastic concept. The unfortunate part of it is it had to be done because the graduate schools of social work, as I indicated, had dropped the whole private sector back there in the 1960's when poverty money was available and they could be big-time in urban planning and urban . . . without thinking that everything was traditional it was the private sector that had to have things new(?). That's where the schools of social work left and left out the volunteer involvement of people to understand why these programs are necessary. So there were two wrongs: one, professional heads, and two, volunteer participation. He had the involvement of labor in a very big way. Joe Burn, at the time, appeared in ____

workers of America, very big, followed by Glen Watts, followed by Louie Martin, followed by ...[t.p.]... who was head of the CWA in New York, Mort Bauer(?) who's now head of the CWA had the . . . I mean he had relationships with Glen Kirkman(?), he really was the key force in starting an organization called Volunteerism which is Brian O'Connell's entity at this point, he's the executive of it, which has all entities _____ separate entities. He really did fantastic things, he brought about standards in giving, because he had Tom Clarson(?) of the B of A and Peter McCullough of Xerox, and so forth, they were able to go to IBM and they changed IBM's giving by three times of what they were giving out to the communities. Went from 1.2 million to 3.6 million in terms of what they were giving United Way's, so that is how they broke it up not how United Way of America broke it up because they could never get any definition of how you'd allocate the money, they could get them to increase monies but the people that he had, he had Cliff _____ an Exxon board chairman, he had Jim Robinson of American Express, Dick _____ of United Airlines, Mary Gates, mother of Bill Gates, was the chairman of the executive committee, Tommy Frist(?) of H_____ Corp. of America, you think of a name and they were involved this process and then he started United Way International to try and bring volunteers into it internationally. There are 21 Community Chests in Japan today, and there's Community Chests in Hong Kong, Signapore(?), in Australia, I went to New Zealand to consult with the Auckland . . .

Ed Hummel: Isn't that interesting? That's a whole other piece isn't it?

Frank McNamara: It really is. United Way International is a strong piece. This is all a part of the whole movement which got all set aside completely because he was there, evidently, two or three years too long. He got involved with some women and he divorced his wife and with that he was broke apart. Not that he thought he was a saint before that happened, I have no idea. But he did do the job which every community got the benefit of and it's unfortunate that that gets lost in a . . . because that's a piece which could be done and I'll see if I can't put some stuff together on it, but this is a broad history of it.

I gave you the history of the Combined Federal Campaign back earlier. Let's see what else ...[t.p.]... a great research department, _____ programs in for research and giving of national corporations.

Ed Hummel: What is your sense, at this time, of the status of research in terms of nationally and locally with the United Way but . . . I have the impression earlier from your remarks that that had declined significantly and . . .

Frank McNamara: Perhaps it's not declined . . . my son's at Louisville, so when I was there at Christmas-time I called Rob R____, who's the executive, his father had been at one time been the head of the Philadelphia United Way and I knew him very well and he had been a young executive and . . . you know, I talked to him a little about the issues of selling donor options, selling this and that in allocations and budgeting.

He said, "Well, we, in this size community, don't get effected by that too much. There's mainly, where you have diverse groups who organize like the Brotherhood Crusade, which is a . . . I don't even know if I touched upon that, did I? No. See the major cities kept all these little groups who now come in to try to take their action of dividing versus trying to unite and the Brotherhood Crusade was the first, there are many that have come along since, not with the same type of power because the black group has taken the same position of confrontation versus inter-relationship all the way, and there's been others prior but they don't have the leadership. They have some policital leadership now but they don't have the . . . I may have touched upon it a little bit but the Brotherhood Crusade was created in 1968 -- going away from the national, a little bit, coming back to the local -- this is a follow on to the Watts riots. There were groups of leaders who came together an entity representing about 48 different groups. They finally decided they should have a joint appeal, I may have touched upon this but I'm not sure. A fellow by the name of Walter Braymond(?) who worked for Pr____ and Community Services at the time, which is now People's Community Services _____. He was not the executive, he was just a staff person . . . and he put together with an ad agency (which I can't remember the name of) a program of what he was going to try to solicit monies throughout all business for these 48 black organizations, which included us ...[t.p.]... they were not social agencies at the time ...[t.p.]... they went to Louie Lumborg, ____ Firestone, and ____ Maclellen(?), and asked them to be chairman of their campaign -- each of whom called me to say ...[t.p.]... that was the third person I went to. ____ Maclellen(?) had been a key figure of the Watts riots in trying to build jobs for people in the inner cities and they worked out of a chamber _____, and he had a paint company that made money zoning the entire . . . he was just doing a very, very good job in trying to get jobs.

"Hey Frank, they tell me that you won't meet with them."

And so, being new to the community I took a look at my calendar and I figured I'll meet with them. I said, "I will call you within 10 minutes." I saw Victor Carter was going to be in my office in the next appointment at 10 o'clock. ...[t.p.]... said, "Lookit, we'll be glad to work with them, our planning segment will work with you to develop what you see as the needs and the priorities. We'll take you on as a special agency to allocate monies to on a contract basis."

Well, they didn't come back. So I had Victor write them a letter saying what we had offered so we could use it with corporations, with labor, to show what we'd offered. Their campaign never got anyplace. About a couple of years later they got some money from AID on a designated basis. When we regionalized we had a meeting at the top of the L.A. Club, which is on the top of the Union Bank branch on Wilshire. We had Tom McDaniels, S__ Mead(?), and it was obvious those two were big time over their; we had Herb Carter there because he had, in between, become president of the Brotherhood Crusade, and we had talked with him as to the things that were needed were to develop leadership of the black community, to develop priorities of the black community and all this and he was sick(?) of this.

...[t.p.]... came and there was Bremant(?) and two others and we made our full presentation of what we were going to do with them and farther(?). ...[t.p.]... and then we'd bring ...[t.p.]... by then, under the board ...[t.p.]... it was a total package. Once again we put it in writing.

Now then, Walter Bremand(?) becomes the head of an organization called the National Black United Fund. He gets one started in New York ...[t.p.]... the question was, what to do with them on a national scale since they were going to be showing themselves. So a committee got set up. Fellow by the name of Wyle Carter, who'd been the head of the Washington D.C. University, had to be ...[t.p.]... I would guess someplace ...[t.p.]... Cunningham, who was a councilman at the time in the city of L.A. ...[t.p.]... Bakewell has now come on to the scene, is a local president of the ...[t.p.]... if you read the papers much you'd see alot about Danny Bakewell, he was the guy out in front for everything that . . . _____ attack, attack, attack. He also made a fortune on properties and political actions, I mean he's a big property owner now and down through various -- I can't prove and I shouldn't say anything ...[t.p.]... in terms of how did he amass the monies to get into the . . . but he is and he wears a great big diamond on his ring. Well Danny and I, as I get back there, who's representing the National Black

United Fund, but it's Dave Cunningham, Danny Bakewell, Walter Breman and this one guy from New York! I said, "Why didn't we have the meeting in Los Angeles? It would've saved us all airfare." (laughs)

We made, once again, a discussion relevant to what are the things that they wish to accomplish. We had merged AID ...[t.p.]... wants to be in the city and have a campaign. I said, "Why don't we have Tom Bradley set up the meeting?"

So we have Tom Bradley bring Bakewell, Breman, and Victor Carter and Joe Brandeman(?) and Jim Dickeson and Ron Miller, I mean, it was a good meeting. We met in the executive dining room with Tom Bradley ...[t.p.]... three meetings -- talked about what they wanted and came back and we even added something here. We added a place where we needed to have funds that we could use that are available on an instant basis so that if we see a need we can allocate it. ...[t.p.]... would give them fifty thousand dollars ...[t.p.]... you got to know that all during this whole thing the discussions that they don't recognize any of our agencies in serving the black community ...[t.p.]... Children's Hospital, Orthopedic Hospital, they're using a black board, they're using a black staff, it's ultimately a black ____ ...[t.p.]... Catholic charities, Visiting Nurses, they have a black board and a black staff! The only thing they would recognize was an agency that had a totally black constituency, totally black staff and totally black board and that was their . . . We had offered -- they wished also to have it be the United Way/Brotherhood Crusade Campaign. Well, we'd just gotten out of being the United Crusade Campaign which had Red Cross and the fact, having us, we could not then substitute at that point. We said, "We're all one community. We're glad to give you a separate type of partnership, like a health agency partnership," which is what we offered this time. "That will give you involvement on the board and on the committees of the board." By the way that's the one thing we did with PCC, at one point we made them an offer which would bring their total board in as part of our total board and we'd have a huge board where they'd have every single board member would be accepted.

Ed Hummel: PCC was?

Frank McNamara: Permanent Charities of the entertainment industry.

And that we would place six people in each of region one, four, and five, which was San Fernando Valley, Western, and Central, where the entertainment industry lived and worked under each of their boards. We would put three

members on each of those allocation committees and we offered them involvement to the nth nth degree. We would accept their allocation basis for the first three years now ...[t.p.]... the professional staff and the old town leaders(?) did not wish to give in to such a ...[t.p.]... but the Brotherhood Crusade is still in being, still has Danny Bakewell as its professional head, I don't know what they're raising today, probably two and a half, three million dollars a year, mainly out of the county and the city. However, when we pulled out of AID, we voted a policy that we would not campaign with any other entity or any other federation, we said we won't stop any other entity from having a campaign but all that would happen if we took another entity in would be to divide up the money we were raising rather than if they could raise the money and then bring some hard value to our . . . [end of side 6]

[tape missing ?]